Nearly seven years after his speech “for a sovereign, united, democratic Europe” at the Sorbonne, Emmanuel Macron speaks again this Thursday, April 25 in the amphitheater of the prestigious Parisian university. It’s time to take stock, after years that have forever changed Europe, shaken by the Covid crisis then by the return of war to its doors. In line with his first speech at the Sorbonne, the president will plead for a “powerful Europe”. But does his voice carry enough? What remains of the voluntarism and promises of 2017? In a brilliant essay entitled French diplomacy, published in April 2024 (Alpha ed.), former ambassador Michel Duclos deciphers the evolution of the “Macron doctrine” in a world destabilized by several major conflicts. A president who is “obstinate” but overly adept at show-offs, and who has been deluded for too long about Putin’s Russia, analyzes the special advisor at the Montaigne Institute.
L’Express: In 2017, Emmanuel Macron called for a “surge of conscience” to build a “sovereign, united and democratic” Europe. Did he succeed in his bet?
Michael Duclos : The French president has recorded undeniable successes, first and foremost the recovery plan negotiated with Germany to confront the Covid-19 pandemic: for the first time, the Twenty-Seven approved a common loan and the distribution of vaccines was centralized at the Brussels level. Then, Emmanuel Macron’s leadership contributed to the EU reacting in a strong and dignified manner in the Ukrainian conflict. Another success, finally, the launch in 2022 of the European Political Community (which brings together 44 countries): initially considered a far-fetched idea, it responds to a real demand – even if its results remain to be confirmed.
We must remember that the Sorbonne speech in 2017 was very poorly received in Germany. Chancellor Merkel’s response was very disappointing. She gave no response to Macron for about two years, which seriously disrupted the momentum of the implementation of the Sorbonne’s proposals: on European defense, on the European market, etc. However, thanks to the war in Ukraine, the ideas of the French president have infused into European chancelleries and many people recognize that he was right about this notion of sovereignty.
The problem is that Emmanuel Macron has difficulty generating full support from his partners, because of the distrust he has aroused. His dialogue with Putin (he invited him to Brégançon in 2019, then continued to exchange with him at the start of the war while calling for “not to humiliate Russia”) greatly weakened the authority of France and its president throughout a whole part of Europe (Northern and Eastern). His imperious methods also undermined confidence: he brought to its peak the arrogance often criticized by the French! In addition, our domestic political setbacks (the yellow vests, the drift in the public deficit) are weakening France’s leadership abroad.
On Russia, Emmanuel Macron’s position has evolved considerably since 2017. The one who wanted to build a “European security architecture” with Moscow now says he is ready to “send troops” to Russia. How to explain this 180 degree turn?
This development is considered difficult to read by our partners. This is a handicap for President Macron’s training capacity. His initial posture is part of a collective error of the French political class, a poorly understood legacy of General de Gaulle. She is convinced that dialogue with Russia, to counterbalance American domination, is the alpha and omega of the policy of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle called for “getting out of Yalta” or moving beyond bloc politics. And now Emmanuel Macron is pleading today for a France “power of balance”. This is the same inspiration that prevented our leaders from seeing the change in Putin’s fundamental strategic position from 2011-2012, and in particular with the annexation of Crimea in 2014. It was all the more surprising in Macron that a man of his generation should not have had these illusions.
But this interpretation of General de Gaulle’s line is erroneous: let us remember that the policy of dialogue with Moscow was carried out in the mid-1960s, at the time of détente, certainly not in times of crises like in 1960-61 when of the Berlin crisis, or in 1962 with that of Cuba! At that time, de Gaulle was aligned with the allies, and even among the firmest.
When, on February 26, Emmanuel Macron made his resounding declaration on the possibility of sending Western soldiers to Ukraine, he regained credit with the Eastern and Northern States. But they remain skeptical. They wonder how long France will be able to maintain this position, especially given the state of its economy. For its part, Germany hardly appreciated this outing, it considers that France wants to once again pull the rug out for itself… while Paris delivers half as many weapons as the Germans to Ukraine.
