YES/To help Ukraine and give more diplomatic weight to France
By Pierre HarocheLecturer in International Security at Queen Mary University of London
By thus placing itself at the forefront of support for Ukraine, France could ensure a leading role in the debates on the future of European defence, but also on a possible future settlement of the conflict. These are major issues. To be convinced of this, let us remember the efforts made by General de Gaulle at the end of the Second World War to have France admitted to the club of victors. But today, its place is not acquired, because the presidential policy of reaching out to Russia has sometimes prompted our allies to question our reliability.
The context for sending tanks is favorable, because the German government is reluctant to take on a leadership role and remains very dependent on the initiatives of its allies. A delivery of Leclerc tanks could have a multiplier effect on the ground, encouraging other European countries to deliver more, and faster.
We have few Leclercs, but their main function is to be able to fight effectively against Russian tanks. They are not of much use in African theatres. Investing in the Ukrainian rampart means ensuring that tomorrow we don’t have to use our Leclercs closer to our borders.
Certainly, training and maintenance are major challenges. But the Ukrainians have demonstrated their extraordinary capacity for adaptation and innovation. It would not be surprising if their use of our tanks turned out to be very instructive for our own troops. Even by placing ourselves in the logic of a European plan aiming to send German Leopards as a priority, it is always possible to deliver Leclercs to a European ally in order to partially replace its delivered Leopards. France would thus contribute to the collective effort and, in passing, would disseminate the use of its technologies on the continent.
NO/”It would have a limited effect on the pitch”
By Léo Péria-Peignéresearcher in armaments and foresight at the French Institute of International Relations
France has less than 200 battle tanks, of which a hundred are waiting to be modernized in the coming years. This fleet is supposed to last until the arrival of the MGCS, the Franco-German tank project of the future, with uncertain success. Even if, as a maximalist hypothesis, France supplied a hundred of its Leclercs, this would have a limited effect on the ground, since it is estimated that for a functional tank, another is in maintenance and a third is cannibalized to provide parts. Less than forty could be sent to the front, with a heavy logistical investment for a Ukrainian army already faced with managing a heterogeneous fleet of vehicles.
To part with half of its Leclercs would therefore leave France with a “sample” of less than 50 combat-ready machines. The question therefore arises of the relevance of such a small fleet. It is therefore better that the French support is expressed differently: giving the twenty AuF1 self-propelled howitzers that it still has would be a useful complement for the Ukrainian artillery. Intended to be withdrawn from service by 2025, these systems would not represent an insurmountable loss for the Army. Sending more VABs, personnel carriers being withdrawn, is another relevant track.
Only the fleets of German Leopards (13 European armies are equipped with them) and American Abrams can provide the contingent of tanks likely to make the difference on the ground for Ukraine. Especially since each model requires specific training and its own logistics. France could participate in this support, in particular via the Franco-German company KNDS, by producing certain parts under license or by participating in the training of Ukrainian crews.