Treaty of the Elysée: the coup de theater of General de Gaulle

Treaty of the Elysee the coup de theater of General

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On January 22, 1963, General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the Elysée Treaty, a symbol of Franco-German reconciliation. A week earlier, the French president had surprised his European partners by opposing his first veto to the entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC. The journalist Boris Kidel then carried out a report in Germany where he reported on the discrepancy between Adenauer’s support for General de Gaulle’s position and the fierce opposition of the parliamentarians of the Bundestag. “We are against a Europe of grandfathers” confides a young deputy to our reporter.

L’Express of January 24, 1963

Adenauer in the midst of drama

In Bonn and in the Ruhr, Boris Kidel saw the masters of Germany preparing their counter-attack.

“General de Gaulle is deeply mistaken in believing that he can impose his policy on Germany… We are not Algeria at the time of May 13…”

This comment by a German parliamentarian, an influential member of Chancellor Adenauer’s party, reflects the real revolt that was unleashed in Bonn. The Germans feel flouted by de Gaulle who, on the eve of signing agreements providing for close consultations between the two countries, did not even think it necessary to warn them of the coup de theater he was preparing in Brussels, by refusing to continue negotiations with England. From the socialists to the bosses of the Ruhr, a united front has formed to demand the entry of the English into the Common Market. In the large modern building of the Bundestag, on the banks of the Rhine, reigns the tense atmosphere of days of crisis. Meetings of committees and parliamentary groups follow one another.

Outside, greyish pack ice descends the river towards Cologne. During the discussions, no voice was raised to defend the French position. Since the end of the war, Germany has rarely experienced such unanimity in a major conflict. Opposite, cruelly isolated, is the old chancellor who has just celebrated his eighty-seventh birthday and who sees the work of his life, the creation of close and permanent links between Germany and France, threatened by the theses of his friend de Gaulle. Until the last minute he stubbornly tried to deny the existence of a crisis in Brussels. Even after the general’s press conference, he maintained that France was only trying to put pressure on the English to force them to accept quickly the Treaty of Rome in all the rigor of its regulations.

The epidermal hostility of the general and the chancellor towards the English

“It’s just a technical accident”, was the first reaction of those around him. In the Council of Ministers, he remained majestically imperturbable, affecting to ignore the crisis aroused in Brussels by General de Gaulle. And his spokesman declared that the entry of the English into the Common Market would provide only a marginal subject for the conversations of Paris. But, very quickly, France’s intransigence forced it to abandon this position of refuge and to bow to reality. Never “der Alte”, as it is called in Bonn, has found itself in such a heartbreaking situation. With all his heart he supports the general’s refusal to welcome Great Britain into the European community. His epidermal hostility towards the English is as violent as that of his French friend.

L’Express of January 24, 1963

© / The Express

In private, he expresses himself in equally categorical terms against the entry of the English. In recent months, it has been noted that he used more and more the same arguments as de Gaulle, seeking to demonstrate, to justify his opposition, that the English presence would destroy the nascent structures of Europe. But the last few days have revealed how lonely the chancellor is in playing the general’s stalwart. He has against him the political world, the industrial world, and public opinion. The extraordinary has happened: Adenauer’s views are no longer accepted as being of divine inspiration to which the whole country must submit without flinching. In the political world, even one of his main lieutenants, Heinrich von Brentano, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, now chairman of the CDU parliamentary group, does not hesitate to show his opposition to the Chancellor in this European controversy. The Chancellor’s own party refuses to limit Germany’s European policy to an alliance with France.

