The Covid and then the surge in the prices of agricultural raw materials have profoundly destabilized socially and politically a large part of Africa. As coups d’etat follow one another in the Sahel, anti-French sentiment is spreading like wildfire. On the occasion of the annual conference of the Foresight and Innovation Foundation, of which L’Express is a partner, Lionel Zinsou, former Prime Minister of Benin but also an economist and investment banker, delivers a breathtaking analysis of this domino effect and dismantles the narrative of Françafrique.
L’Express: Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso. Then this summer Niger and Gabon: were you surprised by this cascade of coups?
Lionel Zinsou: Do you think that nobody expected it in Gabon? You have no concerns today for other West or Central African countries? It’s true, many people wonder: have we analyzed the situation badly, badly anticipated it? But a note from the Quai d’Orsay, in March 2020, entitled “The pangolin effect: the storm that is coming to Africa?” explained how the Covid was going to increase poverty, make countries regress, generate social and political problems. … This document was far-sighted, even if the Covid was not the only triggering factor for all these coups: these African countries were also victims of a first inflation shock at the end of 2020 due to shortages of logistics , then a spike in food prices in 2022 linked to the war in Ukraine. It must be realized that in this region of the world, 50% of disposable household income is devoted to food: the situation is untenable and is destabilizing governments Because if the West was able to draw the “whatever the cost”, it was unthinkable for these countries, deprived of resources.
But this note to which you refer did not foresee the arrival of military juntas in power…
Indeed, its authors envisaged that the dictators risked being swept away by a new elite of intellectuals, under the influence of the diasporas or of the religious, and in particular of the Christian Churches. Curiously, they did not mention the military. However, the latter are often the pillars of the powers in place, with the mission of maintaining public order. Except that in the event of riots, most African countries do not have the means to calm the streets. Hence this reasoning among the leaders of the security forces: “I cannot maintain order, but I can overthrow the president, and in addition, the crowd of demonstrators will cheer me.” This is how we are witnessing a giant game of dominoes, which could affect more than ten countries, so acute is the social crisis. International institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF, must realize that peace, poverty reduction and progress in the rule of law in Africa will be the victims of hunger and youth unemployment.
What is there in common in these coups?
We always find exacerbated social conditions. But these countries also share another specificity: a kind of indirect homage to democracy. The reality is that even authoritarian regimes are obliged to organize elections. Many observers only see it as a form of theatre, meaningless since the results are rigged. Conversely, I am very favorable to elections and hostile to boycotts, even when we are sure to lose them. Because there arises a moment of truth during the vote, when we establish local minutes, and when using the Internet, we compile them. Today, we get the results overnight. And when it takes several days or weeks to communicate them, it means that we are trying to “manufacture” the results. The risk for the power in place then comes from the rational calculation of the people in charge of repression: they were able to repress for years, but this time, they will no longer do so. This is what we saw in Mali, Guinea or Gabon. Burkina or Niger are different cases where the popular will was respected by the overthrown authorities.
But why are you talking about a tribute to democracy, when we are dealing with putschists?
Because people absolutely want to express themselves democratically. It is wrong to say that democracy has been imported into Africa which had never known it. This amounts to forgetting the practices of pre-colonial history, such as decisions taken by consensus, or palaver, or even by elections… I also observe an irrepressible desire for expression on the part of the population: elections in our countries Africans are a big party and have enormous political force.
What becomes of this popular will which is expressed?
The putschists exploit it by proclaiming: “Look, we are supported.” The problem is that if you have real scenes of jubilation, it’s easy to manufacture them. But there is indeed an ambiguity, because these forces which overthrew the regime in the name of the popular will, who were they supporting an hour before the coup d’etat? They were, sometimes for decades, at the center of the system, particularly security. In an instant, they become popular, their men presenting themselves as liberators. In reality, rarely at the end of a manipulated election, the real winner finds himself in power.
France is often the target of populations and putschists, admittedly to varying degrees depending on the country. What is your reading of this disenchantment ?
France had a practice of active interference in the twenty years following independence. It was in the past. We can date the break to the five-year term of François Hollande and it was amplified by Emmanuel Macron. When Ivorian President Henri Konan Bédié was overthrown in December 1999, a thousand French soldiers were present at the Port-Bouët base. France then sets up barges to exfiltrate through the lagoon and shelter a certain number of officials. But that’s all, she doesn’t do more. We are very far from what it did in Gabon in the time of Léon Mba in 1964 when, after the putsch, France intervened militarily to restore the regime. This kind of visible physical interference is gone.
Yes, but the interference fantasy is still very present…
It is true, but the images are often misleading: French rejection is a minority in most French-speaking countries and non-existent in the English-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries which form the majority of the continent. Social networks are often misleading: anti-French sentiment is staged by fake news and openly funded fake media. French troops are present for external security reasons and only when desired. There are also Franco-French reasons for neutrality: the very first is that French public opinion deeply and overwhelmingly wants the withdrawal of its troops. She refuses the death of her children for causes she does not understand, in countries she no longer knows. Moreover – and I think this is also very important – France does not have, contrary to what one might hear, major strategic and economic interests in these countries.
Admittedly, French companies are present. Admittedly, there are a few thousand residents whose safety can be easily ensured. But look at the weight of these economies: the GDPs of Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and even Gabon are each around 20 billion dollars. If you add them up, you get 100 billion. That sounds like a lot to you, but in reality, it’s only 20% of Nigeria’s GDP. Those who assert that the French presence is justified by the preservation of its interests are mistaken. Because if that was the case, she would have been long gone. In reality, Françafrique no longer exists except in the imagination of those who fight it.
How do you explain then that this idea persists in public opinion, even in France?
La Françafrique is a novel, a narrative that allows certain leaders to explain many of the weaknesses of their economies. If these countries have difficulties, it is “the fault of the other, the fault of the colonizer”. Obviously, if there had not been slavery, colonization and imperialism, Africa would live much richer and freer. But this colonial past is an easy scapegoat. The year 2024 is going to be an interesting symbolic year. West Africa was colonized around the years 1894-1896. Full independence dates from 1960. Colonization will therefore have lasted sixty-four years. But next year, we will celebrate 64 years of independence.
Could we not erase during all these years part of the evils of the previous sixty-four years? The bad conscience is strong and equally shared: guilt in the North, feeling of failure in the South. Last explanation: the frustration of youth. In Africa, we have fairly low unemployment rates as defined by the ILO. In Benin, we must be at 7%. The problem is that the more you are trained, the less you have access to the labor market, because the economy cannot absorb these highly qualified young people. There are many jobs in agriculture, in informal trade. Rural youth is not in revolt. It’s the cities that cause the riots, not the countryside. Some families have made considerable educational efforts and the paradox is terrible: the more you are qualified, the less you correspond to the structure of the economy and therefore the less you have access to employment. The most educated youth is therefore the most rebellious. And she is not wrong to think that the richest countries, and not only France, dominate an unfair commercial and financial system.
A form of populism feeds on this anger…
Yes. I try to explain to my French friends that we too have our populists. French public opinion believes that all of Africa rejects it. It is in my opinion a mixture of ignorance and low consideration.
In all non-French-speaking countries, the Alliances Françaises are full. During his state visit to Nigeria, Emmanuel Macron inaugurated one of the largest Alliances Françaises in the world. For culture, for literature, for art, for French football – so African! – for the values of freedom and equality… there is a deep desire for France in Africa. The anti-French feeling is certainly the fact and the right of a minority in Africa, it does not sum up Africa, it does not represent it.