It is not only the Ukrainian forces, currently in the middle of a counter-offensive, who are adapting to their adversary. Since the start of the war, the Russian army has shown itself capable of self-criticism, to evolve its combat systems. This is what confirms What does the Russian army think of its war in Ukraine?a new study by Dimitri Minic, from the Russia-Eurasia center of the French Institute of International Relations. “Rather than a war of movements, the Russian army was forced to wage an armed struggle of high intensity and attrition,” summarizes the researcher, author of Russian strategic thought and culture. From the circumvention of the armed struggle to the war in Ukraine (Editions of the House of Human Sciences). Interview.
L’Express: What lessons have the Russians learned from their failures in Ukraine?
Dimitri Minic: Russian military elites discussed a few areas related to combat actions: artillery, ground tactical formations and the ability to effectively maneuver them, drones, as well as aerospace forces. Several concerns arise: the waste and shortage of material and human resources, the difficulty in mobilizing them, and finally the disappearance of qualified personnel to use complex and modern equipment.
These elites came to provide basic advice, such as not massing moving troops in small spaces or having reliable cartographic information. Two recommendations emerge for the battlefield: the development of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources, combined with strikes, emphasizing the importance of tactical drones and their use in “swarms”; then, taking into account the “transparency” of the battlefield, requiring dispersed units, smaller, more mobile and decentralized than the previous organization.
Precisely, since the start of this war, the Russian army has been able to give the image of forces unsuitable for the combat of the moment. How self-critical was she?
The Russian army had not been reformed or prepared to fight such a war. Russian strategic thinking has in fact been focused, since the fall of the USSR, on circumventing armed struggle. However, both military elites and Russian leaders overestimated both the effectiveness of the circumvention and their own ability to implement it. The implementation of this thinking, combined with the specifics of Russian strategic culture, led to the initial failure of the “special military operation”. Moscow had to, from the first days, intensify its conventional effort and will end up changing strategy a few weeks later. Rather than a war of movements, the Russian army was forced to wage an armed struggle of high intensity and attrition, where destructive power and artillery became central. All of this was identified and criticized by military elites, who produced analyzes of the failures of forecasting and intelligence, the lack of planning, the inadequate preparation of troops and even the poor use of airborne troops (VDV).
Russian soldiers take part in the rehearsal for the May 9 military parade on May 7, 2023 in Moscow
© / afp.com/Kirill KUDRYAVTSEV
The Ukrainian army is struggling to break through on the Zaporizhia front. What strategic thinking did the Russian army rely on to prepare and hold its defense lines?
It must first be remembered that the Russian army did not expect and was not prepared to carry out this type of operation or combat. In the plan of the “special military operation”, the role played by indirect actions (strategic deterrence, armed and unarmed subversive actions, psychological-informational and cybernetic actions, etc.) was supposed to surpass that of the armed forces, which was to be final and limited. But this largely failed, as of February 24. Since then, what the Russian command has done has been improvisation, with varying degrees of success.
The defense established by the Russian army in the Zaporizhia oblast dates from the Surovikin era, who was the most competent commander of Russian troops in Ukraine [d’octobre 2022 à janvier 2023]. This relatively effective defense is deep and quite traditional with a first zone saturated with mines, reconnaissance assets and associated strikes, very difficult to cross, even if the Ukrainian army succeeded in doing so at Robotyne. However, theoretical developments on defense, produced before the Ukrainian counterattack in the summer of 2023, revealed two growing feelings among Russian military elites: the shortage of men and means.
The latest analyzes are also lucid about the counterproductive aspect of cruelty and war crimes, without obviously being listened to…
No one defends, in the sources I have read, the cruelty of the army. The fact remains that the responsibility of the Russian army in certain war crimes and abuses, such as in Boutcha, is not directly pointed out. When it is mentioned, this massacre is presented as a clever staging of Western “scriptwriters” in Ukraine. It has even happened that the Russian strategy of intimidation and threat of destruction of infrastructure (including nuclear) and the Ukrainian population has been praised.
In any case, since February 24, in their writings, the military elites have called for moderation and explained the importance for an invading army to adopt a benevolent attitude towards the population, and the protect from the horrors of war. The destruction of cities and infrastructure, and cruelty towards the population are considered counterproductive because they harm the objectives set, the moral argument being absent. The weak psychological and moral dispositions of the Russian soldiers (but also of the Russian population), who it is recognized were not prepared to lead the special military operation, and even less the war that resulted from it, have also interested the Russian military elites.
You note in strategic publications a late reflection on the use of tanks…
The issue of combat tanks was first addressed indirectly, notably by emphasizing the importance of protecting their turret against portable anti-tank weapons and lurking munitions, via rudimentary solutions such as metal cages and screens. We had to wait until July to see the publication of the first article to address the issue. The observation is clear: the special military operation has changed the way combat tanks are used, in a space saturated with troops equipped with modern portable anti-tank weapons (Javelin, NLAW), shifted to a fire support role to the infantry. Various adaptations are, however, praised among tankers: minimum required quantity of shells in the ammunition chest, systematic conduct of reconnaissance via drones…
A long war is being fought with industrial support. What do strategic circles recommend?
Although weakened by sanctions, the Russian arms industry has not collapsed. However, Russian production remains very dependent on advanced Western technologies – which it continues to obtain to a certain extent – and the state favors lower quality Chinese products, including small drones. The military elites paint a pessimistic portrait of this whole and are fully aware of the deleterious impact of Western sanctions on the Russian military-industrial complex. Certain players gravitating at the intersection of the Russian military and industrial communities also see the opportunity to offer their particular solutions and projects (tactical simulators, anti-drone combat systems, drones, logistics service), and, perhaps, ‘reap benefits from it.
The idea of favoring quantity over quality regarding the weapons and equipment produced, of simplifying their design as much as possible, remains quite in the minority. Military elites instead call for rationalization and innovation. Lucid about their techno-scientific dependence on the West, the economic weakness of the country and the loss of know-how, the theorists propose as solutions to develop national production, to rationalize expenses, to stop the “brain drain” , to innovate, to focus on “critical” dual-use technologies. Above all, they propose reversing the current logic by calling on innovative SMEs in the civil sector. Things have been tried, with little success.