A new step has been taken by the members of NATO, who are going to supply combat tanks to Ukraine. The military escalation in Ukraine does not seem to be able to be stopped by any diplomatic prospect. It is now clear, almost a year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that the “special military operation” did not go as planned: the Russian army had to change its strategy and strategist several times ; THE churn rate of the Russian army in the Ukrainian theater turn out to be very high, according to the most reliable estimates available to us, and concern equipment such as troops; insider critics abound; neither the Ukrainian army nor the Ukrainian power collapsed, despite the terrible consequences for a whole section of the civilian population; Westerners have remained at a high level of cohesion despite the deleterious effects of the energy crisis in Europe (even on this question of heavy equipment, so little consensual, they end up acting in concert)
The inability of the Russian army to easily and quickly win this war is bad news both for Russian power, internally, and for Russian power on the international scene. Similarly, the massive loss of equipment, sometimes among the most expensive, will perhaps permanently weaken Russian intervention capabilities in other theaters (we can already see this in the Caucasus) and dim the prospect of an attempted Russian coup elsewhere in Europe, particularly in the Baltic countries or further north… But this is perhaps not the main negative consequence for the Russian authorities and army.
The unfolding and the prolongation of this war in fact cause the continuous accentuation of a process started from the beginning: the delivery of military equipment to Ukraine by the Western powers, led by the Americans, with all that entails of the transfer of skills, know-how and abilities. The course of the heavy tanks is crossed. The next may be the delivery of Western-designed combat aircraft. Until recently, the West had limited the delivery of such materials to Ukraine. Of course, France delivered Caesar cannons from April 2022. But if we take the case of armored equipment (but also aviation), Westerners first organized themselves to deliver tanks and planes of Russian design still used in the armies of Eastern Europe.
There are undoubtedly several causes for this, including the ease and therefore the speed of implementation for the Ukrainian army of equipment already known and used. But now, Americans like French and Germans are taking a new step: the delivery of Western-designed equipment, such as the French AMX-10 RC light combat tanks, the American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles or the Marder infantry fighting vehicles ; the German Leopard 2 and American Abrams battle tanks; not to mention the air defense equipment, in particular the highly anticipated Patriot air defense batteries which could significantly reduce, or even challenge, Russian air and ballistic supremacy.
Real-life testing of NATO military equipment
At this stage of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it is possible to envisage that the conflict is likely to last for a long time, barring a dramatic change at the top of the Russian state. But a number of consequences of this conflict seem to be consolidating over the weeks and months. Here are the main ones:
1/ The mechanisms for transferring military equipment from former members of the Warsaw Pact to Ukraine has the secondary, but strategically major, effect of accelerating the renewal of equipment for the armies of Eastern Europe by equipment of Western design, often American. (but not exclusively). This is the case, for example in Poland as in Lithuaniain Romania or in the Czech Republic. This process will have the effect of enhancing the military capabilities of these countries, in terms of equipment and skills. As they are also members of NATO, this will therefore induce an acceleration of the process of integration and consolidation of the military apparatus of the Organization, in particular by mechanically and rapidly improving the interoperability of the armies of the Member States. This process could be accentuated by the decision to deliver combat tanks because if the logistical challenge is considerable, its learning and integration effects could be equally so. This is obviously a strategic consequence that is not very favorable to Russian long-term interests.
2/ These equipment transfer mechanisms, increasingly of Western design, associated with training actions with the Ukrainian army and coupled with direct experience in combat, will probably result in a drastic rise in the level of competence and capacity. of the Ukrainian army. It now seems unlikely that Russia will take full political and territorial control of Ukraine. Whatever the outcome or the situation that arises, Russia will find itself permanently with an efficient army of a country that has become openly hostile on its border; army which – moreover and at the politically opportune moment – will have every chance of joining NATO.
3/ This Russo-Ukrainian war is also a real-life test of many materials used in NATO armies (such as the French Caesar) leading to an acceleration of defense innovation with a view to improving them or preparing their successors. This is valuable against Russia, but also against a Chinese People’s Liberation Army which has no combat experience, neither for its soldiers nor for its equipment. The Ukrainian front interacts strategically with the Taiwanese front. The phenomenon could be aggravated by a weakened Russian army and economy which may struggle to rebuild their capacities. This process is facilitated by numerous captures of Russian equipment, including state-of-the-art. In other words, without committing any force directly, NATO will benefit from an assessment – irreplaceable on the strategic level – of the “real” military balance of power (in terms of equipment operated, technologies, strategy and skills) with Russia and indirectly with China;
4/ The gravity and the proximity, for the Europeans, of the threat provoked mobilization and cohesion rather than divisions between Westerners. And this despite the remaining strategic differences, some of which are of a worrying nature, such as the inability of the Germans and the French to develop proven and stable geostrategic cohesion. Their ranks are tightened as never since the end of the Cold War and this favors American leadership in the absence, or almost, of European defence.
5/ The intensity of operations in the Ukrainian theatre, even if for obvious reasons there is little mention of it in the media, represents an unexpected source of stimulation and legitimization of Western military intelligence in the face of a russian intelligence thwarted. There too, it is a “life-size” test for the Westerners, making it possible to measure themselves with risks limited to Russian capabilities while making themselves absolutely essential to the Ukrainians. The massive deliveries of equipment to the Ukrainian army would indeed probably be in vain without the equally massive communication of tactical military intelligence. This is the kind of capacity that is largely lacking in the Ukrainian army with regard to the technologies necessary to implement in contemporary conflicts.
6/ This war also makes it possible to have a realistic assessment of the cyber capabilities of declared belligerents and their supporters. This turns rather to the advantage of Ukraine and the West since the country continues to “function” despite Russian cyberattacks and nothing spectacular has happened among its Western supporters (such as the hacking of delivery systems of energy in Europe and in the middle of winter…). It shows that Western cyber defense capabilities are not as vulnerable to Russian capabilities as might have been feared, even if it is to be hoped that this will be permanent and without obscuring the – probable – link with the multiplication of cyber attacks. in our country.
7/ Finally, we can wonder about a collateral effect of this war resulting in a “strategic” strengthening of democracies. Authoritarian systems, stifling critical thought and contradictory debate, inspiring fear to maintain themselves, end up poisoning themselves and losing the strategic lucidity necessary for war and geopolitical balance of power. This seems to have happened to Vladimir Poutine and explain the failure of this “special military operation”, eleven months after being engaged.
It therefore seems – on the basis of the dynamics of this conflict for nearly a year – that the medium-term strategic consequences will be rather unfavorable to Russia and that the West – particularly NATO – is in a position to take advantage of it. very favorable strategy. It should still be remembered that despite this, history is not written but is written as operations progress, successes and failures. But, for now, the war in Ukraine appears to be a major strategic oddity for Vladimir Putin.
*Ludovic Jeanne is assistant professor in geopolitics. Métis Laboratory, EM Normandie Business School.