Ukraine has been a partly divided country for decades. The nation has been torn apart by both political and ethnic issues and difficult history.
Religion also plays a major role in the recent history of Ukraine. Even in the atheist Soviet Union and in our increasingly secular world, the Orthodox Church has had power that can be difficult for Protestants to understand.
Religious life has contributed to both the division of the Ukrainian people and the abrasion of space with Russia.
Razumkov (switch to another service)Over the years, the research center has diligently studied the religiosity of Ukrainians: in 2018, about 70 percent of Ukrainians defined themselves as believers. By far the majority of believers are orthodox, divided into two different patriarchates, the ecclesiastical domain.
Doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki Miro Leporannan according to the orthodox map of Ukraine is quite straightforward: in the west the majority now belongs to the autocephalous or independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church or the Patriarchate of Kiev, while in the east there is a church under the Moscow Patriarchate.
In addition, there are areas in western Ukraine in particular where the majority of believers belong to the Greek Catholic Unitarian Church in Ukraine, whose worship is very similar to that of the Orthodox, but the churches recognize the power of the Pope.
These three largest are not just churches. Lines are drawn between religions on political and ethnic issues. Ukraine’s complex church history has driven spiritual life into a glass mosaic that will remain in a hurry – until it disintegrates.
Violent, religious history of Ukraine
Kiev is one of the largest cities in the Orthodox world, and also houses the Kiev Cave Monastery, one of the oldest and most important Orthodox pilgrimage sites. According to the writings, it was founded almost a thousand years ago.
For a long time, the western parts of present-day Ukraine belonged to the Catholic world, especially Poland, and the religion was divided into classes: the upper class was predominantly Catholic and the lower classes Orthodox.
The genocide became a national trauma that was not addressed during the Soviet era for decades. Now Putin has taken advantage of it in his Nazi rhetoric.
In 1946, another religious community was persecuted when imprisoned by Soviet occupiers Metropolitan of the Uniate Church (you will move to another service) Josyf Slipyjn and numerous priests of the church, delivered them to the gulags, or prison camps, and confiscated church money to the Russian Orthodox Church.
In the same process, the power of the Moscow Patriarchate in the country was increased, even though the Communist Soviet Union was a seemingly atheist state.
Docent of Russian Cultural History at the Alexander Institute Elina Kahla says that the chasing of nationalists, and especially Uniates, continued at least Joseph Stalin until his death, until 1953.
Kahla estimates that the violent history of the two occupied countries has created a culture of silence. When things have not been discussed and approached as a nation after the wars, the painful history of Ukraine is divided into East and West.
– It is absolutely terrible that Ukraine’s sovereignty and confidence-building capital has not been addressed.
Greek Catholicism was not re-legalized until the Soviet Union took its last breath away in the late 1980s, and when Ukraine became independent in 1991, the Unites got their money back.
The independence of the Church of Ukraine is rubbing against Russia
According to Miro Leporanta, who specializes in church history and politics, the union between church and state is often very strong in Orthodox countries. At the moment, this can be noticed by the Patriarch of the Kremlin and Moscow Kirillin close relations, as the patriarch has not established himself with the justification of war, on the contrary (switching to another service).
– In a Protestant country, it is so difficult to understand the great political role of the church and the strong influence on who is voted on and which parties belong to it. In Orthodox countries, complete independence is not achieved until the Orthodox Church has complete independence, Leporanta says.
After almost 200 years of waiting, Ukraine, which became independent from the Soviet Union, had the opportunity to become a truly sovereign state.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Kiev Patriarchate began to slowly disengage from Moscow. The final seal was given by the Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew Iwhich recognized the independent status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 2018.
The administration of the Russian Orthodox Church did not accept the decision of Constantinople. The Russian Church was concerned that the activities of the Patriarchate would increase religious inequality in Ukraine. At the same time, the decision severed the umbilical cord of Moscow for hundreds of years.
