Two conflicts, and the same fear. On April 15, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, sounded the alarm about threats posed to infrastructure by the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East nuclear power plants in these regions. “We are getting dangerously close to a nuclear accident [à Zaporijia, une centrale ukrainienne]”, he even declared on the sidelines of the UN Security Council.
Paul Dorfman, chairman of the Nuclear Consulting Group and a member of the Irish government’s Environmental Protection Agency’s radiation protection advisory committee, says these concerns are entirely justified. According to him, a military attack on a nuclear power plant would lead to catastrophic consequences. To the point, even, of calling into question the development of civil nuclear power in the world? Interview.
In your opinion, is there a risk that the conflict in Ukraine could trigger a nuclear accident?
Paul Dorfman Of course, no nuclear power plant in the world is safe from military attack. These attacks could target either the reactor or the storage basins for highly radioactive spent fuel, which are significantly less protected.
There is no doubt that a military attack on the Ukrainian Zaporizhia power plant would trigger a catastrophe, with radioactive releases that would have a serious impact on the surrounding environment and human health. Additionally, if weather conditions are unfavorable, such as a wind blowing towards Central Europe or Russia, the consequences could extend well beyond Ukraine.
According to an article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by Jungmin Kang and Eva Lisowski, the effects of such an attack could be comparable, if not greater, to those of Chernobyl ?
Numerous studies have been carried out on the probable effects of Russian aggression on the Zaporizhzhia power plant. A article written by four researchers assesses the potential for the spread of cesium 137 (Cs-137), in the event of an accident, across Ukraine and neighboring countries, taking into account the meteorological factor. In the most conservative scenario, “significant” contamination could occur in Ukraine as well as its neighbors.
However, it is important to note that the nature of the Zaporizhia reactors differs from that of Chernobyl, whose reactor was moderated with graphite, a material that floats very easily in the air and disperses quickly in the atmosphere. The absence of graphite in Zaporizhia would limit the dispersion of radioactive particles. But even so, the release of radiation would remain dangerous and catastrophic.
In the Middle East, the conflict has taken on a new turning point last weekend between Iran and Israel. Rafael Grossi worried about the possibility of an Israeli response against nuclear infrastructure in Iran. Are these concerns founded?
These fears are absolutely justified. However, there is a certain inconsistency between the IAEA’s alerts and the initiatives of its boss. Recently, Grossi met with Bashar al-Assad to relaunch negotiations around the construction of new nuclear power plants in Syria. On the one hand, the IAEA is alarmed by the risks weighing on civil nuclear power in conflict zones and, at the same time, it is planning the installation of power plants in more than controversial regimes.
Historically, the IAEA has taken little account of the risks of attacks on civilian nuclear power plants, but the crisis in Zaporizhzhia was a rude awakening. In the last twenty years, many experts, like me, have not talked about these risks because we feared that it would germinate ideas in the minds of people with bad intentions. The situation in Zaporizhzhia and the Middle East is changing the situation. The IAEA has been promoting civil nuclear power for years but, in my opinion, the growing instability of the global context calls this perspective into question.
“The Middle East is the scene of proxy conflicts between great powers”
Whether in the conflict in Ukraine or that in the Middle East, the risk of a nuclear accident is real. In the Middle East, the question is all the more delicate as Saudi Arabia is showing a growing interest in civil nuclear power while also considering the transition from civil to military.
This reminds me of the dynamics of the Cold War. At the time, Germany was seen as a sacrifice zone in the event of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. Today, we find this same logic which makes the Middle East the scene of proxy conflicts between great powers which, ironically, could endanger those who seek to protect themselves by the adoption of nuclear power, such as Saudi Arabia. Saudi.
What would be the consequences of a nuclear accident in the Middle East?
A nuclear accident in the Middle East could have particularly serious consequences given the scarcity of water in this region of the world. The Persian Gulf, which experiences low levels of precipitation, is home to around 70% of the world’s desalination facilities, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain. The Gulf has a depth of 35 meters, is completely enclosed, the rivers that feed it have a very low flow, and the evaporation rate is very slow.
Major contamination, in the event of a nuclear accident, would directly impact the Arabian Sea, seriously compromising desalination operations and, by extension, the region’s drinking water supply. The implications for local populations and the environment would be catastrophic.
The Iranian regime is accused of not respecting the 2015 agreement, particularly on its uranium stocks enriched. What do we really know about the situation in Iran, and the regime’s desire to obtain atomic weapons?
Indeed, the initial 2015 agreement, which involved Obama’s United States, Europe and Iran, had the initial objective of monitoring and reducing the risks linked to Iran’s nuclear program. For a time, this program was effective. But the arrival of Trump turned everything upside down, his withdrawal from the agreement, against the advice of Europe and France, made us lose our capacity to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities.
Since then, it is clear that Iran has stepped up its uranium enrichment efforts, and there is major concern that Iran could develop its nuclear capabilities for military purposes.
How can we guarantee compliance with international nuclear safety standards in conflict contexts, or in countries known for their non-compliance with international rules?
It’s simple: it’s impossible. The vast majority of existing nuclear power plants were built before the events of September 11, 2001, and obviously well before the Russian offensive in Ukraine. There was, after Fukushima, measures to strengthen security, including in Zaporizhia, but the inherent complexity of nuclear power makes it impossible to achieve zero risk. When a problem arises, things can happen very quickly and become dramatic.
Currently, I know of no effective way to protect a nuclear power plant against a targeted military attack. And I don’t think that will change in the future. There are certainly ways to neutralize missiles before they reach their target, but there are always some that can escape defense systems. Nuclear reactors are well protected, but they are designed to withstand an impact like that of a Boeing 747, not a cruise missile equipped with a uranium warhead capable of penetrating concrete.
Whether we like it or not, all nuclear infrastructure has vulnerabilities. This reality should encourage us to reconsider our future energy directions. At COP28, France, among other nations, expressed its intention to triple its nuclear capabilities by 2050. But given the risks associated with nuclear power and the escalation of global conflicts, it is legitimate to ask why continue to invest in this form of energy.
.