These devices used by Russia to conduct its information war – L’Express

These devices used by Russia to conduct its information war

Three years of war in Ukraine. Three years of disinformation war. If not (much) more (much). Since the early 2000s, the Russian state has been at the head of a real information influence device. Its objective: to legitimize its “special military operation” in Ukraine, by making it in a defensive action. Posted this Monday, February 24a report of the technical and operational service of France responsible for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference (Viginum), analyzes these three years of disinformation.

France in the heart of propaganda

Since 2022, France has not escaped this information war. On the contrary. “By its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its policy of economic and military support in Ukraine, [elle] It is the subject of a particularly aggressive and persistent targeting of actors in the Russian information threat “, we can read in the report. This information war would have even intensified since February 26, 2024, when Emmanuel Macron indicated that The possible option to send troops to Ukrainian territory was not excluded.

To start, hexagon has been targeted by the system “Reliable Recent News (RRN) “, an information mode, also known as” Doppelgänger ” [expression allemande désignant un double maléfique, NDLR]. As its translation suggests, this technique consists in particular in the creation of false information websites, usurping the identity of media or institutions. Since 2023, The world,, The Washington Post,, Der SpiegelNATO or the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs have also paid the price of the typosquating, one of the RRN’s processes, aimed at encouraging users to visit websites whose URL is similar to that of the media recognized … A few spelling mistakes. Specialized French-speaking pseudo-media have also emerged, publishing articles on sport or European news, with an anti-Ukrainian editorial line. The whole thing relayed on social networks using fashionable hashtags in order to improve SEO.

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Another information mode: Matriochka. At least active since September 2023, the system has since been trying to discredit the media and the Fact-Checking by broadcasting false content on Telegram in order to take journalists and analysts to investigate false tracks.

A few months later, Viginum detected a disinformation operation involving the broadcasting of photos of Graffitis and a video shot in Paris, relayed on Facebook with the Turkish diasporas of Europe, only a few weeks after the earthquake in Turkey. According to a survey by several media, this action was part of a wider campaign, carried out by a Russian intelligence service, aimed at discrediting Ukraine, the European Union and Turkey by organizing false rallies in several European capitals. This information mode has a name: Stop Erdogan.

Faced with this disinformation, on March 2, 2022, the Council of the European Union implemented restrictive measures which aimed to counter the propaganda actions launched by Russia. The Russian and Sputnik transnational media have, for example, were suspended. In response, two new media were created in 2023: Voice of Europe and Euromore. The first, suspended by the European Union on May 17, 2024, denigrated Volodymyr Zelensky from Western audiences. EUROMORE, for its part, aggregates content from European or Russian media and automatically translates it into 48 languages. According to Viginum, the site is also funded by Prayfond, a Russian organization accused by the Estonian external intelligence service to be linked to unit 54777 of the Russian military intelligence service (GRU).

Ukraine and Africa also affected

France is obviously not the only concerned. The territories occupied in Ukraine and Africa are also victims. As early as June 2022, pro-Russian local television channels were launched in the Oblasts of Kherson and Zaporijia in order to legitimize the Russian invasion with the Ukrainian population. Internet sites then followed. “Portal Kombat” is an example. This information mode is based on more than 200 websites and connects publications from pro-Russian sources which “amplify the resentment of Russian-speaking local populations against the Ukrainian authorities”.

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On the African continent, an operating mode is particularly raging: the Lakhta project. Created in 2013 by the Russian oligarch Evgueni Prigojine, this semi-circular structure is responsible for carrying out operations of influence abroad. For example, the system had, via false accounts on social networks, accused of Paris of wanting to enlist Africans to fight in Ukraine. Since the death of the businessman in 2023, the project could be under the control of the Russian external intelligence service (SVR), according to an article in the New York Times.

For the time being, the scope of this Russian disinformation strategy remains “relatively limited” according to the report. “The many technical errors committed by their operators and the poor quality of the content produced” weigh on the effectiveness of the device.

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