She is the big winner of the European elections, on all counts. With almost 29% of the votes, his party, Fratelli d’Italia, emerged victorious in the Italian elections, ahead of a divided left and weakened partners who failed to reach 10%. Fratelli d’Italia’s Europarliamentarians will form the largest delegation of the parliamentary group of European Conservatives and Reformists (CRE), which she chairs, and which could find itself the third largest in the Strasbourg hemicycle, ahead of Emmanuel’s liberals. Macron.
Finally, and perhaps above all, by consolidating her electoral base in Rome, Giorgia Meloni strengthens her positions in Europe: faced with a weakened France and Germany, she can allow a politically more stable Italy to establish itself as leader in a new European triumvirate, and can distance itself from the radioactive Viktor Orban, while keeping the channels of communication open with him – it is notably thanks to her that the illiberal Hungarian leader finally gave in on aid to Ukraine this winter.
So what is the Meloni recipe? Let us be careful not to transfer our hexagonal reference points to our transalpine neighbors – the famous “union of the rights” is nothing new in Italy, it was already in power under the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi in the 1990s and 2000s, and the Giorgia Meloni’s coalition today is only an extension of it. His leadership of this alliance was only sealed very late, just before the 2022 legislative elections, thanks to the weakness of Forza Italia (today led by Antonio Tajani, but also and above all by the ghost of Berlusconi) and a Matteo Salvini in free fall in the polls since the Covid crisis.
Leader of post-populism
To unite the rights, Meloni therefore filled the void that had been created in her camp, but she was only able to do so by “centering herself”, by blending into the establishment. It is by weighing his remarks and making the effort of true moderation, that which proposes a certain continuity in public action, without overturning the table – as evidenced by his promise, largely kept until now, to follow the economic policy of her predecessor, Mario Draghi, who said that she had been more loyal in the opposition than certain members of his government. As one of his close friends, now a minister, told me during the electoral campaign: “We propose to continue Draghi’s work by giving it a more right-wing inflection, in a government coalition which has already proven itself several times over the last twenty years – where is the revolution in all this?”
The Melonian lesson is perhaps precisely there: of the change in the continuity that she promised to the Italians. The President of the Italian Council is thus the leader of a new movement, post-populism, which is in the process of redefining Italian – and perhaps even European – politics, by reimposing a right-left divide replacing that which was imposed between populists and elites during the last decade.
Of course, the Melonian right has changed compared to that of Berlusconi. In addition to the absence of “bunga bunga” (not at all in the style of the Chigi palace host), the Melonian right remains economically liberal, but protectionist on questions of international trade; Westernist and Atlanticist internationally, but conservative on a societal level – with an anti-illegal immigration discourse which did not prevent the government from announcing the reception of 452,000 foreign workers by 2025, in the aim of replacing uncontrolled immigration with labor immigration.
Intended confrontation between Macron and Le Pen or Mélenchon
Unfortunately, we do not find this post-populist situation in France, where despite the implosions and recompositions caused by the dissolution, the debate still remains dominated by a confrontation desired by President Macron between an establishment that he represents today more than ever and a populist rebellion led either by the National Rally of Marine Le Pen or by La France insoumise (or both at the same time, depending on the moment). The realignments are certainly beginning to emerge, with a New Popular Front which makes more room for the Socialist Party and a “Bardellamania” which makes the Lepenist alliance more acceptable, without removing the serious doubts which may exist on the merits: on the Ukraine as on the economy, we do not know what would really be the program of a National Gathering which would take over business.
When we know that the RN continues to refuse to place itself on the right of the French political spectrum, we see that this Melonian post-populist lesson of straddling the right-left divide has not been learned. And in fact, it is perhaps the left which, today, is taking the lead, by proposing a government program that is certainly irresponsible, but faithful to what has historically made this political family.
Because, the real problem today is that Emmanuel Macron, like Marine Le Pen (and to a certain extent also Jean-Luc Mélenchon) have an interest in perpetuating the populist-elite divide, because it is indeed the one -there which allows them to continue to exist politically. Remove these labels from these characters, and they will have difficulty existing, thus perhaps allowing new tenors, hopefully more responsible, to normalize French political life again by returning to a classic right-left divide. This would allow Macronism to save the Republic from populism twice: the first time in 2017, by defeating it in the elections, and the second, between 2024 and 2027, by disappearing.
Italians often criticize the French for not repaying them the esteem they have for them. However, in political terms, they have a lot to teach us. Perhaps it is time to learn lessons from Italy’s post-populist experience.
*Thibault Muzergues is a political advisor at the International Republican Institute and the author of Postpopulism (Ed. of the Observatory).
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