how Russia lost the battle of the Black Sea – L’Express

It was in rainy weather that the Moskva patrolled off the coast of Odessa on April 13, 2022, almost two months after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Suddenly, the flagship of the Russian fleet is hit by a Ukrainian anti-ship missile, then by a second, a few minutes later. Despite the crew’s efforts to contain the fire, this jewel of the Russian navy sank the next day east of Serpents Island, in the western part of the Black Sea. “The enemy was not ready for this strike,” Ukrainian Navy spokesman Dmytro Pletenchuk recently commented on its anniversary. “The Russians did not suspect that we had our own cruise missile and that we could cause them harm.” Even today, this loss resonates as a humiliation for the Kremlin. No Russian flagship had been sent to the bottom since the Knyaz Suvorov in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War.

This coup marked above all the beginning of a long series of successes at sea, which contrast with the difficulties that the Ukrainian forces face on the land front. These victories are all the more spectacular as the latter are almost devoid of a navy. “Many of our ships were captured by Russia during the invasion of Crimea in 2014,” recalls Mykhailo Gonchar, president of the Ukrainian institute Center for Global Studies Strategy XXI. “In 2022, we only had a handful left small, poorly equipped boats. But the work of our engineers and the help of our allies allowed us to equip ourselves with drones and missiles which caused catastrophic losses to the Russian navy. Despite much superior resources, it lost more than twenty ships, or 30% of its Black Sea fleet.

Russian Navy ejected from coast

During its latest strike, on March 24, in the port of Sevastopol, the Ukrainian army, it said, hit four Russian vessels. “In addition to the large amphibious ships Yamal and Azov, the Ukrainian defense forces struck the reconnaissance ship Ivan Khurs and the large amphibious ship Kostyantyn Olchansky,” the Ukrainian navy said three days later. It is no longer good to sail in the Black Sea for Russian boats. Twenty days earlier, the patrol boat Sergei Kotov was destroyed by several Ukrainian surface drones near the Kerch Strait. “The war in Ukraine has highlighted a new phenomenon: even without boats, it is now possible to control the sea up to a distance of 200 to 300 kilometers from the coast, underlines former admiral Pascal Ausseur, now director general of the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies The democratization of the means of detecting and striking opposing ships – thanks to inexpensive radars, drones and missiles – has completely changed the situation.

The Russians learned this the hard way. After taking control of Serpents Island on the first day of the invasion, the Russian navy had no choice but to withdraw on June 30, 2022. The reason: the increase in Ukrainian strikes on this end of land in the northwest of the Black Sea and the inability of Russian ships to resupply it in the face of the threat of Ukrainian anti-ship missiles. “It was a precursor event to the difficulties that the Russian navy was going to encounter,” observes Jérémy Bachelier, researcher at the Ifri Center for Security Studies. From the start of the conflict, kyiv was able to support its coastal defense on the Neptune anti-ship missile, with a range of 300 kilometers and developed by itself. Before enriching its arsenal with a whole range of drones that can strike from the air, or at sea – like the Sea Baby, an unmanned machine moving on the surface of the water and capable of carrying up to 850 kilos of explosives 1,000 kilometers away.

According to the Ukrainian army, this model would have been used to strike the very strategic Kerch bridge in July 2023. A year earlier, the structure had already been the target of a first truck bomb attack, disrupting logistical flows. to the peninsula for several weeks. “We can reasonably expect a third strike in the months or years to come,” says Jérémy Bachelier. “For Moscow, it is both politically symbolic and valuable for supplying Crimea.” Its destruction would constitute a means of isolating the peninsula and weakening the forces present in southern Ukraine.

Already, thanks to its remote strikes, kyiv has managed to push the Russian navy away from its coasts. And relaunch, in the process, its maritime traffic. Despite Russia’s attempted blockade of Ukrainian ports and its withdrawal from the grain agreement in July 2023, Ukraine today manages to export more than 5 million tonnes of grain each month via the Black Sea. “The situation is close to the one we knew before the start of the conflict [soit 6 millions de tonnes, NDLR]. Our main ports, including Odessa, are today open to transit to the Bosphorus Strait,” comments Mykhailo Gonchar. A key issue for Ukraine – almost 90% of its agricultural exports are by boat .

A “decimated” Russian fleet

The losses recorded by the Russian fleet have also removed the scenario of an offensive from the sea. “The Ropucha class ships, which are used to carry out amphibious operations, have been decimated, points out Jérémy Bachelier. It is difficult to imagine a landing operation at Odessa or elsewhere on the coast.” In addition, the Russians cannot bring in reinforcements from their other fleets (North, Baltic and Pacific) due to the blockage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits by Turkey since the start of the conflict. Result, “the Russian navy, which would have the vocation to participate intensively in this war, is incapable of doing so, summarizes Admiral Ausseur. Strikes from the sea are almost non-existent in the face of the risks weighing on ships approaching the ribs.”

For the Russians, danger also lurks above the Sea of ​​Azov, where two of their rare A-50 command planes were shot down by the Ukrainian Air Force in January and February 2024. Further south , the delivery of long-range Scalp and Storm Shadow missiles by France and the United Kingdom, from spring 2023, has enabled Kiev to increase strikes in Crimea. On September 22, 2023, the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was hit by a salvo of missiles. Nine days earlier, a submarine and a landing ship were destroyed in dry dock.

To guard against this, Russia was forced to move some of its ships from Sevastopol – its historic base since 1783 – to the port of Novorossiysk, in the eastern part of the Black Sea. The Russian navy does not gain from the exchange. “The port of Sevastopol had the advantage of being located in the heart of the Black Sea and of benefiting from a deep bay, ideal for stationing warships,” explains Jérémy Bachelier. “It also had numerous port infrastructures, which are not as developed in Novorossiysk.”

This distance does not, moreover, prevent attacks. Despite the approximately 700 kilometers separating the port from the Ukrainian coast, the landing ship Olenegorski Gorniak was severely damaged there on August 4 by a Ukrainian surface drone. To further distance its fleet, Moscow has undertaken the construction of a naval base in Ochamtchire, in the separatist province of Abkhazia, in Georgia. “The Russians are aware that even Novorossiysk will be increasingly threatened,” underlines Admiral Ausseur. “It is only a question of time.” Faced with this debacle, Vladimir Putin appointed a new commander at the head of his Black Sea fleet on April 2 – the third since the start of the conflict. Hoping, this time, to avoid shipwreck.