“At some point, we will have to come back around a negotiating table”, judged Emmanuel Macron about the war in Ukraine, at the bend of the COP27 which was held in Egypt at the beginning of November. That “moment” has not yet arrived, according to historian and political scientist Eugene Finkel, associate professor of international studies at Johns Hopkins University and author of the forthcoming book. To Kill Ukraine (Basic Books, 2024). This genocide specialist thus explains to L’Express why this idea is both “unrealistic”, “naive” and “dangerous” at this stage of the conflict. According to him, negotiations leading to the freezing of the conflict would trap many Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation and, by killing the “win/lose” dialectic, would give Russia a blank check. Worse, Eugene Finkel predicts that instead of putting an end to this war, the negotiations would only “sow the seeds of a future conflict perhaps more important”.
L’Express: Lately, calls for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine have multiplied. You are doubtful to say the least…
Eugene Finkel: Absolutely. Between certain progressive members of Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other great specialists in international relations, there are many who are urging the United States to push for this option… But this is simply unrealistic and naive! Negotiations would require both Ukraine and Russia to make concessions over territories that both countries consider to be theirs. Ukraine should thus give up its claims to Crimea or the Donbass, and Russia should withdraw from at least some lands it has invaded and now annexed. This is absolutely unthinkable in the current state of the conflict, if only because public opinion in each country would not forgive its leader for having ceded part of “his” territory. We must realize that all military conflicts do not necessarily have political solutions. ad hoc applicable at any stage! I would even say that such a design is dangerous…
Why that ?
Any premature diplomatic initiative would only sow the seeds of future conflict. Thanks to a “ceasefire”, Russia would thus be able to rearm, regroup and attack again – something it has already done during previous episodes of a one-off freeze in the conflict. This is also valid for Ukraine, which could counter-attack Russia in order to regain its territories. Historical precedents have shown that freezing a conflict is by no means a long-term solution if the conditions are not met beforehand. This war took root after the conflict in Donbass was frozen, just like the conflict in South Ossetia was before Russia attacked in 2008. Not to mention the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan… A frozen conflict is no guarantee of peace.
But from a moral point of view, can Russia, Ukraine and NATO afford to let this conflict cause hundreds of thousands more deaths? Public opinion in these states may well hold it against their leader…
If the goal is to end the violence, negotiations at this stage will instead be counterproductive. By freezing the conflict, many Ukrainian civilians will find themselves trapped under Russian occupation. However, Russia does not shine by its respect for human rights. There are many reports of violence, including sexual violence, against Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation, executions, torture chambers, and the abduction of children. What will happen to those who are stuck on the wrong side of the borders determined during the negotiations? At most, negotiations would save a handful of soldiers posted on the front line, but would not prevent this genocide from continuing with impunity. Moreover, in view of the methods of Vladimir Putin, who repeatedly violated Russia’s commitments to respect the sovereignty of Ukraine, annexed Ukrainian territories, lied about his intentions with regard to this country, there is little chance that Ukraine will place its trust in him.
What would it take to change that?
In a conflict involving two States, negotiations can be initiated in three scenarios. The parties can undertake to reconsider their objectives, abandoning their plan to annex this or that territory. For example, peace between Egypt and Israel occurred when Egypt agreed to recognize Israel’s existence, and Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. In the case of the war in Ukraine, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kherson clearly shows that this is impossible as it stands: this event has absolutely not changed Russia’s objectives!
In the second case, one of the two parties – at least – becomes too weak to continue fighting (as in the case of the First or Second World War). Which is not yet the case, especially with the support of the international community for Ukraine. Finally, it could be the intervention of a third actor outside the conflict, as the United States did between Israel and Egypt. But in the case of Ukraine and Russia, the only outside force that could provide viable security guarantees to Ukraine is NATO or the United States, which refuses to be drawn into this war.
