MOSCOW Two months after the bizarre military coup that rocked Russia, it appears that the founder of the Wagner military company, businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin has finally had to pay the bill for his ambition.
So it seems, because nothing around Prigozhin is ever completely certain.
His name is on the passenger list of the Embraer Legacy private plane that was destroyed in the Tver region on its way from Moscow to St. Petersburg, says Rosaviatsija, the Russian aviation authority.
The Russian media says that Prigozhin would indeed have been on the plane with the Wagner commanders. According to media reports, the Wagner commander, who was considered Prigožin’s right-hand man, also died in the crash Dmitry Utkin.
Greyzone, the Telegram messaging service channel connected to the Wagner company, didn’t exactly mince words:
– The leader of the Wagner group, a hero of Russia, a true patriot of his native country Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin died as a result of the actions of Russian traitors, wrote Greyzone.
– But even in hell he will be the best. Kudos to Russia!
The claim that the plane was shot down by Russia’s own anti-aircraft quickly spread on Telegram channels connected to Prigozhin.
There is no evidence for thisbut inevitably the events give rise to the wildest rumors and conspiracy theories.
At the time of writing this, there is no definite information about the reasons for the plane’s destruction.
It could be considered a real irony of fate if the plane crash that was Prigozhin’s fate was a pure accident. In today’s conditions, hardly anyone would believe that.
Inevitably, the speculation is directed in the direction of the Kremlin.
A short-lived revolt by Prigozhin’s Wagner forces in June defied the president Vladimir Putin created hierarchy, “vertical of power”.
The coup made the Kremlin look weakwhen Prigozhin’s forces took over the important city of Rostov-on-Don with a million people and advanced rapidly towards Moscow.
The situation was finally resolved by the leader of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko by brokering an agreement. This also eroded Putin’s image of a strong leader: He was not able to solve the situation himself, but needed side support from Lukashenko.
At the time, many doubted that the Russian president, known for his long temper, would not leave Prigozhin’s challenge unretaliated.
At first it didn’t seem like it: Prigozhin was moving around in Russia and apparently held negotiations about the future of his companies.
Perhaps Prigozhin was lulled and lulled into a false sense of security.
Perhaps he began to believe in his own irreplaceability and did not respect the agreement that ended the rebellion: instead of retreating to Belarus, he seemed to travel freely in Russia.
Prigozhin’s trump card was considered to be the lucrative African contacts built by his mercenary company.
Prigozhin had just published a video in which he appeared in full-scale war in Africa. Perhaps the founder of the Wagner company overestimated the security provided by African contacts.
The information had already spread to the public earlierthat Prigozhin’s favored general Even Sergei Surovik was relieved of command of the air and space forces.
US authorities told the public of the intelligence information, according to which Surovikin would have been aware of Prigožin’s June coup project in advance.
Surovikin’s firing could have been a warning sign that Prigozhin should have heeded.
In any case, in the Russian elite many will probably take Prigozhin’s fate as a warning to themselves: the Kremlin is still not worth defying.
The Prigozhin case still revealed serious internal weaknesses in the power system Vladimir Putin built around himself.
Putin has presented himself as a builder of a strong state, but in practice he has often resorted to informal methods of operation, which have rather weakened state structures and institutions.
Important projects during Putin’s reign has often been left in the hands of oligarchs who are considered loyal or political entrepreneurs like Prigozhin who sell their favors.
State affairs have been managed through personal relationships, bypassing official institutions.
Thus, also in the war against Ukraine, the Russian leadership has circumvented official structures through Wagner and later also through other mercenary companies.
After the “partial movement support” announced in September, the Kremlin has not wanted to frighten the citizens with new official elections.
The Russian leadership has preferred to recruit soldiers to the front through, for example, unofficial mercenary companies.
The mutiny of the Wagner troops showed the risks of operating models of this kind.
Private armies may not stay in their intended role, and gamblers like Prigožin may start to think too big about their own influence.
At the same time, state institutions appear weak when they fail to discipline informal gamblers.
During Prigozhin’s rebellion, the official Russian armed forces seemed to be following the situation from the sidelines. The Wagner forces simply marched to Rostov and took over military targets.
If the destruction of Prigozhin’s plane was the revenge of the Russian authorities for the warriors of fortune who had become too powerful, it also shows the weakness of the official structures.
Opposition politicians and other dissidents could be brought before the courts, but against Prigožin and the Wagner commanders, covert means were needed.
The turmoil that rocked Russia and accidents have often occurred in August.
These included, for example, the coup attempt that led to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kursk submarine accident in 2000, the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.
It is uncertain what kind of waves the destruction of the private plane in the Tver region will eventually raise.