Adenauer against parliamentarians

For one hundred and fifty minutes, on the eve of departure for Paris, von Brentano and his Liberal and Socialist colleagues lobbied the Chancellor, arguing that Germany could not follow de Gaulle in his refusal to accept England into the ‘Europe. This must be the German position at the Élysée talks, they stressed. Obviously the old Chancellor showed no enthusiasm for this unusual role of British lawyer in Paris. Constantly emphasizing the difficulties of recent months in Brussels, he seemed far from convinced of the need for an understanding with the English. Deeply distressed by the turn of events in Europe, the political leaders were not afraid to let him glimpse the weapon they have in reserve in this showdown. Dr Adenauer, who has pledged to step down from power in the fall after a 13-year reign, is seeking to ensure the continuity of his foreign policy. He would like to establish a link between France and his country that his successors could hardly break in the years to come. Also his strongest desire is to obtain the parliamentary ratification of the agreements which he came to sign with General de Gaulle. Freed from their old inhibitions towards the chancellor, the political leaders warned him that he risked a disastrous defeat in this vote in the Bundestag if he neglected to heed the unanimous opinion of the country. […]

In public opinion, General de Gaulle deeply disturbed the new feelings of friendship and attachment of the Germans towards France. Among all my interlocutors, whether on the left or on the right, I rediscovered the conviction that rapprochement with France constituted the essential element of German post-war foreign policy. A very real pro-French sympathy has ingrained itself in the German mind today. However, in the political elite, this credit has just been seriously undermined. Parliamentarians and journalists realize that the Gaullist objective is the creation of a Europe under French hegemony in which the current American preponderance would be eliminated. “The Gaullist conception makes the whole European ideal laughable,” one of the CDU leaders, whose political sincerity is beyond suspicion, told me. “An acceptance of these theses implies the betrayal of our goal which is the unification of Europe. General de Gaulle takes us back to the harmful bilateral alliances of the 19th century. By slamming the door in the face of the English, he is violating the Treaty of Rome which guarantees entry into the Common Market to any country which accepts its laws. It is deeply shocking that, in a frankly dictatorial way, it seeks to impose its will on its five partners.”

“De Gaulle presents us with an impossible choice”

The disarray of the men who devoted themselves to a close friendship with France is striking. They are appalled, “De Gaulle puts us before an impossible choice, one of them told me, he orders us to choose between Paris and Washington. It’s as if we were asking someone to choose between his father and mother. Of course, we can’t do without either of them.” The German reaction is essentially conditioned by the fear of seeing the Americans, exasperated by the European quarrels, fall back into isolationism and abandon the continent. No German would for a moment consider exchanging the American military presence for the French strike force. For politicians across the Rhine, the Gaullist goal of an independent Europe between the two great powers is only a dream unrelated to the harsh realities of our world. What counts above all in their eyes is the existence of an effective defense in Europe against the Russian threat, which, for the Germans in any case, remains complete. “What do the few French bombs represent compared to the 50,000 American nuclear warheads and the approximately 26,000 Russian warheads?” a German military expert told me. […]

But what weighs so heavily in Bonn today is the mobilization of the industrial world against French policy. Fritz Berg, president of the federation of industrialists, Dietz, spokesman for exporters, and Paulssen, representative of employers, gave a solemn warning to the chancellor that the failure of Brussels could lead to an economic and political rupture in Europe. […] “The development of the Common Market is in danger of coming to a complete halt if France continues to prevent British accession”, such is the unanimous opinion of the political leaders in Bonn. The consequences of the French position still remain uncertain. However, in Germany, it is clear that it provoked one of the most serious post-war crises threatening the entire cohesion of the Western world. Leaders realize that their country is at a crucial crossroads. So far the government has managed a balancing act full of prowess by simultaneously supporting Paris, Washington and, to a lesser degree, even London. Now General de Gaulle, by cutting the tightrope, is forcing the Germans to decide between their two main allies. Their supreme desire, in this situation, is to find the miracle formula that would solve this heartbreaking dilemma. If France persists in backing them up against the wall, they will eventually be forced, if only because of their military preoccupations, to turn to Washington. “Der Alte”, which will no longer be in power in eight months, cannot change that. For the new generation of German politicians, the general’s policy constitutes a dangerous anachronism. “We are against a Europe of the elderly”, said a young deputy to me. This joke reflects the German spirit of 1963.

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