Johannes Roviomaa’s column: What is China really up to in the Arctic region?

Johannes Roviomaas column What is China really up to in

The war in Ukraine also affects the future of the Arctic region. If Russia weakens as a result of the war, will it increase China’s role in the Arctic region, thinks Roviomaa.

Johannes Roviomaa Freelance journalist and visiting researcher at the Arctic Center

Sometimes I think about what the states are doing rather than what my friends say. What’s up with China these days? What is it really up to?

China’s economic and political networks have spread around the world like a mycelium.

China has turned its attention more strongly towards the arctic region during the past twenty years. The Arctic region is an essential stage of geopolitics, where the great powers struggle with each other, sometimes with questionable rules of the game.

In China’s opinion, non-Arctic countries should have the right to participate in creating the rules of the game by which Arctic politics and economy are managed.

China is 1,500 kilometers north of the Arctic Circle, but it still sees itself as an “almost arctic state”.

Familiar with China’s Arctic strategy investigator Sanna Kopra has been involved in preparing the one published by the National Defense University this year report. It explained China’s presence and interests in the Arctic region.

Kopra says that in 2018, China published its own strategy for the Arctic region for the first time. In China’s opinion, non-Arctic countries should have the right to participate in creating the rules of the game by which Arctic politics and economy are managed.

China claims to be a major power in both poles by 2030. In Antarctica, China already has one. However, China has stated that it does not want to challenge the legal and political structures of the Arctic region, such as international agreements.

China has been an observer member of the Arctic Council since 2013. It has been the most important forum for Arctic cooperation. Now the future of the Arctic Council is a big question mark.

Will we see Chinese-made cruise ships in the future? sailing in the arctic? China is interested in developing the Northeast Corridor to be suitable for shipping, because this Ice Silk Road would connect Northeast Asia and Europe.

Through the Northeast Passage, ship journeys would be almost halved in less time: cargo ships would no longer need to go through the Suez Canal. The Ice Silk Road runs along the coast of Russia, so China must take care of its relations with Moscow. For example, it is recent that the Chinese Coast Guard and the Russian FSB security service signed in April cooperation agreement.

However, the war started by Russia in Ukraine may affect whether the Northeast Corridor is no longer an object of interest for China and Russia.

Economic interdependence was supposed to maintain peace, but the war in Ukraine has shown otherwise. How the war develops also affects the future of the Arctic region.

In 2014, representatives of Chinese and Russian oil and gas companies shook hands on a $400 billion of the natural gas contract in honor of. Russia has promised to supply natural gas to China for 30 years. (What is worth noting is whether China will need natural gas for anything thirty years from now.)

The world’s second most populous country also wants to increase its military and intelligence activities.

China’s efforts in the Arctic region do not remain alone for research and development work. The world’s second most populous country also wants to increase military and intelligence activities.

Often scientific work and military interests can also be combined. A Chinese military strategy textbook published in 2020 says: “Mixing military and civilian personnel is the main way for major powers to achieve a military presence in polar regions.”

China has research stations in Finland and Iceland, where they study the atmosphere, northern lights and glaciers, among other things. In the next few years, China has tried to buy critical infrastructure in the Arctic region: for example, an abandoned US naval base in Greenland and an airport in Finnish Lapland.

China would also like its own satellite antennas for the Sodankylä Arctic Space Center, but at least for the time being it will have to be satisfied with buying the satellite data offered by Finland. For China, data is valuable in many ways: in shipping, combating climate change or military intelligence.

Despite everything, China has not gained a proper foothold in the Arctic region like Russia. The awakened Arctic states have taken care of that.

Does China have the same risks as Russia? Will cooperation between Russia and China increase? If Russia weakens as a result of the war, will it increase China’s role in the Arctic?

Tensions in the Arctic region would grow to new proportions if the situation between the United States and China were to become even more tense. China would likely bring nuclear-armed submarines to the Arctic. Through the North Pole, missiles have the shortest distance between the two superpowers.

Inevitably, it seems that Finland is on the playing field of the great powers like a lily pad hanging on the tail of a giant.

Johannes Roviomaa

The author is a journalist and visiting researcher at the Arctic Center, who sometimes wakes up in the middle of the night to think about news from China.

The column can be discussed on 5.7. until 23:00.

yl-01