The Middle East is today the scene of an “asymmetric war”, waged across the region, between Israel, supported by its Western allies, and the pro-Iranian axis, a priori the weakest link militarily, but which has adopted a posture of defiance towards its adversaries. In this war, time is an essential factor: Israel needs it to carry out its designs against the Palestinians, in Gaza and the West Bank, and to consolidate its regional position. Iran too, since its objective is to last, at all costs, on all fronts, to establish itself as an essential actor and partner. While America is trying to regulate the conflict as best it can, by supporting Israel, while tempering its ardor, and that of Iran. The war of attrition between Israel and Iran is therefore called upon to last, until a possible agreement that would outline a regional balance.
Two issues condition the immediate future of the Middle East. The first concerns the Palestinian issue. After ten months of conflict, the Gaza Strip is more than 50% damaged or destroyed. In addition, the Knesset has just adopted a resolution, by an overwhelming majority of 68 votes to 9, rejecting any creation of a Palestinian state. From the Israeli point of view, the two-state solution, the cornerstone of the Oslo process, is now obsolete. This decision also jeopardizes the fate of the West Bank, whose future sovereignty is called into question, and where one can fear an increase in Israeli repression. Both the government and the Knesset seem to no longer enjoy the support of the Israeli electorate, which is gripped by a security reflex that has only hardened since October 7, 2023. One can therefore legitimately wonder whether the current firmness of the Jewish state is solely due to the political stance of Prime Minister Netanyahu, or whether it reflects a broader consensus within Israel, determined to impose a new balance of power, and which the United States, sponsors of the Hebrew state, do not seem to want to stop.
What are Tehran’s real motivations?
The second question concerns the emergence of two rival regional axes, the first being formed by the rapprochement between Israel and the Gulf countries, which has become more discreet in the media since the start of the war in Gaza, but which is still relevant on the diplomatic, economic and security levels. Thus, the United Arab Emirates has just proposed to participate in a peacekeeping force in Gaza, under the aegis of the United States, de facto confirming the end of the current role of Hamas and assuming security coordination with Israel. At the same time, Iranian forces have expanded their scope of maneuver to the entire region, from Syria to Lebanon and from Iraq to Yemen, with Iranian authorities accusing the Jewish state of being behind the elimination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. While NATO has just announced the opening of a liaison office in Jordan, the first in the region (Jordan being the geographical pivot of the Israel-Gulf axis).
Now, if, in fact, the second regional axis led by Iran is today displaying its support for Hamas, the question of the real motives for Iranian action arises. If the objective of Tehran and its allies is to provide assistance to the Palestinians, the fact is that this intervention has not produced the expected results: it has not prevented the destruction of Gaza, nor has it really protected the Palestinians, and it is doubtful that it will be able to do so in the future.
But what is Iran looking for? In a second reading, its action can be seen as preemptive and guided by its own interests. Faced with the scale of Israeli operations, as well as the emergence of the Israel-Gulf axis, Tehran, which recently claimed to control “four Arab capitals”, can thus ask itself whether its regional achievements are threatened. Iran and its allies are therefore puffing out their chests and harassing the Jewish state. Between the lines, the Iranian message is clear: if Israel wants normalization with the Arab countries, and to continue to act as it does with the Palestinians, Tehran, for its part, wants normalization with the West, the end of American sanctions, and to preserve its regional achievements. The defense of the Palestinian cause is, in this sense, a negotiating card (even if some in the pro-Tehran camp may sincerely consider it fair).
Despite its influence, Iran is therefore surrounded
Apart from Gaza, Iran is fighting essentially on two fronts: Yemen and the Lebanese-Syrian bloc. The Iranian position is, however, fragile. Isolated on the edge of the Arabian Peninsula, 1,500 kilometers from the Iranian coast, cornered by its adversaries, Yemen is indeed difficult to defend. The situation in the Lebanese-Syrian bloc is no better: Iran, which sponsors Hezbollah, must share its influence in Lebanon with the United States, which finances the Lebanese army, holds a strong hold on the financial and banking sector, maintains ties with Hezbollah’s opponents and influences many government decisions. In Syria, Iran must also deal with the Turkish presence in the north, the Russian presence in the northwest, and, above all, the American presence in the east and along the border with Iraq, which cuts the Tehran-Beirut axis in its center. Despite its influence, Iran is therefore surrounded.
However, the position of its adversaries is not necessarily better. Does Israel have the means to invade and occupy Lebanon and Syria and dislodge Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad? Is the United States ready to repeat the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in Syria where Russian forces are present, not to mention Yemen, a vast chain of mountains and deserts? However, as long as the Iranians and their proxies remain on the ground, they will be able to continue to wage their own version of “asymmetric warfare” which consists of saying: as long as I am here, and I resist, I consider myself victorious, whatever my losses. This is exactly the meaning of Hassan Nasrallah’s speech.
The alternative for Tel Aviv and Washington, namely a massive bombing campaign in Lebanon and Syria, would not necessarily produce results either, as the example of Yemen shows, where the Saudis and their allies have not managed to force the Houthis to give in – not to mention that the pro-Iranian forces can, for their part, retaliate directly on Israel. Moreover, even assuming that these bombings succeed in breaking the pro-Iranian axis or Hezbollah, they would have to be followed by an occupation of the Lebanese-Syrian territory by Israeli or American forces (if Russia agrees). Otherwise, we would see chaos occur in which various formations, including Hamas or Daesh, would once again infiltrate, which could threaten the Israeli border and Western interests. There are therefore no obvious scenarios.
For Israel and Iran, the solution is therefore to gain time, and to seek to consolidate their gains, while trying to cause the maximum number of losses in the adversary to push it to make concessions. It is therefore to be feared that the Israeli-Iranian war of attrition will continue, with bombings and assassinations, targeted military operations. Until the situation matures for each of the actors, pushing it to an agreement. Only one thing is certain: Israel and Iran are ready to fight to the last Palestinian, to the last Syrian and to the last Lebanese. This is not really a scoop. But, for these three peoples, the pill is still bitter.
*Fouad Khoury-Helou, executive director of The Orient-The Dayis the author of several works on the Middle East: America and the Middle East (Hermann, 2015); Globalization, the death of a utopia (Calmann-Lévy, 2017); and The Collapse of the Arab-Islamic World (Hermann, 2018).
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