One year after the invasion of Ukraine and one year before the presidential election in Russia (March 2024), the future of Vladimir Putin, 70, hangs on the evolution of the situation on the front. In Moscow, the gap between the president and the Russian elites continues to widen, according to Tatiana Stanovaya, non-resident researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center – based in Paris – and founder of the analysis firm R.Politik: “Putin is now the only one among the Russian elite who thinks that Kiev will one day capitulate.” However, his resignation seems more unlikely than ever, believes this Franco-Russian analyst.
L’Express: Can 2023 be a rocking year for Putin?
Tatyana Stanovaya : By December, Putin must decide whether to run again in 2024 or choose a successor. For the presidential administration, the first option seems like a default scenario, but a lot can change in nine months. Everything will depend on the evolution of the war in Ukraine and how Russia will meet the military challenges. If Ukraine fails to turn the tide on the battlefield in the coming months, Putin will have a serious advantage. Otherwise, the Russian armed forces will have to retreat, which will constitute a serious internal political coup, not to mention the possibility of a second wave of mobilization. In short, the situation is not under control. And is therefore unpredictable.
The war could last for several more years. Is time on Putin’s side?
I’m not convinced, because a protracted conflict can turn into a trap for Putin. He thinks he has time, but he’s getting older and more and more isolated in his way of waging war. I would even say that he is now the only one among the Russian elite who thinks that the Ukrainians must be “liberated” and that kyiv will one day capitulate.
Today, much of the Russian elite thinks much more pragmatically. I would distinguish three main groups. The first is that of the supporters of escalation. These are the ultrapatriots who believe that Russia must mobilize all the resources at its disposal in order to crush Ukraine. It includes Evgueni Prigojine, at the head of the Wagner militia, part of the “opposition” (adopted by the Kremlin) and certain media which throw oil on the fire and feed the information war. This part of the elite, however, is far from the center of decision-making and cannot impose its vision on Putin.
The second group are the realists, also pro-war but who argue that Russia got it wrong about Ukraine, the West and its own capabilities to sustain this conflict and therefore needs to pause, start internal reforms and the fight against corruption before, possibly, continuing the offensive. We find this current at the intermediate level of the security services, among certain military bloggers, in particular those closest to the front, who observe the situation closely and are realistic about Russian capabilities.
Finally, a third part of the elite is made up of technocrats, who believe that this war is a disaster for Russia and that it should come out of it as soon as possible. They don’t want Russia to lose or plead for concessions or dialogue with the West, but they silently want this conflict to end somehow, so that Russians can get back to normal life. .
What these three groups have in common is their mistrust and misunderstanding of Putin’s tactics. Almost no one believes in a possible victory for Russia anymore. This is the main danger for the head of the Kremlin: the longer the conflict lasts, the more frustration and anger will accumulate against him.
What are the signs of this growing rift between Putin and the Russian elites?
The actions of the Wagner group and its boss, Evgueni Prigojine, are a first signal. The oligarch has recently become politicized. It represents a phenomenon that was impossible to imagine before the war, namely a frontal opposition to part of the Russian regime. Without being anti-Putin, Prigojine dares to attack the pillars of his regime – the army, the governors, the deputies and even the presidential administration. It has real political capital, its own agenda, its ambitions, its ideology. But he remains loyal to Putin, which, for now, makes him untouchable.
Another influential group are military bloggers, who have become an important voice in the Russian information space. The Kremlin does not control them, at least not all of them, and has to deal with part of the elite who are demanding criminal proceedings against them. But Putin remains very cautious, believing that this group represents a genuine part of civil society, potentially useful in revealing the weaknesses of the Russian system. Over time, these bloggers could gain influence and affect political decision-making.
Is Prigozhin able to challenge Putin politically?
Not yet, because Prigozhin officially has no status. It does not have an independent resource and depends heavily on its links with senior officials. He needs official institutions in all areas: to continue his activities in Ukraine, in the information space, for his business, in Africa, in Syria… In the same way, to recruit men in prisons, Prigojine does not had no choice but to rely on the support of the Kremlin, otherwise he would not even have had access to it! If he breaks these ties, Prigozhin will not be able to survive. And if he were to threaten Putin, the president could get rid of him at any time. We must not forget that the boss of Wagner has alienated a significant part of the elite, in particular the FSB, which openly leads a campaign against him on social networks.
In this war against Ukraine, what would a victory be for Vladimir Putin?
