This is a first in the history of the United States: Marco Rubio, the future Secretary of State, will theoretically not be able to set foot in China. The Republican senator from Florida is in fact targeted by sanctions imposed by Beijing for having supported pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong in 2019 and criticizing the repression of Muslims in Xinjiang. Viscerally anti-communist, the leader of Cuban origin is convinced, like many officials in Washington, that China represents an existential threat to the United States. He has not missed an opportunity, in recent years, to propose measures to punish Chinese officials or block the importation of Chinese products suspected of being the result of forced labor.
The next Minister of Foreign Affairs is far from being the only one to lead this fight, in a Trump 2.0 administration which appears on paper as the most anti-Chinese of all time. The next national security adviser, Mike Waltz, also considers Beijing to be public enemy No. 1. Like Rubio, he is also a great defender of the “sovereignty” of the island of Taiwan – considered by China as one of its provinces. To this duo of hawks, we must add John Ratcliffe, appointed head of the CIA, who wrote at the end of 2020: “The intelligence is clear: Beijing intends to dominate the United States and the rest of the planet on economic, military and technological plans. But also Elise Stefanik, who will be the representative of the United States to the United Nations; and perhaps Robert Lighthizer, expected to return to his position as trade representative, where he distinguished himself during Trump’s first term by setting up customs barriers against China. As for Pete Hegseth, expected to join Defense, he insists that “China is building an army to defeat America”.
Stopping China’s rise
It remains to be seen how these appointments will translate into action. There are many unknowns regarding Donald Trump’s intentions and the room for maneuver he will leave to his ministers. Will the Republican president seek confrontation with Beijing or strike a grand deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping for whom he has publicly declared his admiration (“A brilliant man” who “controls 1.4 billion people with one hand?” of iron”)? It is not impossible that, putting into practice his manual of The Art of Negotiation (The Art of the Deal), he increases the pressure on the communist regime as much as possible, while seeking an agreement aimed at reducing the enormous American trade deficit vis-à-vis China – even if the one signed during his first mandate was hardly respected by China, according to analysts. One thing seems certain, “we should expect more friction between the United States and China,” summarizes Yun Sun, a China specialist at the Stimson Center in Washington. After reaching heights of tension under Joe Biden at the time of the Chinese “spy” balloon affair in early 2023, relations had calmed down recently.
The most obvious threat is that of a new trade war. Trump has already promised that he would impose tariffs of at least 60% on products imported from China. The United States could also further tighten restrictions on exports of strategic technologies to the Asian giant. Objective: to slow down the development of the world’s second largest economy in sectors such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing or robotics, which will determine the global hierarchy in the coming decades. This movement was initiated during Trump’s first term, then continued by the Biden administration. China reacted to this tightening by seeking more autonomy in the manufacturing of strategic products (such as semiconductors) and less dependence on the dollar. But the current slowdown in its economy does not put it in a strong position for a trade and technology war.
Strong pressure on Taiwan
The arrival of a team of hawks at the White House could also increase the risk of escalation in the Asia-Pacific. “We should expect an increase in tensions around Taiwan in 2025. Especially if the United States strengthens its military presence in the region and adopts more assertive behavior; and if its arms deliveries to Taipei increase,” predicts Marc Julienne, director of the Asia Center at Ifri. China could then be even more belligerent in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. “With the intensification of the rivalry between China and the United States, their relations are becoming increasingly tense. But Trump’s strategy towards China is to favor containment and restrictive measures, in order to prevent this country from challenging the United States as a world leader, rather than seeking war or creating a crisis”, nuance Chen Daoyin, independent political scientist and former professor at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law .
Donald Trump was able to suggest – unlike Joe Biden – that the United States would not necessarily intervene in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, it is difficult to predict how it would actually react in such a scenario, as support for Taiwan is so unanimous in Washington. And Trump’s ego risks having difficulty coping with a major defeat against Xi Jinping in the region. In the meantime, “Trump will exert strong pressure on Taiwan so that the island strengthens its military defenses and better balances its trade with the United States,” points out sinologist Yun Sun. The Republican leader, who accused the island of having “stolen” the semiconductor industry from the Americans, could also encourage Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te to adopt a more cautious tone towards the communist regime.
Faced with the wave of appointments hostile to China, Beijing is for the moment holding back while waiting to see what the Trump 2.0 administration has in store for it. But if the arrival of Marco Rubio is not good news for the communist regime, the authorities are probably relieved to have avoided a return of Mike Pompeo, Trump’s former secretary of state, considered even more dangerous. “Unlike Mike Pompeo, Marco Rubio has not publicly advocated for changes within the Chinese regime or the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei. Pompeo’s comments aimed at antagonizing the Chinese people at the party power have aroused serious concerns in Beijing regarding the security of the regime, which is the top priority of the Chinese Communist Party,” underlines Tong Zhao, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington.
Elon Musk as intermediary?
Faced with this new situation at the White House, the Chinese authorities will look for a defense. “They will undoubtedly try to play on the inconsistencies and contradictions of Trump’s policies, in particular by attempting to exploit entrepreneurs like Elon Musk, who have invested heavily in China, and to use them as intermediaries,” predicts Jean-Pierre Cabestan, associate researcher at Asia Centre. “The constellation of anti-China hawks will create a very difficult working relationship at the operational and ministerial level. Beijing “will probably try to get around the problem by getting Xi to engage more in a direct relationship with Trump, knowing that he will have the final say on all decisions,” adds Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute, to the University of London.
L’influence that Elon Musk will have on the American president constitutes another unknown in the equation. The boss of Tesla and SpaceX has been propelled to the head of a “government efficiency” department responsible for cutting federal spending, but the main financial backer of the Trump campaign could also want to weigh in on his country’s foreign policy. Hailed as a “super genius” by the president-elect, he was present during his first telephone conversation with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky in early November; and he recently met with the Iranian ambassador to the UN to “ease tensions” between Tehran and the United States, according to the New York Times – an interview denied by Iran.
But the richest man in the world has enormous interests in China, where he produces half of his Tesla electric vehicles. Anxious to establish good relations with Beijing, he has distinguished himself in recent years by comments perfectly aligned with Chinese rhetoric, believing that Taiwan was an “integral part” of China or suggesting that the island adopt a similar status to that of Hong Kong. The fact remains that Trump does not like sharing the spotlight, nor does he like being opposed to him: so not sure that Musk manages to impose his views on him. Nor to prevent Sino-American relations from entering an era of turbulence.
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