January 1943 – January 2023: the still current lessons of Stalingrad

January 1943 January 2023 the still current lessons of

In geopolitics, certain anniversaries seem unavoidable, as the burning news opens up comparative perspectives. In January 1943, the German Sixth Army was annihilated at Stalingrad after six months of a daunting campaign which caused two million deaths. We will not give in here to the infamous propagandist process dear to the Kremlin – and to dictatorial regimes in general – consisting in abusing comparisons and reductio ad hitlerum ; in the current war in Ukraine, no one is a Nazi. Nevertheless, Putin tends to bring together more and more the faults and errors of the two German and Soviet demiurges of this apocalyptic era, in at least four respects.

Like Stalin in 1941, Putin locked himself in an ideological matrix that blinded him. At the time, the “man of steel” had neglected Allied information indicating to him the preparation of a German offensive; in 2022, the Russian president neglected the will of Ukrainians to remain sovereign and their ability to assert this right. Although different in their nature and context, these two cases have an essential common point: the certainty of statesmen with brutal methods never to fail. This lesson is generally paid for in cash and very expensive. If Stalin had seriously prepared for war, it is unlikely that the German army would have found itself in front of the loop of the Volga after having captured more than two million soldiers…

The second lesson of Stalingrad is barbarism. Once again, nothing is comparable to what was the fate reserved for the “racial enemies” (civilian or military) of the Third Reich, and the Russian army does not behave in Ukraine in the manner of German soldiers. However, the Boutcha and Mariupol massacres, the beatings and abuses committed in many places since the invasion, and now the deliberate bombings of energy production sites – are all morally unjustifiable atrocities. and tactically stupid. In 1941-1942, many Ukrainians were tempted to join the German ranks, so terrible was Soviet repression, and remained so, starting with the organized famine of 1932-1933. But the racial contempt of the Nazis was such and the German monstrosities so manifest that only a few thousand Ukrainian auxiliaries would eventually join them, the vast majority of Ukrainians fighting with the last energy against the invader. Today, the brutality of the Russian army has succeeded in convincing the same immense majority of Ukrainians to fight against the invader, although the latter claims to be Slavic and “liberating brother” – in the Kremlin propaganda.

Putin, a president disconnected from the field

More material, the third lesson concerns the preparation of soldiers. A racist ideologue to the last degree, Hitler believed that the Slavic “beasts” would not resist the military push of a “superior race”. The serious disappointment of the winter of 1941 in front of Moscow and Leningrad could not serve as a lesson to a fanatic of such caliber, the winter of 1942 will see the Sixth Army suffer martyrdom in front of Stalingrad, for lack of equipment – and in particular of clothing. – adequate. Since February 24, 2022, a multitude of testimonies and evidence indicate that the invading army of Ukraine was not ready, strategically but also vis-à-vis the rank and file; insufficient rations, unsuitable clothing, unsuitable helmets and boots… Doesn’t this poverty betray a contempt and/or a sacrificial dimension of human life, including vis-à-vis one’s own? Another prerogative of totalitarian regimes…

Finally, on the level of command, there is currently a constant that helped to explain the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad: confidence in subordinates and the place given to maneuverability. In the fall of 1942, for the first time, Stalin let his generals show initiative by (temporarily) abandoning his position as absolute leader, while, just as far from the realities on the ground, Hitler on the contrary seized the post as supreme chief of the general staff, by granting no alternative to the all-out offensive or to staying in place, including in the event of a desperate situation. Ukrainian officers in 2022 have quite a bit of leeway left by a young president who trusts them, while their Russian counterparts are paralyzed by the orders of an elderly president who is disconnected from the field, blindsided – and the circle is complete – by… his dogmatism.

lep-sports-01