Xi Jinping in Russia: the underside of an interested friendship

Xi Jinping in Russia the underside of an interested friendship

With vertical takeoff or on the runway, from three to 200 kilos, with variable autonomy: on the 81uav.cn portal, you can discover the drones sold by Bingo Intelligent Aviation Technology. “Our products and services are mainly used for the prevention and control of forest fires, the inspection of pipelines, networks, etc.”, specifies the company based in Xi’an, in central China. One model does not appear there: the one that interests Moscow, the ZT-180. The German weekly Der Spiegel revealed that Russia would negotiate with Bingo to buy around 100 of these prowling munitions, similar to the Iranian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones used by Moscow in its war against Kiev.

Will Chinese weapons soon hit Ukraine? Washington says Communist leaders plan to supply it to Vladimir Putin. Beijing denies. Officially, China has been calling for dialogue and refusing to take sides since the February 24, 2022 invasion, which, however, it refuses to condemn. But in fact, the war accelerated the rapprochement of these two authoritarian regimes, avowed adversaries of the United States, determined to shape the international order in their favor.

Certainly, the “limitless friendship” claimed on February 4, 2022 by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping has precisely shown limits: Beijing is careful not to deliver to its Russian neighbor shells, rockets, armored vehicles and any other lethal equipment ready to employment. Such support would undermine its neutrality, even if it is only a facade, and would cause bad publicity that the communist leaders are precisely trying to avoid. “However, notes Zhao Tong, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, China fears that a defeat of Russia will lead to the replacement of Putin by pro-Western leaders, ready to change the strategic positioning of Russia in favor of the UNITED STATES.”

Russia increasingly economically dependent

For Beijing, it is therefore better to act behind the scenes. According to an article from wall street journal, the Chinese would have provided “tens of thousands” of elements likely to have participated in the Russian war effort. These would mainly be “dual-use” technologies, both civilian and military, such as electronic chips, essential for high-precision missiles; spare parts for SU-35 combat aircraft; radars. In order to keep the Kremlin afloat economically, China has increased trade with its neighbor. These jumped by nearly 30% in 2022 (177 billion euros), driven by an increase in Russian exports of agricultural products and oil. Those of gas are destined to progress: the Force de Sibérie gas pipeline (15.4 billion cubic meters sent to China in 2022 and a capacity of 38 billion cubic meters) should be doubled by a Force de Sibérie 2 by 2030.

“Yes, Beijing and Moscow are getting closer and closer at the economic level, but also at the diplomatic level, in international bodies or through their declarations, China taking up the Russian narrative on NATO and the West”, notes Yurii Poita , head of the Asia hub of the Ukrainian think tank CACDS. At the beginning of March, during the G20 in India, the Foreign Ministers of Russia and China jointly denounced Western countries which, according to them, use “blackmail and threats” to impose their views. Renewed on March 10 for a third presidential term, Xi Jinping criticized “Western countries, led by the United States”, guilty of “implementing a policy of containment, encirclement and repression against China”.

“The Sino-Russian convergence is political, specifies Antoine Bondaz, researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research. But the two countries do not share an ideology. They are two authoritarian regimes which consider Westerners and more broadly liberal democracy as a threat. for their power. Beijing’s goal is to appear responsible without doing anything in Washington’s direction. All of this determines China’s policy towards Ukraine.”

Xi Jinping and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, by videoconference, April 1, 2022.

© / afp.com/Olivier Matthys

Unveiled on February 24, a year to the day after the invasion, Beijing’s call for peace talks in a “12-point” document has nothing to do with a plan for resolving the conflict. “Half of the points go against the interests of Ukraine and respect for international law, deplores Yurii Poita. The ceasefire advocated by China would above all allow Russia to strengthen itself before resuming its war. of aggression.”

Volodymyr Zelensky nevertheless wants to be optimistic: “That China is starting to talk about Ukraine is not a bad thing,” he explained. The Ukrainian president even declares himself ready to “meet Xi Jinping”. “This positive attitude aims not to deteriorate the relationship with China and to prevent it from giving arms to Russia, continues Yurii Poita. It is different from the case of Germany, on which public pressure may have favored certain promises of arms deliveries, such as Leopard 2 tanks.”

China’s balancing act

After having refused the slightest phone call since the invasion, Xi could thus exchange with Zelensky by telephone soon. “Such a diplomatic gesture will make it possible to counterbalance the visit of the Chinese president to his Russian counterpart”, continues the researcher Zhao Tong. Because the two men like each other. “There is a form of personal loyalty between Putin and him, which is accompanied by a whole mystique of virile friendship”, recalls Mathieu Duchâtel, director of international studies at the Institut Montaigne and specialist in China. “I have a personality similar to yours,” the Chinese leader told the Russian leader during his first official visit as president to Moscow in 2013.

But this Chinese friendship is also self-serving. The weakening of Russia could offer new opportunities to Chinese leaders determined to exploit the slightest situation to their best interests. “It will be more and more difficult for Russia to refuse certain requests, believes Zhao Tong. Sensitive technologies on which the Russians are ahead are of great interest to Beijing, whether it is the motorization of aircraft, or submarine and nuclear engineering.

More than a year after the start of the war, it is still unclear whether Vladimir Putin had warned his counterpart of the real nature of the invasion he was planning, far from being a simple “special operation”. “In any case, China would have done well without this war, observes Antoine Bondaz. Firstly because the Kremlin did not succeed in its coup de force. Then because the media regularly make the link between Ukraine and the threat of an invasion of Taiwan, finally, because it has led the Europeans to spend more on their defence, which will allow the United States to allocate more military resources elsewhere than in Europe, particularly in the region Indo-Pacific.”

The failure of the kyiv lightning strike also shakes up imaginations. “The Russians have discredited the idea of ​​a Blitzkrieg leading to a quick capitulation, Beijing’s favorite scenario in the event of a resolution by force of the Taiwan question, points out Mathieu Duchâtel. It was an important psychological weapon for China and it disappeared. If, in the scenario of a conflict in Taiwan, the inhabitants of the island showed a real capacity for resistance over the long term, that would encourage part of the international community to support them.” As happened in Ukraine .

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