She is a key player in the unexpected reconciliation that took place on July 23 between the Palestinian movements Fatah and Hamas. She is also the one that the head of Ukrainian diplomacy went to try to convince on the same day to get involved in the peace negotiations in Ukraine. Is China trying to appear as the reference mediator in major international conflicts?
“China is trying to take advantage of the crises that exist to increase its image as an essential power and appear as a sort of ideological or economic power of recourse, particularly with countries of the ‘Global South'”, explains Valérie Niquet, Asia specialist at the Foundation for Strategic Research and author of China in 100 Questions (Tallandier editions). The geopolitical researcher returns to the springs of Beijing’s “more visible attitude” on the international scene.
L’Express: China recently played a role in the unity agreement between Hamas and Fatah, while maintaining ties with Israel. What influence does the country have in this region of the world?
Valerie Niquet: Traditionally, China has always had a relatively cautious attitude on the Middle East issue, including the Palestinian question. However, it has a dual interest in the region. It has extremely important economic interests since a very large part of its energy supplies come from there. China has an interest in maintaining a certain stability or contributing to there being a certain stability in the region. Recently, the Chinese were extremely worried about the situation of the Houthis in Yemen who were weighing on the passage of oil groups. [NDLR : les rebelles Houthis mènent depuis fin 2023 des attaques en mer Rouge en coordination avec les Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza].
At the ideological level, China – in a context of rivalry with the United States – seeks to find allies that allow it to strengthen its positions on the international scene. Hence its relations with Iran, which have always been extremely cordial, but also its efforts to develop ties, which are not new, with Saudi Arabia, which has become one of its main oil suppliers. We also see a position of ideological support for the Palestinians – which is part of its desire to appear as a leader of the “Global South” – although China has fairly close ties with Israel, including long-standing cooperation in the military field.
The head of Ukrainian diplomacy also reached out to China to ask it to get involved in peace negotiations. How does China position itself on the Ukrainian conflict?
China is coping quite well with this war. This gives it the appearance of a responsible power compared to Russia. Unlike Moscow, it has not yet invaded a foreign territory with brutality. With its peace plan [NDLR : en 2023, l’empire du Milieu a proposé un plan de paix en 12 points] – which no one has signed, by the way – China is in opposition to the Western powers, in particular the United States, which it presents as a warmongering nation.
“For China, the war in Ukraine brings only benefits”
Then, China’s relationship with Ukraine is quite unique. Volodymyr Zelensky certainly believed that China could put pressure on Russia to obtain some sort of ceasefire or withdrawal. On this point, I think he was wrong. With the war in Ukraine, China is facing on one side a very weakened Russia, which supplies it with energy at unbeatable prices and on the other side, a European Union increasingly focused on the Ukrainian question and a little less turned towards China’s Indo-Pacific ambitions.
Does China continue to support Russia?
China is not taking a huge risk. It helps Russia without going too far because it has no desire to cut itself off from Western markets. For it, the war in Ukraine only brings benefits.
Moreover, even if China had wanted it, it is not certain that it has the real means – short of cutting all economic relations with Moscow – to really exert convincing pressure on Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that after the war or after a possible freeze in the conflict, China will manage to play a role with Ukraine in terms of reconstruction. We must not forget that before this Russian attack, Ukraine was one of China’s first partners in Europe, in the context of the Silk Roads. [NDLR : un vaste projet d’infrastructures lancé par la Chine en 2013].
What is the objective or objectives of the Chinese executive with this diplomatic strategy of mediation?
We find ourselves in a very global context where China has very strong ambitions to become the leading power in Asia again and to be recognized as such. At the same time, it is a country that does not want to take major risks because its economic development is not at all complete. On the contrary, the country is facing significant difficulties. But China is trying to take advantage of the crises that exist to increase its image as an essential power and appear as a sort of ideological or economic power, of recourse particularly to the countries of the “Global South”.
Whether it is for Iran or Saudi Arabia [NDLR : la Chine a été médiatrice dans le rétablissement, en 2023, des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays]or today in the case of the agreement with the two branches of the Palestinian movement, China has played mainly a facilitator role. By offering neutral ground, it allows these actors in the Middle East to show the United States that they have other possible great partnerships. There is a joint interest of China and these actors, to demonstrate to the United States and the rest of the Western body, whose ideology they reject, that they have other opportunities.
How does China differ from other leading mediators such as the United States (which was, for example, a major architect of the Oslo Accords) in its approach to conflicts?
The nature of these powers is very different. One of the first things that China emphasizes is that it never sets conditions. That is to say, unlike the West, which would always have expectations regarding principles of respect for human rights – although this point can be discussed in the context of relations between the United States and countries in the Middle East – China always wants to appear neutral.
“China says it is in favour of a multipolar world, but it is also – without saying so openly – in favour of a unipolar world in Asia, where it would be the main power.”
When we think about the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, why did the latter, which is an ally of the United States, enter into this game, offering Beijing the opportunity to appear as a major player on this issue? China is playing on the possibility of offering these countries – at least in appearance – the opportunity to diversify their partnerships and not be prisoners of an exclusive alliance with the United States. However, in reality, the main partner obviously remains the United States.
Is this a way for China to impose a new world order?
China always puts forward the principle of what its leaders call the “democratization of the international order”, where ultimately the objective is to fight against the unipolarity around the American power or the West which would have imposed its values and its way of functioning on the rest of the world. China says it is in favor of a multipolar world, but it is also – without saying it openly – for a unipolar world in Asia, where it would be the main power.
In this hypothetical world, it envisions balancing powers on which it could rely. This could be the European Union, if it agrees to work with China. This could obviously be the countries of the “Global South”. Anything that can allow it to oppose the United States is viewed favorably by the Chinese regime.
Where are we in this process?
We are still far from that. For the moment, China does not have the means to ensure global security and its projection capabilities on the international scene, including in Africa, are modest. We can see this with the Houthi crisis: it is not China that is going to act in the region to try to interrupt the attacks on carriers that are considerably damaging its own energy interests.
China has ambitions. Some are playing on them to become more independent from the United States while retaining Washington’s protection. It’s a big game, but we are very far from global domination on the part of China, which – it must be remembered – is going through a complicated phase economically, which will ultimately limit its room for maneuver.
Are we entering a new era of Chinese diplomacy?
What is new is that China is adopting a more visible attitude and is taking much greater advantage of opportunities than it did a decade ago. This is correlated with the personality of Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who wants to put China at the forefront on the international stage, regardless of its real capacity for action. There is a game of image, all the talk around the Silk Road project was aimed at reinforcing this idea of power on the international stage.
It is true that in the Middle East for a long time, China has been relatively discreet and has not highlighted the role of mediator that it could play on important issues. In essence, this does not change much, because its interventions do not resolve crises in the long term. They are mainly media stunts.
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