On the 111th day of the war, the Russian forces tried this Tuesday, June 14 to encircle the Ukrainian soldiers in Sievierodonetsk, a strategic city in the east of the country, but the forces of kyiv affirm “ hold on “. Beyond the Donbass, the war is also being waged on another front, that of Kherson. Interview with Elie Tenenbaum, research director at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri).
RFI : Isn’t the southern front the main issue for the Ukrainians ?
Elie Tenenbaum : Odessa and the great Ukrainian south were both clearly among the primary objectives of the Russian offensive. It is a Russian-speaking region, which allowed Moscow to completely cut Ukraine off from its access to the sea. And all the more so, because after the fall of Mariupol and the capture of Crimea in 2014, Odessa became the last lung, the last maritime opening of Ukraine. It is also an important point of contact and passage with Romania. But also one of the two accesses with the European Union which is not cut off by other territories, like Transnistria which is a complicated crossing point on the western border of Ukraine. So the South is strategic.
It is also a space of resistance. The Ukrainians have understood this very well by developing from the beginning and supporting a form of passive civil resistance in Kherson, a resistance that we have also seen developing in cities like Melitopol. From this point of view, it is a symbol, it is in a way occupied Ukraine, martyred Ukraine, a territory that Ukraine obviously hopes to be able to liberate one day. Hence the importance of being able to permanently launch this form of initiative in the South which fixes a certain number of Russian forces and blocks their offensive.
It’s a bit different in the Donbass, where the history is not the same. There are pro-Russian Ukrainians there, there are still institutions of the People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk which embody a form of Ukrainian discord while the power in kyiv plays the card of national unity to the maximum. This discord is not found in the South. So politically, the Donbass is more complex, militarily too. There is a concentration of Russian forces which form a form of salient on the Ukrainian positions. Sievierodonetsk and more generally the entire Donbass front is in fact partly surrounded. It is not a 360° encirclement, but a strong circumvention which makes the lines more difficult to hold.
Is a Ukrainian offensive to retake Kherson possible in the short term and what do the Ukrainians lack to lead this fight?
What is missing is undoubtedly a technical increase in the Ukrainian army as well as a reorganization of the forces. Because as much to do slowing down combat, defensive combat, the structure that had been adopted until then by the Ukrainian army, a territorial defense structure, relatively decentralized, very resilient is effective. Nevertheless, if you want to go on the offensive, you have to reorganize at least part of the offensive point and probably switch back to a more centralized organization.
They’ve been preparing to defend, not attack for eight years
Then you need a great mastery of these famous offensive weapons which have only just started to be delivered as the long range artillery. The Ukrainian air force is also still too weak and it is not with drones [Bayraktar] TB2 that you can conduct a wide offensive. Offensive capabilities are therefore not yet sufficiently present and integrated in the Ukrainian army. For eight years they have been preparing to defend themselves, not to attack. Contrary to what Vladimir Putin was able to claim during the entire phase of the rise in power of the crisis. Today, the Ukrainian army is not an army built to attack and even counter-attack against Russian lines which are well buried. There are also engineering issues. Many bridges have been destroyed, if you want to take Kherson, in fact you have the Dnieper to cross.
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These numerous obstacles mean that the counter-offensive is not for tomorrow, but it could take place in a few months. It will depend on the development of the Donbass front. If in the East the front lines freeze, then a new phase will be possible in the South. But for the moment a significant part of the resources is still dedicated to the battle of Donbass, the materials are concentrated on the logistics bases of Dnipro and Zaporijjia.
On this coastal strip of the Black Sea, what role could the Harpoon naval missiles recently received by the Ukrainians play?
For the time being, as always, it is a matter of developing a prohibition bubble, avoiding having too many Russian naval forces present and no doubt also replacing the Neptune missiles produced by independent Ukrainian workshops in too small quantities. The Harpoon brings significant shoreline interdiction capabilities, which pushes back the prospect of an amphibious assault on Odessa, although such an assault is now out of reach for the Russians. For sure, the presence of Harpoon missiles increases the sanctuary of this small southern cone of the Ukrainian coast. However, it remains a defensive weapon in a logic of coastal prohibition.
The question is whether Serpents’ Island will become a real lock
Therefore, the Harpoons alone will not be able to break the maritime blockade put in place by Russia, nor to dislodge the interdiction position that Snake Island has become. Serpents’ Island is fundamentally problematic in the short, medium and long term. There are rumors about the installation on this island of long-range ground/air batteries. The question is whether Serpents’ Island will become a real lock that will block not only maritime traffic to or from the port of Odessa, but also the mouths of the Danube.