Conversely, should we negotiate with Putin, whom some compare to Hitler, Stalin or Pol Pot? Public opinion may well not understand the process of negotiating with a “tyrant”…
There have been negotiations with dictators in the past, and there will be more. But as long as Russia remains strong and determined to control Ukraine, negotiations will probably end exactly like the previous ones with Putin on Ukraine. The Minsk I and Minsk II agreements both failed.
When the conditions are met, we will therefore be able, and even we will have to, to negotiate with Putin. But this remains impossible as long as it enjoys the support of its elites and certain States, because we cannot trust it. If he finds himself in a weak position, however, we will be less dependent on him keeping his word.
It is also possible that in the future – perhaps not so distant future – Russia will have a new president… And even if Putin remains in power, it is entirely possible that Ukraine is too weak to continue the fight. In this case, negotiations could be envisaged: when the conditions are met, peace settles.
In a contribution published in the Los Angeles Times, you wrote that “the Biden administration is warming up to the idea of negotiations”. Why that ?
I have no inside information, so I have to rely on what is publicly known. Some people in the administration want to move on to other topics that they consider more important. Some want the United States to focus more on the economy and internal affairs, others believe that the main threat to the West is not Russia but China. For both groups, the focus on war only diverts resources and attention from what they see as more important issues. Reason why they want to freeze the conflict.
Isn’t the fear of a military escalation (and the specter of the use of nuclear weapons) a sufficient argument to sit down around a table and find a compromise?
As long as NATO stays out of the direct conflict, there is no reason to expect a military escalation – especially since the conflict is already of great intensity. As for nuclear weapons, Russia has no interest in taking the risk of using them. Since Ukraine does not have one, only Russia can use such a weapon in this conflict. A nuclear attack against a NATO state, and probably even against Ukraine alone, would involve the Alliance militarily, which Russia does not want. Not to mention that it would strengthen the international community’s support for Ukraine. And the strikes could hit Russia or Belarus, geographically close to Ukraine. Putin is many things, but not suicidal.
Is financial pressure not a valid reason to justify negotiations?
No. This would be the result of a short-term vision of the problem. Admittedly, the war affects the world economy: Ukraine’s partners are spending considerable sums to help it financially or by directly supplying it with arms (more than 100 billion dollars since February). But these sums pale in comparison to the estimated costs of rebuilding Ukraine after the war. And in the case of a frozen conflict, this money will have to come from the United States and the EU, and not from Russia. Indeed, there would be no recognition of a win/lose situation, which would give Russia a blank check to avoid acknowledging its responsibility for war crimes, its deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure and its obligation participation in the reconstruction of Ukraine. Moreover, these costs will be increased tenfold in the event of a new war. The sums at stake are considerable on both sides, but if we freeze the conflict now, they will be much greater in the future.
Some might answer you that any “successful” negotiation goes through many attempts which at first might have seemed like “failures” for lack of concrete results on the ground. Aren’t you a bit pessimistic?
There may be negotiations on specific subjects such as grain, prisoner exchanges or Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. But previous negotiations of this type have not changed Putin’s reading of this war. For example, he withdrew from Kherson but still considers it his territory. I don’t know if I’m pessimistic, but I think I’m realistic. The time for negotiations will come, either with Putin or with his successor. But I am firmly opposed to pushing for negotiations that have no chance of succeeding. It is not a question of choosing between a bloody war and diplomacy, but between a bloody war and an equally bloody peace. If the international community is ready to sacrifice Ukrainian civilians in exchange for freezing the conflict, we must at least be aware of the compromises that this implies. For now, only the defeat of the Kremlin will make it possible to do justice and above all to establish a lasting peace.
Who has the most to gain from negotiations?
Russia is losing ground and men, and sanctions are beginning to strangle its economy. It therefore has every interest in starting negotiations to return. The big losers will be the Ukrainians (primarily the civilians under Russian occupation). And to a lesser extent, the West, which will find itself with a frozen, but unresolved, conflict in the middle of Europe. In negotiations, each side usually gives something, but it is clear that Ukraine will have to give much more than Russia.