We thought that Russian public opinion was indecipherable, caught between the Kremlin’s repression and the self-imposed self-censorship. For the third time, Russian opponent Alexey Minyaylo proved us wrong. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the creator of the site Chronicles. report, censored in his country for his dissident national opinion polls, reveals for L’Express what his compatriots really think of the war in Ukraine (and of Vladimir Putin). On the program of this new survey: a year of war seen by the Russians.
While the number of people who said they supported the “special operation” in Ukraine remained stable during the year (about 58.5%), this survey reveals effective support of only 22%. These results are all the more eloquent since they were obtained thanks to a new survey method, more precise but above all more adapted to Russian psychology.
And the slide could well continue given the economic problems that most Russians are experiencing. Even on the side of the regulars of state television, rather committed to the cause of Vladimir Putin, “support is reduced much more significantly than among those who do not consume television”. Proof, according to Alexey Minyaylo, that “economic problems are beginning to neutralize state propaganda”. Interview.
L’Express: One year after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, how has Russian opinion about the war evolved?
Alexey Minyaylo : It is not so much Russian opinion that has changed – 72% of Russians have not questioned their position – but our understanding of it. The number of Russians who said they supported the “special operation” in Ukraine remained stable during the year (around 58.5%). But while some may respond in good faith, others are subject to fear of reprisals and pressure from the majority.
This is why we have evolved our method to more accurately estimate the real support of public opinion. This consisted of crossing three questions, instead of confining oneself to just one: “Do you support the special operation against Ukraine?”, “Do you think that in the context of our budget deficit, State funds should be allocated in priority to the army? and “if Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from Ukrainian territory and start peace talks without achieving his goals, will you support this decision?”
We thus obtained two groups: the hawks, fervent supporters of this war (who support the special operation, the fact of allocating funds in priority to the army, and who would not support a withdrawal of troops by Vladimir Putin without that the objectives have not been achieved), and the pigeons, firmly opposed to the invasion of Ukraine (against the war, so that financial priority is given to the social sector and for a withdrawal of troops even without having succeeded in a victory). These two groups represent 22% and 20% of Russians respectively. On the one hand, it is not surprising that only 20% of respondents express their opposition so clearly. On the other hand, it is remarkable to note that while they run no risk in expressing their support for the special operation, barely a quarter of those polled are genuinely pro-war.
After a year of war, does the criminalization of anti-war positions still weigh heavily on the expression of a critical position with regard to the invasion of Ukraine?
Of course, the introduction of various laws criminalizing opposition to the special operation in all its forms has had an impact on public opinion. So much so that when we asked respondents if they were in favor of criminalizing public criticism of this war, 41% said they approved. But there are other ways to measure the decline in Russian support. Between April 2022 and February 2023, the number of people who said they felt proud of this war fell by 18 points to 52%. Similarly, the proportion of those who said they were “inspired” by this war fell by 9 points to 31%. More broadly, 37% said they were tired of the war, while a quarter of respondents said they were disappointed.
What are the determining factors of opposition to war?
The people who most often feel negative about the war are those who have become poorer in the past year. That is people whose family income has decreased and those who have lost their jobs. However, the number of Russians who have declared that their family income has decreased since March 2022 has been increasing, admittedly slowly but continuously since May! In March 2022, they were 39%, compared to 43% in February. Same observation concerning job losses: at the beginning of last year, they were 4% to declare themselves unemployed, against 9% in February of this year.
““Economic problems begin to neutralize state propaganda””
Is the profile of support for this war still the same?
Yes. It is still most often elderly or retired people and the wealthiest, who are the least inclined to review their judgment. Indeed, the richest people do not experience serious difficulties due to the war. For them, it is above all an idea, a quest for greatness. But on the side of the poor, it’s a real thing: they can no longer feed their children. In addition, older people are also the most likely not to have VPNs and to consult official news sources that disseminate propaganda (TV, radio, newspapers). Conversely, those who use YouTube are much less likely to support the war.
But we have observed a new dynamic among television viewers: the economic problems they are encountering push them to make an all the more negative judgment of this war in that they are spectators of a major contradiction between the unrealistic promises of the propaganda of state they receive through television, and their daily lives. This means that in these people, support is reduced much more than in those who do not watch television. Economic problems are therefore beginning to neutralize state propaganda, especially since the number of Russians who watch television has been steadily decreasing for five years.
