what would the French army look like? – The Express

The last time France spent more than 5% of its GDP to finance its defense was in 1962, the Algerian War was coming to an end and its army was leaving the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Since then, and despite the economic effort required by the production of nuclear weapons and the establishment of deterrence, desired by General de Gaulle, the share dedicated to military spending has fallen. It approached 3% in the 1970s, before decreasing to 2% since the start of the 21st century (the lowest was reached in 2018 and 2019 at 1.84%).

Dedicating a greater share of national wealth to the armies, as was the case in the past, the French military dreamed of. Now, Donald Trump is asking for it: less than two weeks before his return to the White House, the businessman was once again moved, at a press conference from his Florida residence at Mar-a-Lago, that its European NATO allies devote so little, in its eyes, to their defense budget. “They should be at 5%, not 2%,” he insisted several times, adding that “they can all afford it” – around twenty countries out of the 32 members of NATO are at 2%. % or more.

For France, such an increase would more than double the current budget of 2%, to reach 130 billion euros (in purchasing power parity). “This would obviously change everything, while today we are still in a logic of budgetary constraints, indicates Elie Tenenbaum, director of the Center for Security Studies at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri). Already, move to 3 % would allow us to have two fully operational land divisions, while we are currently pooling the forces’ equipment.” There are thus more regiments than weapons available.

“At 4%, we can increase the force structure, while at 5% we would change the world, because we could then consider staying in the technological race, without having to cut back on the volume of forces, continues this good connoisseur of the French army model At 5%, a second carrier group becomes possible, i.e. an additional aircraft carrier with accompanying ships, frigates, attack submarines, supply ships, etc. Enough to ensure permanence on the seas, currently impossible, with the sole Charles de Gaulle, whose replacement is due to arrive at the end of the 2030s.

Spend more… to buy American?

The move to 3% only makes up for the lack of investment of past decades. “It would not allow us to move away from the current ‘sample’ army model, which allows France to do almost everything, insists Yohann Michel, research fellow at the Institute of Strategy and Defense Studies (IESD) in Lyon III. But at 5%, in the event of an increase in power, this model gives an advantage that other European countries do not have, which have had to make big choices to abandon capacity.”

A significant increase, without even going up to 5%, would make it possible to increase production rates and finance fallow programs. But it cannot be done in a snap of the fingers. “There is no excess production capacity today, which means that we would have to order equipment and recruit staff for the factories,” recalls Julien Malizard, holder of the defense economics chair at the Institute. of advanced national defense studies (IHEDN) Such a shift from 2 to 5% would need to take place over a long period of time, with significant investments, so that the entire value chain keeps pace, the major manufacturers. sometimes involving hundreds of subcontractors.” The difficulties encountered since the invasion of Ukraine in increasing shell production are a recent illustration of this.

Can the increase in the share of GDP devoted to defense by Europeans, as Trump demands, precisely benefit French arms manufacturers? “They don’t export much of their equipment to Europe, underlines Julien Malizard. There could be opportunities to produce under license or accept joint ventures, but this would require a change of mentality, because our manufacturers are more cautious than those of Germany, for example, to involve more local producers or set up subsidiaries.”

Donald Trump’s intention is probably quite different. “Above all, he wants Europeans to spend to buy from Americans, but it is not sure that they are capable of producing more already,” estimates Renaud Bellais, co-director of the defense observatory of the Jean-Jaurès Foundation . The paradox of the Republican’s announcement is that the United States has been spending less than 3.5% of GDP on defense for several years. If they rose to 4.9% of spending in 2010, at the time of the expensive commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have to go back to the 1980s to see them exceed 5%.

Trump’s 5%, the Europeans hope, is only a basis for negotiation. The new Secretary General of NATO, Mark Rutte, has already warned that it would be necessary to go well beyond 2%, without advancing on a figure or the modalities to be decided between member countries. It is a question, through this spending, of strengthening the defense of the continent and of dissuading the Kremlin from any attack, or of being able to resist it, knowing that it would probably pit Russia against a continental coalition. “One of the great lessons of the war in Ukraine is that such a conflict leads to material and human losses,” explains Renaud Bellais. “A significant increase in the military budget would make it possible to gain in depth.”

It remains to be seen whether this is acceptable on a political and social level. At constant wealth, we would have to draw on another part of the nation’s budget. “I know that spending more on defense means spending less on other priorities, admitted Mark Rutte last month. European countries easily spend up to a quarter of their national income on pensions, health and social security, we need a small fraction of this money.” While such choices seem obvious for countries bordering the Russia, this is less the case in the west of the continent.