In the press, on the airwaves, and on social networks, Jordan Bardella iterates: “We will refuse Matignon if the French do not give us an absolute majority.” Unless… “deputies […] who have expressed in the past a closeness to us” agree to form an alliance with the National Rally (RN), Marine Le Pen casually said on France Inter on Tuesday July 2. The importance lies in the fact that “we can […] change the lives of the French.”
Except that by insinuating that an absolute majority alone would allow the RN to implement its program, the newly re-elected deputy from the North is stepping several meters over institutional reality. Because absolute majority or not, ultimately what matters since beyond its opponents within the hemicycle, the party with the flame co-founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, will face much more formidable obstacles if it were to sign a lease at Matignon.
Obstacle No. 1: The Constitutional Council
First and foremost the Constitutional Council. No one can imagine Laurent Fabius, president of the Rue Cambon Institute and former Prime Minister of François Mitterrand, allowing a text establishing national preference to live, or turning a blind eye to the abolition of the right of the soil.
“Certainly, the Sages must only look at the law, and be impartial, but there are red lines that they cannot cross,” says a connoisseur of the Constitutional Council. And to draw attention to “the sacrosanct principle of equality” which could be unsheathed in the event of “measures establishing too great differences between the French and foreigners”. If this is the case: no appeal is possible.
Except in the case of approval of the law by referendum. And for good reason, the Sages of the rue Cambon do not have the power to censor a law adopted by referendum. In order to circumvent the “government of judges”, Jordan Bardella could thus be tempted to rub shoulders with popular suffrage. To do this, there is only one possible path: the shared initiative referendum, the famous “RIP”, the fruit of the constitutional revision coordinated by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008.
But unlike the classic referendum, included by the fathers of the Fifth Republic in Article 11 of the Constitution, the RIP is characterized by the rigidity of its conditions of application. Because to be triggered, the initiative must be supported by at least one fifth of the members of Parliament – or 185 deputies or senators – and by one tenth of the voters registered on the electoral lists – approximately 4.7 million. “Which could take a lot of time: several months, or even more than a year,” explains constitutionalist Guillaume Tusseau.
There are two difficulties, however: first of all, unlike a legislative referendum, or a presidential initiative, the Constitutional Council must judge the conformity of the text before the opening of the period for collecting support for the proposed law within the framework of a RIP. Secondly, the bill must not have been examined by either chamber of Parliament. One could therefore imagine that the Senate, “particularly hostile to the National Rally”, according to political scientist and historian Jean Garrigues, would rush to the text in order to prevent it from being presented to a referendum.
Obstacle #2: The Senate
Thus, the Senate could stand out as an active pole of resistance against a far-right majority in the National Assembly. In the event of an attempt to unravel the Constitutional Council, for example. For several years, and even more so after the censorship of measures in the immigration law in December, the National Front executives have been calling for a change in the method of appointing the Sages, deemed too political.
A maneuver that would, however, require a constitutional revision, and thus, the approval of three-fifths of each of the two chambers of Parliament. At that time, there is no doubt that in its current composition, the Senate, “very concerned with the preservation of the institutions of the Fifth Republic” would stand up against this type of initiative, anticipates Jean Garrigues. This is why the National Rally knows that it has an interest in making allies.
Several of its executives are already reportedly canvassing to try to convince the most right-wing senators in the hemicycle of the Luxembourg Palace. “They will manage to seduce a few, but not enough to reshuffle the cards in their favor in the Senate, which is an assembly of centrists, rather ready to form a coalition with the Macronists,” says constitutional law professor Guillaume Drago.
Especially since the president of the upper house, Gérard Larcher, himself hammered it home in front of the Les Républicains group in the Senate: “I say it strongly: I will never, under any pretext, endorse an agreement with the RN that is contrary to the interests of France and our History”. Aware of course, that outside the scope of constitutional revisions, the Palais Bourbon has the last word. And that a Jordan Bardella at Matignon will have, like his predecessors, the weapon of Article 49.3 in the event of a blockage of the legislative shuttle.
Obstacle No. 3: The President of the Republic
Then there remains the President of the Republic, the ultimate guardian of the institutions. A text that would go too far? Referral to the Constitutional Council. An order that would shake his political conscience a little too much? Refusal to sign it. “It is difficult to see Emmanuel Macron making things easier for a government whose views he does not approve of and letting texts that he does not approve of slide,” confirms Guillaume Tusseau. If there is cohabitation with Jordan Bardella, “it would certainly be the most abrupt of the entire Fifth Republic,” confirms Jean Garrigues. This is for a simple reason: until now, cohabitations have been with personalities from a different political persuasion, certainly, but sharing the same republican tradition.
It thus happened that personal links were formed between the President of the Republic and members of the cohabitation government. François Mitterrand with Michel Noir, or Jacques Chirac with Hubert Védrine under the Jospin government. On this point, the respective entourage of the two members of the executive couple, formed after a forced marriage, played a crucial role. “The “The staff of the Elysée and Matignon have always ensured that the machine continues to function, which might not be the case in the context of a Bardella-Macron cohabitation, where the exchanges risk being much more complex,” believes Jean Garrigues.
Especially since to irritate Jordan Bardella, Emmanuel Macron could take inspiration from one of his predecessors. In 1986, President François Mitterrand took the liberty of refusing his cohabitation Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, when the latter asked him to sign the ordinances on privatizations. The Sphinx will not, however, refuse to promulgate a law voted by Parliament. Could Emmanuel Macron, “whose audacity is no longer in doubt”, according to Jean Garrigues, take a new step by, for example, ruling out promulgating a text?
Legally, Article 10 of the Constitution states that “the President of the Republic promulgates laws within fifteen days following the transmission to the Government of the definitively adopted law”. Referring the matter to the Constitutional Council and requesting a new deliberation by Parliament therefore seem to be the only possible avenues of appeal for the Head of State. But not promulgating a law voted by the representatives of the people would also be deadly. “It would put him at odds with his own dissolution approach, which he justified by the idea of calling for a return to the people”, recalls political scientist Jean Garrigues. Others, in the aftermath of the dissolution, remain more cautious: “The President of the Republic has demonstrated on many occasions that he refuses himself nothing”.
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