Almost a month after the start of Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine, China still refuses to criticize Russia, after the two countries proclaimed their “limitless” friendship at the last Olympic Games in Beijing. The Chinese president and his Russian counterpart share the objective “of shaping a new world order where the United States and its allies would be marginalized, as a military power but also as democracies”, underlines Alice Ekman, researcher in charge of Asia at the European Union Institute for Security Studies.
L’Express: The invasion of Ukraine may be contrary to the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity advocated by China, but the latter did not condemn the attack at the UN and even reaffirmed that Moscow was its “greatest strategic partner”. Has China clearly chosen to align itself with Moscow or is it still hesitating?
Alice Ekman: No, she does not hesitate. Its positioning is quite clear today, and it has not changed significantly since the start of the war. She never condemned the Russian invasion, nor the bombing of civilians. It should not be forgotten that China-Russia relations have strengthened significantly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This rapprochement had often been interpreted as a simple “marriage of convenience”, pragmatic and circumstantial, limited to the energy cooperation. But the two countries have also strengthened their military cooperation (conducting joint military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, or in the Baltic Sea, in the South China Sea, joint development of an anti-missile warning system).
They have also strengthened their coordination within the United Nations and other multilateral organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This rapprochement is cemented by privileged personal relations between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and above all by major conceptual and ideological convergences: the two presidents share a very strong resentment towards NATO, the United States and their allies; and nurture the common goal of shaping a new world order where the latter would be marginalized, as military powers but also as democracies.
Isn’t China taking the risk of exposing itself to sanctions?
China’s Foreign Ministry has said publicly that China will continue normal trade with Russia. Whether in the medium or long term, Beijing does not plan to reduce its imports of Russian oil and gas, which will undoubtedly remain massive. In this sense, the position of the Chinese authorities vis-à-vis the sanctions differs in this sense greatly from that of European countries. This will not allow Russia to compensate for the drop in exports to Europe, if these materialize in the long term, but will nevertheless mitigate the effect of the sanctions.
Not only is China taking the risk of exposing itself to secondary sanctions, but also, and more generally, of deteriorating its economic relations with its primary trading partners, which are the United States and the European Union, far ahead Russia. Given the current economic balance of power, it would be rational to anticipate an adjustment of China’s position in order to manage relations with its main trading partners. But the economic factor is not today the one that primarily guides its strategic partnership with Russia, nor its position regarding the war in Ukraine. The Sino-American rivalry is still very strong and structuring. The ideological differences are very deep, and result in differences of interpretation or reinterpretation of the conflicts. We are today in two diametrically opposed visions of the war in Ukraine. The official Chinese vision – which designates NATO and the United States as primarily responsible – converges much more with that of Moscow than with that of Washington.
Won’t China, all the same, seek to preserve its economic ties with the West? And, besides, will the West dare to punish her if she crosses the red line?
The United States, during the meeting between Jake Sullivan (Joe Biden’s security adviser) and Yang Jiechi (chief diplomat of the Chinese Communist Party) in Rome, has already threatened China with heavy sanctions in the event that Beijing would strengthen its support for Russia. But the meeting apparently turned into a dialogue of the deaf: even the agenda was the subject of major differences – the United States wishing to tackle the Ukrainian file above all, warning China about a possible reinforcement of support for Russia, China addressing the Taiwan issue, calling on the United States to stop arms sales. And China threatened the United States with counter-sanctions in the event that secondary American sanctions were put in place.
The subsequent discussion between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping last week confirmed major differences of opinion. Since then, China has made no commitments. Undoubtedly, the United States would not hesitate to apply such sanctions – Washington has in the past sanctioned Chinese banks that had continued to operate with Iran or North Korea. Other countries, such as Australia, have also indicated that they are willing to apply sanctions. But we must not forget that China is already facing American trade and technological sanctions, and that its medium and long-term objective is to limit as much as possible its dependence on the American market and products, and Western products in the broad sense, in particular in the technology sector – as displayed in the 14th five-year plan published in March 2021 and covering the period 2021-2025. The secondary sanctions affecting China would undoubtedly have a negative impact on the Chinese economy in the short term, but the Chinese authorities could decide to seek maximum ways to circumvent these sanctions while accelerating the implementation of the 14th five-year plan, in the hope of succeeding in the long term in strengthening its autonomy in the sectors which it considers to be strategic.
Are we witnessing the birth of a new cold war opposing on one side the United States and its allies and, on the other, an autocratic duo formed by China and Russia?
The analogy with the Cold War is in itself already outdated, since a war in the proper sense of the term is underway. However, two phenomena have been consolidated in recent weeks and can recall, to a certain extent, certain aspects of the Cold War: the growing bipolarization of the world, and the ideological rivalry that characterizes this bipolarization. It is often pointed out, particularly since the Biden administration’s organization of the “Democracy Summit” but also more recent statements on the need to defend the free world, of which Ukraine is a part, that the United States and their democratic allies conceive of the rivalry with China and Russia in terms of competitions between political systems.
This is true, but the reverse is also true: since 2013, Xi Jinping’s China has publicly and clearly displayed its ambition to promote its political system throughout the world and to compete with those of the so-called “capitalist” countries. The Chinese media also communicate very regularly on the presumed “decline” of the “West”, of its values, of its way of life. Never since Mao Zedong has Chinese diplomacy been so virulent against “the West”.