He followed minute by minute the rebellion of the boss of the Wagner mercenary group, on this surreal day of Saturday June 24. Convinced that Vladimir Putin’s power could topple, Mikhail Khodorkovsky even went so far as to call for “help” the “criminal” Yevgueni Prigojine in his march on Moscow, even if it meant getting rid of him later.
For one of the main Russian opponents, exiled in London since 2015, Prigojine’s coup revealed the fragility of Putin’s regime. If he did not succeed, other rebellions will take place sooner or later. And when they do happen, the Russian opposition (whose various members in exile met in the European Parliament at the beginning of June) will have to support them better this time, insists the former boss of the oil giant Yukos, who spent ten years in prison and in a labor camp on the borders of Siberia for defying the “tsar” and denouncing the corruption of his regime. Hot interview, carried out the day after Prigojine’s crazy escapade.
L’Express: Why do you think Yevgueni Prigojine chose this moment to launch his rebellion? Did he want to bring down Putin?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: I think he made this decision because he perceived an increasing risk that his group, Wagner, would be dissolved. According to the information I have, it was also possible that his own arrest was imminent. As for his objectives, at the beginning of his rebellion, he said he simply wanted to dismiss the leaders of the Ministry of Defense. Perhaps it was the truth: he did not verbally attack Putin, during this entire episode, even after Putin accused him of treason. Maybe his goals changed as the situation evolved, but it’s hard to know…
What does this episode reveal about Putin’s power? Does he come out weakened?
A very serious blow has been dealt to his reputation. The support he has in the army, in the population, has proven to be very weak. Neither the army nor the police tried to resist Prigozhin. And the people of Rostov welcomed him with open arms. This shows that the Kremlin leader’s popularity is much lower than previously thought: Prigozhin is not that popular, and yet people supported him. They’re so fed up with Putin that they’re ready to support anyone else…
You wrote on Twitter that what happened this weekend constitutes one of the most important political elements of the last twenty years in Russia. For what ?
What happened was a real possibility to change the current regime. Not necessarily in favor of Prigojine, but in favor of the political force that would have known how to use this situation to its advantage. Of the entire period that Putin has been in power, the crisis has come closest to knocking him out of power. It is regrettable that the opposition failed to seize the opportunity, but this display of Kremlin weakness means that events similar to the Prigozhin rebellion will not be long in coming. I am absolutely certain that we will see more such attempts in the next two years.
At the end of this weekend, Vladimir Putin is still in power… Are his days in the Kremlin numbered?
He certainly managed to contain the situation this time. But he comes out very weak. A Russian dictator cannot be ridiculous, he cannot be pitiful. Putin was, he fled Moscow in front of a few tanks going up to the capital [NDLR : son avion personnel s’est dirigé vers Valdaï, où se situe sa résidence]. It will need to stabilize, perhaps by strengthening repression. But what we saw this Saturday is that it is terribly easy to threaten power in Russia. It will give ideas to others.
If at the time when Prigozhin approached Moscow there had been an uprising in the capital, this uprising would have had a very significant chance of succeeding. Putin had fled Moscow, the leaders of the special services were completely disoriented and the power was on the ground, within reach of whoever wanted to pick it up.
The chances of this kind of scenario happening again are extremely high. All it takes now is for these types of actions to come to an end. The West must understand that a power shift is possible and can happen very quickly. If he does not bet on the coalition of Russian opponents, it is very likely that whoever emerges victorious in the next episode will not please him.
The opposition created a common platform – the Russian Action Committee [NDLR : fondé par Mikhaïl Khodorkovski et Garry Kasparov] to which belong almost all the representatives of its various currents. If the West recognizes this committee as its legitimate interlocutor, when this type of event happens again, the sequence could unfold differently. It’s time to bet on the right people…
How is Putin likely to react? By further hardening his power?
For Putin, there is no alternative to stepping up repression. To what extent he will achieve this and to what extent it will allow him to stay in power is difficult to predict at present.
Are we witnessing the end of Putin’s mode of governance, who reigned by playing the arbiters between different rival clans?
Putin is not going to change his methods of governance, he knows of no others.
Has Prigozhin completely failed?
We don’t know at the moment, because we don’t know what Putin and Prigozhin agreed on, the content of the compromise that was found. If Sergei Shoigu, the Minister of Defense, is replaced, Prigojine will have achieved his stated objective. But he lost much of his ability to act, and in particular the little support he could still have within the military hierarchy. He no longer poses a real threat to Putin, as he has been deprived of his fleet of military aircraft and heavy weapons, such as tanks and guns. This weakens his military capacity, which was the basis of his power.
Putin apparently sent Prigojine to Belarus… Why not eliminate him?
For Prigojine, being in Belarus is rather an advantageous exit: he has not been arrested, all charges against him have been dropped [selon l’annonce faite par le Kremlin le 24 juin] and it is in territory where the FSB [les services secrets russes] is not competent. Why not eliminate it? Putin may still need him in the war in Ukraine. The future of Prigozhin, in a way, now depends on the Ukrainian army. If it progresses and undermines the Russian army, Prigojine may be called back to the front. Otherwise, if the Russian army proves able to get by without him and without Wagner, he will be in very great personal danger.
Is this the end of the Wagner group?
I think Putin will try to reorient the Wagner group towards Africa and bring it under the control of the Ministry of Defense.
You felt that Prigozhin should be supported because nothing was worse than Putin. Wasn’t that risky?
I made it very clear that it was not Prigozhin who should be supported, nor his attempt to take Putin’s place. I was saying that we had to help Prigojine to go to Moscow. I don’t think Prigozhin wants to take Putin’s place, he doesn’t have that political ambition. This can be seen in the way his men behaved in Rostov, by not seizing civilian institutions. They contented themselves with taking control of the general staff and the military structures. I think the objective was not to raise Prigozhin but his ally Sergei Surovikin [NDRL : l’actuel commandant adjoint de l’opération militaire spéciale en Ukraine].
Prigozhin clearly understands that he has absolutely no support from the Russian elites. But if he had gone as far as Moscow, he could have destabilized the regime in a very serious way – he actually did. And in this situation, Putin could have lost power. However, I have no doubt that it would have been necessary after that to fight against Prigojine, who is a bandit and even a war criminal.
The population did not seem very concerned…
A large part of the Russian population will always be amorphous. But it is obvious that the opposition did not do everything possible to rally the part of the population that could have supported it.
What effect will this rebellion have on the Russian army, on its morale?
What is certain is that after this episode, Putin will try to reduce the military’s room for maneuver as much as possible: they will have less latitude to act. All this will have an impact on the morale of the Russian troops.
What will this episode change in the war in Ukraine?
I think that if there were to be negotiations today, Putin would come to them in a much weaker position than just a few days ago. It is unclear whether, on the ground, this will facilitate the Ukrainian counter-offensive. For now, the two elements do not seem connected.
Do you think Russian presidential elections will be held in March 2024? And if so, do you see Putin winning them?
It will be more difficult for him now. However, it must be clearly understood that these will not be elections. It will be an organized event that will be called elections. The whole question is whether he will be able to retain power after these elections. But appointing himself as president, he can do it without problem.