Former Georgian minister in charge of relations with the European Union and Putin, Thorniké Gordadzé looks back on the troubled fate of his country since its invasion by Russia in 2008. A bill targeting NGOs and the media has triggered demonstrations over the past two days. mass campaigns harshly repressed in this Caucasian country. The text adopted Tuesday, March 7 in first reading by Parliament provided that organizations receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad are obliged to register as “foreign agents”, under penalty of fine. A text inspired by a similar law that exists in Russia. Under pressure, the project was withdrawn by the government overnight from Wednesday to Thursday, but the ruling party is not completely closing the door on its future return to parliament. For Thorniké Gordadzé, this episode shows the paradoxes of a territory shared between Russian influence and the attraction of the European Union.
L’Express: What role did the Georgia war in 2008 play in the spiral that led to the war in Ukraine ? Was the diplomatic plan negotiated at the instigation of Nicolas Sarkozy a success?
Thornike Gordadze: The 2008 conflict served as a dress rehearsal for the war in Ukraine, including in terms of Western reactions and the after-sales service of agreements signed under Sarkozy’s impetus. It was a test.
We must remember the facts. Before the start of this war in Georgia, the Russians tried everything that is now called hybrid warfare: destabilization, attacks, disinformation, economic and energy sabotage… This was not enough, on the contrary: Georgia accelerated its rapprochement with NATO, its candidacy was to be studied in 2008 at the Bucharest summit. Russia has also decided to move up a gear. After a few days, the Russians are a few tens of kilometers from Tbilisi. This is when international mediation begins. France then chaired the EU. Sarkozy’s plan, prepared in Moscow with the Russian authorities, halts the military advance of Putin’s forces, which do not take the capital. But it’s a bit wonky. On the one hand, the hostilities stop. But in these agreements – which the Russians do not fulfill – it is written: cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of forces to initial positions. But the Russians are not withdrawing, or very partially. Georgia wants Russia to recognize its country’s territorial integrity clause; the latter refuses. We cannot negotiate with the Russians, they are not credible.
Have Westerners blinded themselves to the nature of the danger posed by Russia?
It is very difficult to know what would have happened without an agreement. The Russians would have taken the capital, Tbilisi, but then? The plan saved Georgia from total Russian occupation, but it compromised its long-term security, its viability as a sovereign state. The results are quite mixed. France regularly refers to these agreements. In 2014, in Minsk, we consulted what Nicolas Sarkozy had done at the start of the Georgian conflict, and Emmanuel Macron did the same in 2022 when the war broke out in Ukraine. This is the model that French diplomacy proposed at the start of the conflict. Fortunately, things have changed a lot.
“We can’t negotiate with the Russians, they are not credible”
In 2008, nobody wanted to get angry with Russia. This country was “shunned” for a few months, then Barack Obama declared the “reset” of diplomatic relations. The Russians concluded that they could go further. If, today, we make peace with them, they will have gained part of the Ukrainian territory and they will try their luck again in a few years. 2008 is a lesson that has not been learned or understood. The consequence was the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
In today’s Georgia, can we speak of a contrast between the population, which supports Ukraine unreservedly, and a power that places itself in the Russian orbit?
Broadly, yes. Georgia and Ukraine are extremely close and very supportive countries. When Georgia was at war, Ukraine provided it with humanitarian aid. What unites them is first of all the common enemy. But since 2012, the government has been dominated by Bidzina Ivanishvili [ancien Premier ministre géorgien, il est l’éminence grise du pays, NDLR], who lived in Russia where he became an oligarch. Georgian foreign and domestic policy is now hostage to the personal interests of this billionaire, whose former employees make up the current government. Ivanishvili is very afraid of Russia and for a few years tried to play double game. He pretended to get closer to the European Union, while Russian influence grew slowly but steadily. The government could not impose a pro-Russian agenda overtly. But for two or three years, there is no longer any illusion, the Georgian regime officially criticizes the European Union. It uses the vocabulary of Viktor Orbán in Hungary and of Vladimir Putin.
The Ukrainians are furious with the behavior of the Georgian government, which was content with the bare minimum to condemn the Russian invasion. According to him, Zelensky could avoid this war. It seeks to erode the massive support of the population for Europe. The message is: “Do you want to join Europe and the United States? You will have war with Russia”.
Does the law on “foreign agents”, which is similar to the one passed by Moscow in 2012 to muzzle any dispute, illustrate this shift into the Russian fold? The bill has just been withdrawn, but are the protests it has provoked and which must continue likely to shake the regime?
It is indeed the copy of Russian law, and only countries that share such an anti-Western vision adopt this type of legislation. This kind of law is used to fight against the media and NGOs. However, civil society and the media are the pillars of democratic life. In Georgia, these organizations are all more or less pro-Western, and to target them is to play Moscow’s game.
Power was mistaken in thinking that society was going to remain passive. With the opposition divided, former President Saakashvili in prison, Westerners occupied by Ukraine, he felt strong enough to deal the deathblow to democracy in Georgia. However, between 80 and 90% of Georgians want to join the European Union. The protest came from all sides. It is not politically structured and rather comes from civil society, the parties being present but in the background.
The outcome will partly depend on the clarity of Western reactions. Will there be consequences, including personal ones, for the promoters of the law? Will Western countries go so far as to sanction Ivanishvili? The other factor will be the ability of opponents to organize themselves. They must also be ready for a long protest, like that of the Ukrainians in Maidan in 2014 or the Georgians themselves in 2003.
What does Mikheil Saakashvili represent in Georgia, imprisoned for abuse of power, and whose state of health deteriorates rapidly after being poisoned in prison according to a medical report?
Saakashvili represents a strong current, even if it is not unanimous. He is a figure of the main opposition party. Why does he stay in prison? It is first, for the government, an act of allegiance to Russia, which had once made it enemy number one. Then, the political agenda focuses on the state of health of the former president, to the detriment of the country’s candidacy for the European Union, the war in Ukraine… Finally, his case divides the opposition. For some, you can’t just focus on him either.
Does Georgia live today under the threat of a Russian invasion? The city of Pitsonida, in Abkhazia, a border region whose independence Russia unilaterally proclaimed, at the same time as that of South Ossetia, would arouse his covetousness…
Pitsonida is a sort of Saint-Tropez of the former USSR. The Russians want to annex it, but that poses a problem for the separatists, who refuse it…
The Georgian government thinks that, since it is pro-Russian, Russia will not bother to invade it. But if the latter is defeated in Ukraine, what will it do? Vladimir Putin is accountable to his opinion and to his elite. In the event of a Russian invasion, the current government will not oppose strong resistance, on the contrary it will try to collaborate.
Chances of invasion are lower if the Russian defeat is so severe as to cause internal instability. On the other hand, if the Russians win in Ukraine, they will not stop there. They may not entirely annex Georgia, but they will want to recreate some sort of union. It was feared that Putin would announce, in his last speech, the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as he has nothing to offer militarily in Ukraine. But he doesn’t need to do that yet, he doesn’t feel completely threatened internally yet. In case of discontent in Russia, he will.
What path should Georgia take today? What can we wish him for the future?
The country is tipping into Russian orbit. If I have any recommendations to make, it is rather to the international partners, to the European Union in the United States: take into account the aspirations of the Georgian population. For the past thirty years, it has perhaps been the most pro-Western country in all of the former Soviet space, with massive investments. It would be a shame to abandon it now, especially when the contours of a regional future are emerging where Russia would be weakened. It’s a window of opportunity for the West, which can tie Georgia to it.