In 2021, still a student, the American Decker Eveleth had revealed to the public China’s construction of a field of around a hundred silos capable of hosting nuclear missiles. The result of an investigation based on images taken by a civilian satellite.
Three years later, thanks to personal research on Russian atomic warhead storage sites, this associate researcher at the American CNA institute uncovered, at the beginning of the month, the construction of the probable deployment site of one of the new nuclear weapons touted by Vladimir Putin, the “Burevestnik” – a nuclear-powered missile that the Russian president claims is “invincible”. For L’Express, he returns to these two discoveries and explains how these new Chinese and Russian sites are part of a new age of deterrence, marked by more uncertainties.
How did you discover the Burevestnik deployment site, named SSC-X-9 Skyfall by NATO?
Decker Eveleth Unlike the discovery of the Chinese silo fields, this one was fortuitous. Originally, I wanted to familiarize myself with the Russian nuclear storage sites and the operations of the 12th Gumo [NDLR : la division qui est chargée du transport, de la sécurité et du stockage des armes nucléaires russes]. While touring the known facilities, I noticed some unusual constructions on this site. This research turned into a serious investigation into the purpose of these. After discussing this with researchers Jeffrey Lewis and Hans Kristensen [NDLR : deux grands spécialistes de la dissuasion]we concluded that the deployment of the Burevestnik was the most likely outcome.
Why is this site unusual?
As far as we know, this is the first time that a nuclear weapons deployment site has been located right next to a storage site. Satellite images also show long buildings to place a missile on a mobile platform, which will move to different stations that are used to check that the missile’s subsystems are working properly. Then there is an area with nine launch stations pointed in different directions. This is not necessary for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), whose trajectory is corrected after launch. This is rather what is done for aircraft such as cruise missiles, so that they can easily adjust their trajectory.
Another important thing: these launch stations are surrounded by earthen mounds. Doing this prevents an explosion at one station from causing a cascade reaction at the other stations, because the earthen edges will direct the explosion upward. This is also extremely unusual for a nuclear site. All of this indicates that this is a site designed to support the long-term maintenance and operation of a fixed weapon system. And the only one that meets all of these criteria is the Burevestnik.
What are the specific features of the Burevestnik?
It is a large cruise missile powered by a nuclear engine. When Putin unveiled the system in 2018, he claimed that it could fly almost indefinitely and evade US and NATO air defenses. On paper, a Burevestnik has the range to fly very low and therefore be harder to detect. However, it is likely that it will not be able to carry out many of the operations Putin described, as there are doubts about its guidance system, as it has been presented.
Does this weapon change anything in Russian deterrence?
I don’t think this fundamentally changes the deterrence relationship between the United States, NATO and European countries on the one hand, and Russia on the other. Because the Russian ICBM arsenal is already capable of penetrating American and European defense systems. The Burevestnik theoretically gives the ability to strike targets in the West in a less visible way. When Putin unveiled this system in 2018, he actually presented a series of miracle nuclear weapons, including the Poseidon torpedo, the Avangard hypersonic glider and the Zircon hypersonic missile.
These weapons are now part of Putin’s political legacy, which is probably to strengthen Russia’s deterrence systems. Moreover, if the United States were able to increase its missile interceptors to defeat ICBMs, this other system would still achieve a target. But it also has vulnerabilities, and there is no reason why a well-placed fighter squadron would not be able to shoot it down.
You had already revealed to the public the existence of a new military nuclear site, the Yumen silo field, in China. How did you discover it?
This research was initiated in response to rumors that there were many more Chinese ICBM sites than were known from open sources. I was an undergraduate, and Jeffrey Lewis [NDLR : chercheur sur les questions de proliférations en Asie] asked me to investigate them. China is vast, so I looked for the most likely sites for such facilities. I was helped by the fact that Hans Kristensen had already identified some silos under construction at a training site in Jilantai, Inner Mongolia. I assumed that the silo fields I was looking for would probably be on terrain similar both geographically and geologically to Jilantai. A series of desert sites in northern China. I combed through satellite images of these areas until I found the Yumen silo field.
In the process, another researcher, Matt Korda, discovered another field of silos, in Hami, Xinjiang. What impact did your discoveries have?
Previously, the general narrative was that China was highly unlikely to expand its arsenal to this extent. What we knew about China’s nuclear doctrine and posture came from reliable sources within its strategic community that it would focus on a small number of highly survivable weapons systems, with significant investments in mobile ICBMs and submarines. The revelation of new fields that together numbered 320 silos was a game changer. What we had imagined was outdated. The dominant nuclear question in the United States now is how to deter both China and Russia while maintaining the existing nuclear arsenal.
Your discoveries of the Yumen field, then of the Burevestnik site, confirm that we are living in a new nuclear era, different from that which prevailed after the Cold War…
We are in uncharted waters, with Russia and China both becoming more nuclear-armed. This raises several problems. It took decades to achieve some form of stability between the American and Russian nuclear superpowers, through an unwritten code of conduct and weapons platforms that were agreed upon and understood by both countries. Through decades of crises and diplomacy, the Americans and the Soviets figured out how to maintain mutual stability.
China today has very little experience of what it means to be a major nuclear signaling power. Chinese nuclear scholars, in their writings, tend to be casual about the possibility of nuclear escalation. Perhaps they don’t fully understand the risks of a large nuclear arsenal. And then we have Russia, theoretically a mature and experienced superpower, investing in these new weapons systems, like the Burevestnik and the Poseidon, whose deterrent value is not as well understood as the ICBMs. We’re in this period where we’re trying to figure out what stability is. Hopefully, it will happen without a major nuclear crisis.
Find our great series “Nuclear, the bidding war”:
EPISODE 1 – Nuclear weapons, the bidding war: how Ukraine had to give up its bomb
EPISODE 2 – Putin and the nuclear bomb: the risk of apocalypse
EPISODE 3 – China and its colossal nuclear arsenal: the inside story of Beijing’s mysterious expansion
EPISODE 4 – The United States’ titanic plan against Russia and China
EPISODE 5 – Nuclear weapons: North Korea’s inevitable atomic test
EPISODE 6 – Nuclear weapons: can France play a deterrent role for the whole of Europe?
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