However, the Moscow patrols still have a strong foothold in Ukraine, especially in the eastern part of the country.
– The Moscow Patriarchate is a great way to strengthen Russian identity and power in Ukraine. The church is a political organization that has both its own goals and common goals with the state leadership, Leporanta says.
Patriarchates have a deeper meaning: the patriarchate of Kiev leans on the symbolic West, while Moscow believes in the idea of Russianness and follows the conservative Kremlin.
Leporanta believes that Ukraine’s religious independence and the weakening of Moscow’s power machinery have significantly eroded relations between Russia and Ukraine, contributing to the escalation of the situation until the attack.
According to Leporanta, Ukraine, which is trying to break free from Moscow, is now writing its own history of Kievan Rus’ and the Cossack Wars, and it is not in Russia’s mind.
The independence of the Church reinforces the idea of an independent nation, whose role in the world need not be exactly what Russia wants.
In the pocket of Patriarch Putin
In Orthodox cultures, the proximity of the state and the church dates back to the Byzantine era, so the alliance of the spiritual world and dominion is an almost ancient tradition.
– In an orthodox country, the church needs to have a lot of rubbish to be able to break away from the narrative of power politicians, Leporanta says.
According to Leporanta Vladimir Putin and in the case of Patriarch Kirill, the interplay between the leaders is a benefit agreement: Putin’s cooperation with Kirill brings the voices of orthodox voters and emphasizes a conservative value base. Kirill gains money, power and popularity for the Orthodox Church. Political and religious goals are combined, even in wars.
According to Elina Kahla, there are wars against Americanism and the unipolar worldview in the interests of both the state and the church. The patriarch does not condemn the bloodshed, but in his rhetoric seeks to justify it.
Only days after the attack, on Feb. 27, Kirill roared in his Sunday Reconciliation address that forgiveness without justice is surrender and weakness — those who break God’s law should not be conceded.
Kahla believes the war is about more than Ukraine for both Putin and Kiril. The war is fought over the idea of Russianness.
– Kirill and Putin have cemented their power through joint appearances and support each other in open warfare. Judging by the parties’ actions so far, they will not compromise.
Within the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill has received criticism from lower levels, but in Russia, at least, no dissenting views have been expressed in public leadership.
In Ukraine, some of the bishops under the Moscow Patriarchate have stopped commemorating Kirill in their congregations, and even the metropolitan representing the highest office of the Patriarchate in Ukraine Onufri is condemned the war (you move to another service).
– It is a political act in this situation, it means that they stand on the side of the Ukrainian people. It could be dangerous for them, Kahla says.
Is peaceful coexistence possible?
The distance between the churches and Moscow’s attitude towards the Uniates were tense issues in Ukraine during the years of war. Patriarchates divided east and west have inevitably become parties to the conflict.
At least the tensions have not eased, as Lepomäki and Kahla estimate that there are now a large number of anti-war members of the Moscow Patriarchate Church in Ukraine who are disappointed with their religious community.
However, the authority of the church can be difficult to challenge, no matter what you think of the war. Many choose to be quiet, at least for now.
Leporanta estimates that the rope has already been tightened to the extreme: when the war ends, there will probably be no room for two patriarchs in Ukraine.
– I would say so radically that it is difficult for me to see how the churches under the Patriarchate of Moscow and Kiev could operate in Ukraine at the same time after this war.
Options Leporanta estimate depending on the outcome of the war: if Russia succeeds in its actions and Ukraine is made to surrender, the conditions are likely to include an increase in the power of the Moscow Patriarchate. If Ukraine survives, the situation of the Moscow Patriarchate will be narrow.
Already in 2018, the recognition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church severed relations between Moscow and Constantinople. The war divides not only the churches of Ukraine, but the entire Orthodox world.
– Orthodox churches have had a need to internationalize, but it will be interrupted for a long time, Leporanta estimates.