At 1:32 a.m. on February 24, 2022, teams from Ukrenergo, the Ukrainian electricity transmission network manager, are hard at work. They are just finishing “isolated mode” tests of their electricity network, a necessary step to disconnect from the Russian system, on which they still depend. The ultimate goal is to synchronize with the continental European plate. The timetable for the changeover is already defined over several years. But he will be totally upset: at 4 o’clock, the same day, the Russian invasion is launched on a large scale. Despite the war, Ukraine is pursuing its objective and will finally be urgently connected to the European network in mid-March 2022, then definitively on January 1.
A feat, as kyiv regularly suffers massive Russian bombing campaigns on its energy and electrical installations. How to operate a network in times of war? Maintain a reliable system for the country’s critical industries, and residents? Glib Didychenko, responsible for the integration of Ukrenergo within the European Union, and Serhiy Fandul, head of national dispatching, were in France for the first time this week. L’Express met them. Interview.
L’Express: What is the current state of the Ukrainian electricity network?
Glib Didychenko : Moscow, with its hybrid war, aims to destroy Ukraine, its rear, and therefore targets critical infrastructure. In its strategy directed against the functioning of the energy system, the enemy launched, between 2022 and 2023, 1,200 missiles against these electricity production, transport and distribution installations. Russia strikes civilian sites, and more specifically thermal power plants or dams, with the engine rooms in its sights, while Ukrainian forces only respond by attacking military sites.
Serhiy Fandul : In the first part of winter 2023-2024, the Russians mainly hit industrial sites, factories and port infrastructure, to destroy the functioning of the economy. But at the end of January, they seemed to change strategy and refocused on transformers, large connection nodes and power generation sites. However, the Russians know the organization of our energy system too well. They know this way perfectly understand which big company falls under which network, and therefore where to target. The recent bombings of March 22, 29 and April 11 were the worst, since they targeted thermal and hydraulic power stations.
How can you protect these sensitive sites?
G.D. : After the great difficulties we had to get through the winter of 2022, we worked during the summer of 2023 to better prepare our system for the following winter, which allowed us to make it work practically continuously. Most Ukrainian sites now aim to have three levels of protection. The first two are the quickest to set up, the third is more sophisticated. But, already, thanks to the first two, we have been able to halve the damage and damages linked to the bombings.
What do these different levels of protection imply?
G.D. : It is above all a question of protecting the sites from collateral damage which would come from fragments of drones or missiles which exploded nearby. All transformers are protected by sandbag walls and metal barriers. But, obviously, only an air defense missile can protect us from a strike aimed directly at a site. This is what Ukraine needs most to ensure the functioning of its entire energy system.
When network equipment, for example substations or transformers, is damaged, small repairs can be carried out with spare parts. For others that need to be completely renewed, it would be impossible to do so without donations from our European partners, like RTE [NDLR : le gestionnaire de réseau de transport français]. And the Ukrainian national company Ukrenergo has released one billion euros in aid to repair, re-equip and modernize the electricity network. But if a thermal power plant is completely damaged, it is very difficult to replace such production power.
How is the network repaired in the middle of war?
G.D. : We have formed 40 rapid intervention brigades, representing 1,500 people in total, distributed throughout Ukraine to intervene as quickly as possible after a strike and restore the situation. They have special protocols, validated with the army on how to proceed. So we run, we run, we run… to fix everything. Unfortunately, the number of missiles sent by the Russians has increased and is still outpacing our efforts to rebuild the network. However, I think that in the end, our experience will be very useful and rich in lessons for other countries which risk experiencing a similar hybrid war.
Is there an effort by the Ukrainian population to reduce its energy consumption, to adapt it to the current situation?
G.D. : The population has learned to hold on, has become accustomed to it. In 2022, some cities were without electricity for several days in a row: we had to apply consumption restriction programs because the system was not able to provide electricity to everyone due to the loss of network elements. The latter, overall, was functioning “rather normally” until these last strikes in March.
Our company has done a lot of education with residents, especially on how to reduce consumption during peak hours to better manage peaks in demand. The population has also made great efforts to equip themselves with generators, batteries and photovoltaic panels. In short, all the independent sources of energy that households could obtain. The same was true for small and medium-sized businesses, which had to continue operating in the event of a power outage.
How can we provide reliable and continuous electricity to the most essential sectors of activity for the country?
G.D. : The Russians, unfortunately, know where to strike. When they target a point on the network, it is precisely the one that supplies large regional metallurgical and oil processing companies, to undermine their operations.
SF : We already have some large industrial regions that we cannot supply with energy up to their needs. They are forced to reduce their production capacities. I do not prefer to give precise names, but these are metallurgical sites, heavy industries, defense. What I can say is that the worst is happening in Kharkiv, an industrial hub where two million people live. Not a single power plant remains in the city. Obviously, in this situation, resisting alone would be an extraordinary challenge. This is why we are very happy to have, even before this war, achieved our strategic objective of connecting to the electricity grid of the continental European plate.
What assessment do you draw from two years of connection with Europe?
SF : We became a full member of the club on January 1, 2024, after the validation of the entire catalog of measures that we had to put in place. But due to martial law in our country, we cannot yet fully implement certain clauses provided for in the protocol.
G.D. : At the start of the war, the connection to the European network was made urgently. For a time, we did not have access to cross-border trade, because there were a certain number of prerequisites to meet. When this was done, we had the option to export or import 100 MW. Now, by improving our operation, we can import 17 times more: 1,700 MW. Which is absolutely critical to the viability of our network. Already part with the contractual amount of import: in emergency situations, we can benefit from energy flows to reduce the consequences on Ukrainians. And in the context of cross-border surplus trade, our operator even made profits. All these profits were put back into repairing the network.
Is it important to increase these import capacities even further?
G.D. : Of course. As system operator, it is in our interest to have the most significant import capacity possible to deal with all emergency situations. We are currently in the process of renegotiating interconnection agreements.
What if Russia got its hands on part or all of the Ukrainian network?
G.D. : In theory the threat exists that they will take over the network. But that hasn’t happened yet. And in practice, their current strategy is to destroy or raze the territories they want to conquer…
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