For Putin and for much of the Russian elite and society, this war is defensive, absurd as that may seem. Its main objective would be to put an end to the “anti-Russian” project that the West would have deployed, according to the Russian president, on Ukrainian territory. At the same time, he pursues two other objectives: total control of the four Ukrainian regions that Russia has annexed, which is, according to him, only a matter of time; and challenging the US-dominated Western world order. You will notice that he constantly talks about his “friends” in the world, that is, countries that have not joined the sanctions.
In an interview with L’Express, the writer Iegor Gran believes that “Putin has already created a magnificent way out”. Do you share this analysis?
Before the war, Putin truly believed that as soon as his military campaign was successfully completed in Ukraine, which became pro-Russian again, he would be able to choose a successor, ensure his election and ensure a safe life after his resignation. . But the situation has changed: the war will not end anytime soon and it would be naïve to expect Putin to resign, at least not before the situation has stabilized. We are very far from it.
Today, the main question is not knowing who Putin will choose as his successor, but whether, when the time comes, he will be able to make this choice and convince the elites and the people of it. The more time passes, the more its room for maneuver will be limited.
Can we speak of “Putinism”?
Yes, and moreover Putinism is almost more anchored in the minds of the population than Putin himself. It is characterized first of all by the attachment to traditional values: the family, the children, the religion… Patriotism is another founding element, that is to say that the interest of the State prevails over the private interest. In crucial moments, people have to sacrifice themselves for its survival. The third pillar is the entrenched anti-Western and anti-liberal ideology. Liberal ideas are still seen as a threat to Russian identity. I don’t see how that could change in the years to come.
That’s why if something happens to Putin tomorrow, his successor will probably continue to govern according to the same priorities as today. Putinism can therefore survive Putin.
Even if the regime is weakened by the war?
This will depend on the regime’s ability to have sufficient financial resources, both to maintain the salaries of its civil servants, social aid, retirement pensions, but also the contracts signed with a myriad of private companies. It must be understood that the political base of this regime is composed, in large part, of Russian citizens who depend, in one way or another, on the good health of the state.
When one wonders why propaganda works, why people believe everything that television says, some analysts suggest that the population is deprived of any other source of information. It’s wrong ! People have access to all alternative sources – even if it is more difficult today – but they choose to trust the state, because it guarantees them social stability. They are so dreaded to return to the chaos of the 1990s… Nevertheless, it is true that if the State loses control and runs out of financial resources, it will not be able to face security and social challenges. In this scenario, the population may begin to turn against the regime.
Is this also one of the hopes of Westerners, via their sanctions?
It will take time for the sanctions to work. We are not talking about one but several years, even decades. We should not expect quick results and I would even say that in the short term, these sanctions constitute a factor of consolidation of Russian elites and society.
Many senior Russian officials are distraught and see no way out of this conflict. But the sanctions leave them no choice but to stay and shut up. When you have been part of the Putin system, it is practically impossible to find a safe option to live outside of Russia.
Would an “exfiltration program” for these individuals in Western countries be appropriate?
All I can say is that among Russia’s elite, many see Putin as a leader who has lost his mind and is leading the country into the abyss. But they share, for the most part, his vision of a hostile “West”. If Westerners offer these elites no alternative, they have no chance of breaking with Putin.
These senior officials could also go to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere. They don’t…
Some people do, like Anatoly Chubais: long close to Putin [il a été son conseiller spécial sur le climat entre 2020 et 2022, NDLR], he resigned just after the start of the war and was seen in Turkey. He enjoyed a privilege, because Putin let him go. But if you’re a truly visible figure in Putin’s regime, you won’t be safe anywhere and you’ll be hunted down by both Western intelligence and the Russians.
For Western countries, however, offering them a way out seems inconceivable…
Likely, and that’s understandable. Russia has gone too far in this conflict. Finding points of reconciliation with the West seems inconceivable today. But the war will end one day and Russia will remain a nuclear power, even if it is affected by the conflict. It is essential to think today about ways to prevent new catastrophes… After the collapse of the USSR, the strategic relations between Russia and the West have not been resolved.
The disappearance of Putin and the end of the conflict – whatever it is – will not settle the question of the modus vivendi between the West and post-war Russia: the role of NATO, strategic nuclear weapons, anti-missile defense… These questions require deep attention. This dialogue will determine whether or not the world will be able to avoid future conflicts.