The annual NATO summit in Vilnius will have left a bitter taste for President Volodymyr Zelensky. Even if the member states have pledged to maintain their aid to Kiev over the long term, no option to join in good and due form has been offered to the Ukrainians, the Americans having opted for the most cautious position in this matter. However, a number of positive signals have been sent to them, explains Camille Grand, former Deputy Secretary General of the Alliance and responsible for defense studies at the European Council for International Relations.
L’Express: What are Ukraine’s reasons for satisfaction with this Vilnius summit?
Camille Grand: The Ukrainians have received military support, with the French decision to deliver Scalp missiles, which complements a similar British decision, and gives them a deep strike capability. There is also a new German package of 700 million euros in military assistance and the establishment of a group of countries to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets. Added to this is the creation of the NATO-Ukraine Council which sets Ukraine apart among the partners of the Atlantic Alliance and will enable it to participate more easily in NATO work.
Regarding the principle of membership, President Zelensky did not hide his frustration…
What is positive is the consensus on the idea that Ukraine has a vocation to join NATO, even if the organization does not say when or under what exact conditions, as Volodymyr Zelensky and a certain number of supporters from Kyiv. Ukraine will nevertheless be exempted from the action plan for accession, the “MAP”, an often long and complicated process, which can give the impression that nothing has been acted on in principle as long as the examination was not passed. Finland and Sweden have been exempted. The lifting of the MAP suggests that things could go very quickly as soon as the political decision is taken. It’s more than a consolation prize.
Why did the Americans hold back the idea of an invitation to join?
There are three arguments. The first, which no one disputes, is that Ukraine has progress to make on its interoperability with NATO, on the democratic control of its armed forces and on other technical criteria. Then the Americans said that it is not prudent to bring a country into war, given the solidarity clause of article 5. They are all the more cautious that the ultimate security guarantee of the Alliance, they are. Finally, there is a third argument: the critics of the position of the United States suspect them of keeping this membership card for the negotiations to end the crisis. This is problematic for Ukrainians, who may feel that Moscow would have a say in the future status of their country.
Others wanted a formal invitation…
This was indeed the position defended by the Baltic countries and Poland. It was no doubt clearer, but at the same time, once the invitation has been issued, in reality, all that is awaited is the ratifications of the Member States. However, I regret the rather vague language used in the summit communiqué, which speaks of membership “when the allies decide and when the conditions are met”. We could have mandated the NATO-Ukraine council to work on setting up the accession process with, for example, a clause for meeting at the Washington summit next year. This would have complemented the other positive signals sent to the Ukrainians.
What more could be proposed at the Washington summit?
It is obvious that the Ukrainians, in 2024, regardless of the situation on the ground, will be waiting for much clearer signals. The Allies have one year to prepare for this next step, taking military developments into account. But if the conflict lasts, one can imagine that what motivated the American and German reservations will not have disappeared by this horizon.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky shake hands before a meeting in Vilnius, during the NATO summit, July 12, 2023
© / afp.com/Odd ANDERSEN
You are pleading for a German-style NATO integration model…
Yes, in 1955, West Germany (FRG) entered NATO, even though there was no peace treaty with the USSR, it did not recognize Germany of the East and that its borders were not stabilized. But it was made clear at the time that Article 5 applied only to the territory of Federal Germany and that the Allies would not support unilateral military action to reconquer the rest of German territory. This model is not perfectly reproducible – the FRG was technically at peace. But one could imagine an accession with application of article 5 on the territory of Ukraine controlled by Ukraine, even if a whole series of major issues are not resolved.
The United States seems to lean more towards the so-called “Israeli” model…
This is indeed one of the alternative models, which American commentators call the “porcupine” model: arming Ukraine and saying that we are ready to support it without having a treaty commitment of the type of article five of NATO. I remain skeptical, because the Israeli model is based on the very special relationship that this country has with the United States. Furthermore, Israel is a country that has military nuclear capability. There is also the so-called “Korean” model: a demarcation line, as between South Korea and North Korea and a foreign military presence – 30,000 American soldiers are active in South Korea. In my opinion, the most sustainable model, the most reassuring for the Ukrainians and the clearest vis-à-vis the Russians remains integration into NATO after the end of hostilities.
Doesn’t this summit ratify a form of vassalization of Europe by the United States?
The United States remains very central in European security. They played a fundamental role in the assistance to Ukraine in the first days of this conflict and within NATO and weigh there with all their weight. And it is very complicated to move forward on a subject when the United States is reserved. But it has happened that France or Turkey have expressed dissonant voices and that the other members have had to find a compromise acceptable to Paris or Ankara.
How do you interpret the French push for Ukraine’s membership?
France was at the balance point of the Vilnius summit, not having strictly rallied to the very open position of the Baltics and the Poles. It’s well done, both strategically and tactically, and it allows Emmanuel Macron to weigh in on the European conversation without always being suspected of having ulterior motives with regard to NATO. This will make France more audible to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and those of the North, the most concerned about Russia’s attitude.
What can we fear if the offensive does not allow Ukraine to reconquer important territories?
The Ukrainians are conducting a counter-offensive in complicated conditions, without air support. Having said that, I believe that we cannot at all exclude today the fact that they obtain significant results. This would reshuffle the cards and could open the door, in an optimistic scenario, to a retreat of Russian forces from all or part of Ukrainian territory, or to negotiations on more favorable terms for Kiev. The Ukrainians might even decide that, given the cost of this war, they leave out this or that region. Without giving up its sovereignty over Crimea, kyiv could agree to a ceasefire, without seeking to drive out every last Russian soldier from Sevastopol. All of this is linked to the support measures taken at the Vilnius summit, which should allow the Ukrainians to envisage an end to hostilities, before the Russians reconstitute their forces and resume fighting.