“Russia must lose the war and Ukraine must win it”

Russia must lose the war and Ukraine must win it

Evacuations continue downstream of Kakhovka, in southern Ukraine, after the destruction of the dam, and the floods caused on both banks of the Dnieper. For Ukraine, Russia bears full responsibility for the disaster, accusations relayed by its Western partners. Like the Baltic countries, which are among kyiv’s closest allies within NATO. RFI was able to speak this Thursday, June 8 in Paris with the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, on the occasion of a meeting organized by the French Institute of International Relations.

RFI: Who do you think is responsible for the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in southern Ukraine?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Russia has been bombing civilian infrastructure since day one and constantly lying about the identity of the bombers. So I think from this experience it is very clear that we can definitely blame Russia and demand that they take responsibility. Ukraine must win the war and Russia must pay the price for all the damage caused.

On July 11, your country will host the NATO summit in Vilnius. Ukraine hopes to obtain guarantees as to its candidacy within the Alliance. Will you support this request?

I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine must become a member of NATO if we want the European continent to be safe. We can discuss when this should happen, but I think we have to commit very clearly to this point. Indeed, in 2008, we gave Ukraine the impression that it would be part of NATO, but it took 15 years for us to come back to the subject. We lost 15 years, and during that time Georgia was invaded, and Ukraine too. So I think it’s time to sit down and find a solution to make our promises come true.

But what solution is it? What do you expect from NATO members?

I think a binding commitment would be the best outcome. A binding commitment that would allow Ukraine to know what to expect and ensure that it is not a vague promise for the 15 coming years. You have to have a timetable, concrete steps, a kind of algorithm on how this work is going to unfold. And I can tell you it’s not an easy discussion. We have a little over a month left for that and I can’t tell you if we’ll get there.

It will also be a question of guarantees for Ukraine’s security, pending accession. Are you pushing for this? And what form should that take?

If it’s weak safeguards or supplying additional weapons to Ukraine, most people would think that’s not enough. If it comes to security guarantees like those that Sweden or Finland obtained until their accession, it is much stronger. This would suggest that the country will be defended in the event of an attack, perhaps not by the Alliance, but on a bilateral basis, which would constitute a security shield. So when we’re talking about that, it’s very, very important to look at the contents, what’s going to be inside the package.

You also expect NATO to strengthen its eastern flank…

Lithuania is in a special geographical situation: we are squeezed between Russia (the Kaliningrad enclave) and Belarus, and therefore our security issues are higher than they normally would be. We see that Russia is currently in a bad position in Ukraine, but if we project ourselves into the future, in 3, 5 or 7 years, we know that it will be able to rebuild itself. If there is no radical change in Moscow, then we will have two dangerous neighbors on our side.

But what do you actually expect from NATO? Additional soldiers, anti-aircraft defense? What do you need most?

I think the best deterrent is always to have troops on the ground. So we need more soldiers. After the first invasion of Ukraine in 2015, NATO took the decision to deploy detachments in the Baltic States. Today we have a German battalion in Lithuania and we think it works very well. Therefore, additional NATO troops would be a logical step after a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But the deployment of additional equipment and air defense means would also be very useful. So that we can have the feeling of being protected in the same way as countries further west.

Doesn’t Article 5 offer sufficient protection to the Baltic States?

This has been the case so far, no doubt. But looking to the future, one has to admit that Russia has crossed a psychological red line. This country is an aggressor that has justified a full-scale invasion against its neighbour. So the idea is that he could find a justification for another invasion. That’s what worries us. That is why we ask that this threat translate into further defense and reinforcement of the eastern flank.

Let’s talk about Ukraine again. In your opinion, has the counter-attack announced for months begun?

It’s hard to say ! Quite honestly, I’m one of those people who check Twitter every morning to see what’s new. But I have full confidence. Kyiv has shown great military and political skill when it comes to managing the set goals. The only remaining concern is: have we sent them enough equipment ? And if not, can we send them something more ?

Do you think the West has done enough or should have done more and still need to do more?

The only thing you can think of is that we could have done some things faster… You remember the debate in Ukraine when President Zelensky asked for ways to secure the skies above Kiev. At the time, a year ago, we said that it was not possible, that it would never be possible. A year later, they are successfully using Patriot systems. The same goes for the F-16. So I think we shouldn’t blame ourselves, but we shouldn’t make the same mistakes in the future. Let’s take into account that they are able to learn and use the equipment provided, that this equipment is very efficient and that we are able to deliver it. So if there’s something that can be delivered faster, I think it should be done.

What will be the relationship between your country and Russia after the war? If Ukraine has regained control of its territories, but Vladimir Putin is still in power, would you consider having a relationship with Moscow again?

For now, the only answer I can think of is deterrence. We want the strategy to be such that Putin never considers outside adventures again. It’s the only thing we’re thinking about right now. Does trust exist? No. Is there a need to restore trust? Unfortunately no. And there’s one thing we want: we want Russia to lose in Ukraine, we want Ukraine to win, and then whatever happens in Russia is Russia’s business. She will take care of it as she sees fit. But we must know that we are defended so as not to be attacked by Russia.

>> To read also:

rf-5-general