We are still far from the Europe of defense that Emmanuel Macron dreams of…
The case of Ukraine is symptomatic: rather than coordinated military aid between the Twenty-Seven, we are not far from the Lépine competition between the allies, which is not up to the situation.
Since the shock of the Russian invasion, Germany, Poland and others began to rearm. But they mostly buy off the shelf: in the United States, Israel, South Korea… It’s a big disappointment for France but it’s inevitable since these countries need these weapons now. Same thing for the significant lines of credit that Europe has released for arms to Ukraine: France wants this equipment to be purchased in Europe while our partners think that it should be purchased where it is available.
A large European loan, a solution favored by France or Estonia, could help overcome this dilemma. The EU could also secure several sources of funding, but this requires a Franco-German compromise. On the one hand, Paris must accept that certain weapons must immediately be purchased outside Europe. On the other hand, part of the new funding released must be devoted to strengthening the European defense industry base, by promoting complementarity between countries, rather than competition.
To hear you say, the notion of “balancing power”, defended by Emmanuel Macron, does not really make sense…
Emmanuel Macron has three years left to overcome the skepticism he still inspires in some. To do this, France must emerge from its strategic isolation. The president is struck by “balancing power syndrome”, convinced of being able to offer a third way, which has often resulted in show-stopping diplomacy, practiced alone. In my opinion, this resurgence of the Gaullian idea of ”overcoming the blocs” is a way of covering up a fundamental anti-Americanism. Deeply ingrained in the mentality of the French political class, this reflex can fade in moments of crisis – like now – but it will always end up re-emerging as long as we have not changed our strategic compass.
The important conceptual leap for our political class would be to admit that we will create Europe, not by including Russia, as we have thought until now (in particular Macron for years), but against Russia, as long as the current regime persists. Secondly, we have a specific vocation, that of being a bridgehead towards the “Global South”. Macron has tried to do this, sometimes successfully, notably with the Paris Peace Forum. We could try to co-opt a number of large southern states which, in the name of strategic stability, could participate in a defensive coalition to contain the aggressive instincts of the revisionist powers. This could be a great design for me.
Relations with Germany have been at their worst in decades. Does the French president bear any responsibility for this spectacular cooling?
Emmanuel Macron believes a lot in personal relationships, in his own relational magic. In his mistake about Putin, this played a role: he thought that thanks to his capacity for conviction and his charm, he would be able to overcome the difficulties. The same phenomenon has been observed with other authoritarian leaders, and even with Trump. But this does not always work, and even quite rarely. It didn’t work with Putin, nor with Turkish President Erdogan, and not at all with Scholz. With the German chancellor, he came across a personality with whom he had no chemistry. This was the case at the beginning between Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, but Chirac ended up establishing good relations. Macron and Scholz are not there yet, but it is not a hopeless case!
It must also be said that Scholz is perhaps even more intellectually sure of himself than Macron, which doesn’t help. And then the Germans are going through a very difficult phase (questioning of their economic model, divided coalition), which makes them even more complicated partners. This is why it is very important to agree on some major projects, in particular on support for Ukraine which is also support for the European defense industry.
How have Macron’s relations with European populist leaders evolved? At first they were very distant, now he seems to be making contact. Are we seeing a change in strategy?
His sentence period did not last very long. Quite quickly, he wanted to find common ground with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Also with the head of the Italian government, Giorgia Meloni, the start was very difficult but Paris, likewise, found common ground. It was with Erdogan that it was the most difficult, even if the relationship improved. But to understand Macron’s foreign policy, we must remember that he is an investment banker. And so, even when he is faced with an autocrat with a terrible character, he tries to compose.
How would you define Macron’s style in diplomacy. He was criticized for his presidential “think-tanker-in-chief” side: intellectual and too talkative…
His faults: excessive confidence in personal relationships, too strong a taste for brilliance. His main quality is stubbornness in defending what he believes in.
How, in your opinion, will he seek to project himself into diplomacy in the three years he has left?
We can imagine that it seeks to play a role in anchoring European resistance to Russia. And, if Trump comes back, to the latter. Second possible orientation, cultivate a particular relationship with the Global South, in relation to other Western powers. That can go through the reform of international financial institutions. Or through a North-South dialogue on world security, which I hope for.
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