Several psychologists and psychiatrists are concerned about the deterioration of the mental health of Russians since the start of the war in Ukraine. What do your polls reveal on this point?
This is a complicated question applied to the Russian population. On the one hand, half of Russians (50%) said they had suffered anxiety attacks since March. One in five respondents have also stopped communicating with loved ones, and more and more people report suffering or having suffered from depression and anxiety. But it remains difficult to accurately assess the state of deterioration of the mental health of Russians because we do not have the culture of emotions. If a psychologist asks us how we feel, we tend to give a “rational” answer. That is to say, we will think about what we should feel socially in such and such a situation, but not really what our emotions dictate to us. It is therefore difficult to assess the seriousness of the problem.
Are the Russians optimistic about a hypothetical resolution of the conflict?
The Russians no longer believe that the war will soon end and adapt to the new reality by accepting it. The proportion of those who think the war will last more than a year has tripled since the end of March to 51%. The average estimate of the attainability of the objectives of the war on a five-point scale is 3.16… Those who say they support the war do not believe that all the objectives have been achieved any more than the others (5 out of 5)! The number of Russians who answered that all goals have been achieved is only 13% and at least one in ten Russians believe that after a year of war, Russia has not achieved any of its goals. The reason, according to respondents: the Russian army was not prepared for war (12%); the humanity of the Russian forces and their desire not to harm civilians (10%), and not enough allies (10%).
But are they able to name the objectives of this war?
We posed an open-ended question to respondents: “If you had the opportunity to speak with Vladimir Putin, what would you say to him?”. Response from 9% of them: “the war drags on and we do not understand its purpose”. However, since May, the number of people who could not formulate war aims has fallen from 35% to 20%. But even with this drop, at the end of 2022, one in five people still did not know why this war is taking place.
Of course, those who watch television every day are the most likely to formulate the objectives of the war… 17% mentioned the “fight against the Nazis”, 15% the “victory of Russia” without specifying how the latter should be – no one starts a war with the intention of losing, so victory cannot be an objective! 12% answered the “return of Russian lands” (which according to some includes all of Europe and even Washington). Not to mention the 2% who say that “Putin knows the objective”. For these people, it seems that it is more important to win than to understand why the Russians are sent to the front. In all, 37% of Russians are unable to say clearly why the war in Ukraine is taking place.
Do the Russians want a change of power?
When asked “what would you say to Vladimir Putin if you had the chance”, only 25% of respondents answered that they would express their support for him (even if the overall approval rating remains high). And 13% would formulate economic and social demands and concerns about the future of Russia. Overall, 21% of respondents would be critical – for example by disapproving of the war or refusing to speak to Vladimir Putin.
Nevertheless, almost half of Russians believe that if the war is not over by 2024, presidential elections should not take place. Similarly, and unsurprisingly, 48% think that a change of power would be more harmful than anything else under these conditions. This can be explained by the fact that for many, a change of power is synonymous with instability and this, in an already difficult context.
What should we deduce about the relationship of Russians to democracy?
It would be easy to deduce from these figures that the Russians have nothing to do with democracy. But that would be to forget that most Russians are aware of the rigging of the elections… So why waste part of the state budget on elections played in advance?
When you look at the results of the elections where some Democratic candidates managed to rush in, it is clear that the Russians are for change. The experience of Belarus is very revealing… The current president, Alexander Lukashenko, has always managed to obtain 90% of the votes thanks to vote rigging and the muzzling of the opposition. But during the last elections, the wife of one of the opposition candidates who had just been imprisoned, Svetlana Tikhanovskaïa, took over from her husband and succeeded in galvanizing the crowds over his rallies. There is no doubt that she would have won if Lukashenko had not tampered with the results of the vote.
You also ventured to ask the families of killed soldiers what financial compensation would be “fair” – in other words, the price of a life.
Absolutely. The majority (62%) found it difficult or refused to answer this question. Of the entire sample, 17% mentioned the fact that “human life is priceless”. However, 26% of respondents believe that it is fair to pay a lump sum of 1 to 10 million rubles as compensation (ie between 15,000 and 150,000 euros). This figure coincides with the one broadcast in the official Russian media of 7,421,000 rubles.