Passed by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Philippe Gros, senior researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research, is one of the best French observers of the war in Ukraine. One hundred days after the start of the invasion decided by Vladimir Putin, he takes stock of the fighting, mainly in the Donbass and returns to Moscow’s change of strategy. Maintenance.
L’Express: Where is the Russian army in its offensive, after 100 days of war?
Philip Gros: During the first phase, the Kremlin hoped to occupy Ukraine without major combat operations, once the regime of President Volodymyr Zelensky was eliminated. Hence the use of forces ill-prepared for the resistance encountered, with parallel attacks on too many different areas, without having the necessary logistics. In this second phase, since mid-April, the Russian army is concentrating, at least for now, on completing the conquest of Donbass and consolidating the territorial gains already made in the south.
Is this war reminiscent of others?
At the strategic level, like all wars, it is unique. It can hardly be compared to past experience, except perhaps the Kabul coup in 1979 as far as the initial phase is concerned. [décapitation du pouvoir politique]. At the tactical level, that of battles on the ground, on the other hand, we come back to the classics of Russian military power: artillery, “god of war” among the Russians, is the main weapon. In theory, based on the intelligence collected, it must crush the opposing resistance, before the tanks and the infantry break through, annihilate what is left and occupy the ground.
And in practice?
If we remove a few modern components such as drones, the current battles largely resemble those anticipated between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Central Europe during the Cold War. That said, the Russian forces show major shortcomings in this combined-arms combat (having to synergize artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, etc.), whereas it was thought that the modernizations undertaken over the past 15 years had made them more effective in matter. They fought as laboriously as during the wars in Chechnya of 1995-96 and 2000, with all-out attacks on the same objective, without the units taking initiatives in the execution of the orders given by the command. All without worrying about losses, with support from the calamitous man: we find the “culture of indifference” of the hierarchy towards the Russian soldier.
Although the logistical situation has improved with regard to supplies, in particular artillery, as close as possible to the areas of operation, the bottlenecks persist. This is another limiting factor that was anticipated during the Cold War era. Added to this is the opposing resistance, the terrain (urban or peri-urban areas, waterways, starting with Donetsk). We are very far from a dynamic manoeuvre. This second phase is a battle of attrition, ofattrition as the Anglo-Saxons say.
Does the Russian army have the means to pursue this strategy for a long time?
No, precisely. And that’s the big difference with past wars, for two reasons. First, the reforms launched in 2008 replaced the historic mass of men of the Russian forces against the modernization of equipment and processes – which we have seen remains quite partial – to gradually move to an army of contractors. In doing so, the Russian army has almost no longer maintained reserve units. The vast stocks of equipment inherited from the Cold War have been badly maintained, degraded by corruption. The other central reason is the asymmetry with Ukraine: the Russians have committed 80% of this reduced ground operational force against a nation fully mobilized on the human, industrial, etc. level. And as Vladimir Poutin did not pass to a more consequent mobilization, it does not have any serious succession.
What do you mean ?
Considering the initial strategic errors, its tactical inadequacies and the Ukrainian resistance, it wears out quickly. There are reinforcements of soldiers, recruited according to well-paid short contracts, among the non-committed armed forces, such as the navy, or even former conscripts who have become reservists. But they are still very limited. A new train of reinforcements, more important, could however arrive at the front in the second half of June, with the commitment of the battalions usually supervising the conscripts, replaced in this case by new contractors.
How many could they be?
We must be careful, as the uncertainty is great. The Russians would have initially committed 125 of their 168 combat battalions composed of contractors. Then, it seems, about fifteen others, in reinforcement in April, in particular the marine infantry, to which it is necessary to add the brigades of support and various support. With the combatants of the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass (several tens of thousands of men), the units of the national guard constituting the occupation force of the captured areas and the mercenaries of the Wagner company, we reach more than 200,000 men engaged .
With what losses?
Two weeks ago, British intelligence estimated that this force had lost a third of its resources. If we set aside the figures communicated by each belligerent, estimates point to around 15,000 combat deaths. Counting the wounded, the missing and the prisoners, this represents total losses that can very roughly be multiplied by four, around 60,000 men. Russian and allied forces, after a hundred days of conflict, are in the order of 150,000 men, while President Zelensky claimed that Ukrainian forces now number nearly 700,000 men. As for equipment (tanks and armored vehicles), losses reach levels of 50%. The Russians are already drawing heavily on their reserve stocks. Even the drones, vital for recognizing a target and hitting it, are starting to run out.
A Ukrainian soldier walks past the body of a Russian soldier in the village of Mala Rogan, east of Kharkiv, on March 30, 2022, Ukraine. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
AFP/Fadel Senna
What about the morale of the Russian troops?
It is a determining factor. If the Ukrainian determination is indisputable, the moral state of the Kremlin forces is much weaker, even if it is difficult to distinguish between what stems from the “culture of indifference”, as in the other conflicts, and a real degradation that profoundly affects combat capacities. In fact, cases of refusal of service seem to be very frequent. It is not surprising, then, that Russian offensive activity has gradually diminished. We went from looking for a victory on the entire Donbass front to concentrating on taking the northern zone, between Izyoum and Severodonetsk. And now it’s focusing on the eastern part of this area. This offensive is about to reach its “climax”. Elsewhere, the Russians entrenched themselves, used their artillery for defensive purposes and sought to fix as many Ukrainian forces as possible by limited actions.
How is the Ukrainian army defending itself in this new phase of the war?
The defensive posture favors it. It still seems to have the tactical advantage, even if the imbalance seems to have been reduced with the Russian forces. It uses its artillery more effectively, practicing for example counter-battery fire, that is to say the neutralization of enemy artillery. His counter-offensives still remain local and culminate too quickly to change the situation.
What about his losses?
President Zelensky explained that his troops were counting between 60 and 100 dead and 500 wounded a day. The losses are therefore heavy and probably of the same order as those of their enemies. Mobilization makes it possible to partially fill them. Regarding equipment, the losses are also significant. But the captures of abandoned Russian equipment, rehabilitated by Ukrainian industry, and Western deliveries compensate for them. However, the Ukrainian units suffer from a lack of heavy armaments, in comparison with the Russians, in particular in the field of artillery. Especially since ammunition resources (shells, rockets) for Soviet equipment are running out. Result: in the main combat zone, they are struggling to contain the aggressor.
And then ?
The central point for the coming months and even weeks is for the Ukrainian army to continue its rise in power, reconstitute its forces and manage to generate a mass of troops equipped to carry out one or more counter-offensives of greater magnitude. Because against it, the Russian combat power decreases, even if the reinforcements I mentioned can allow it to limit this weakening.
What role do Westerners play in the resistance of the Ukrainian army?
Their help is crucial. We have seen the effects of the deliveries of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. It is clearly the flows of heavy equipment that make it possible to restore the balance, in terms of firepower, with the Russians, or even to hope to build this mass of maneuver. This equipment is also more efficient, in terms of range or precision, than Russian artillery. However, the situation is far from ideal. Managing an increasing number of such different pieces of equipment must be a logistical nightmare. Will Westerners be able to maintain this aid over time? This raises questions with regard to the stocks available in the NATO armies.
And the information?
Support in this area is also very important. It undoubtedly allows the Ukrainian staffs to have an informational advantage over their enemies. The command of the American forces in Europe, for example, since the start of the war, has organized itself to provide the Ukrainians very quickly with military information, in particular of space origin. The aid also concerns information systems: the personal intervention of Elon Musk resulted in providing the Ukrainian forces with terminals based on the constellation of Starlink Internet access satellites.