Around fifty meters high and 260 meters long, the “Devonshire Dock Hall” is the pride of the inhabitants of the port of Barrow-in-Furness, in the northwest of England. For decades, nuclear-powered submarines manufactured by BAE Systems for the United Kingdom have come out of this large beige-colored hangar. On the night of October 29 to 30, the emblematic building, however, caused fear among local residents. Alerted by sirens, they saw large flames emerging from its large, half-open sliding doors.
What caused this spectacular fire, which was quickly brought under control? No information was given on its origin, nor on the damage caused – two people were injured. The episode, however, completes the dark series that British submersibles have suffered for several months, a symbol of the setbacks encountered by the navy of King Charles III and, more broadly, his armed forces. These difficulties are all the more damaging as they come at a time when tensions with Russia are increasing and the transatlantic relationship could be put to the test by the return of Donald Trump to the White House.
A lack of operational availability
This summer, the English media were alarmed by the lack of operational availability of nuclear attack submarines (SNA): none of the five Astute class models, the most modern, had been able to carry out the slightest mission since the start of the year. One of these SNAs, the HMS Hanson, was continuing its sea trials phase before being put into service, while the other four were under repair or waiting to be repaired, sometimes for several months. With a double constraint, recently lifted: a ship lift to remove out-of-service submarines from the water, awaiting repair (its manufacturer has gone out of business), and a dry dock under construction.
Only HMS Triumph, the last of the Trafalgar class, armed 33 years ago, was able to carry out a mission. And again, not completely, since this older generation SNA had to turn back, even though it was supposed to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean. “The Royal Navy is paying for its underinvestment in infrastructure, but it is improving for the SNA, nuance Nick Childs, researcher at the IISS think tank. In the long term, the AUKUS agreement [NDLR : un pacte de sécurité entre lest Etats-Unis, l’Australie et le Royaume-Uni] should help solve this problem.” This partnership provides in particular for the construction of Australian nuclear-powered submarines with the collaboration of BAE Systems.
In the meantime, the current lack of availability has cascading consequences. It results in fewer trips to sea to train crews – already difficult to put together – and keep them up to standard. But also to ensure certain crucial missions, such as the hunt for Russian submersibles in transatlantic waters, in particular when ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), carrying nuclear missiles, go to sea to ensure British deterrence.
Here again, the Royal Navy finds itself in a delicate situation. Like France, the United Kingdom has four SSBNs, the centerpieces of its nuclear deterrence, thanks to its intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with atomic bombs, the Trident II D5. At all times, at least one of them must be hidden in the seas, ready to fire on command. But between essential renovations and repairs – priority over those of the SNA – the missions have been considerably extended. A record 201 days at sea was achieved by HMS Vengeance in March, surpassing HMS Vigilant’s 195 days from the previous year.
“In France, it’s generally 60 to 70 days,” explains a former submariner. “I find it hard to imagine how to maintain the attention of a crew for three times as long: fortunately we are not in this situation, it is not a record that we should try to beat…” Living conditions on board were degraded. Due to a lack of resupply at sea, the crew of one of these SSBNs on a long mission had to ration their food reserves, while concern grew over the sailors’ lack of concentration, pushing medical staff to distribute caffeine tablets, indicated the daily at the end of October The Sun.
The gap widens with the French army
The Royal Navy is no longer the first-class force it was for centuries on the seas. To the point of seeing France leapfrog it at the operational level: “I am lucky to have 75 to 80% availability of my frigates, recently welcomed the Chief of Staff of the French Navy, the Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, during an audition by the Defense Commission of the National Assembly. Against barely 33% for the British, he pointed out: “I have more availability than them, while they have more frigates than me” (ten against fifteen). The fault, as with submarines, lies in infrastructure and personnel problems for maintaining the ships in operational condition.
The navy is no exception. We find these concerns both in the “Royal Air Force” and at the level of the land forces – the “British Army”. These two armies have fewer soldiers and equipment than their French equivalents. However, the British defense budget is much higher than that of France (74 billion euros compared to 64 billion, according to NATO). “Defense manufacturers often have more influence on public policies than the latter[sur les entreprises en questions]was moved by Tom Sharpe, a former sailor, in one of his columns of the Daily Telegraph. This is how we find ourselves spending much more on Defense than, for example, France, even though the latter is more powerful than us in almost all areas.”
“The British army is in agony and it is starting to show,” confides a senior French officer. “They have lost the combined arms culture, some land officers have never trained to maneuver with a tank, which is unthinkable in France, another is surprised. They have dropped in range.” This has not escaped their privileged partner, the United States. “A top US general privately told British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace his army was no longer considered a top fighting force,” revealed Sky Newss in 2023.
Having barely come to power, the new Labor government has launched a review of the armed forces, the conclusions of which are expected in the first half of 2025. The Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, has reaffirmed his commitment to devoting 2.5% of his GDP to defense (2.3% currently). Will this be enough to redress the situation, but also satisfy a new American president determined to see Europeans spend ever more on their defense? Probably not, argues the former chief of staff of the Royal Navy, Lord Alan West, in the columns of The Observerrecommending going up to 3%, to “set an example”. “It would be a big step forward, he wants to believe. Donald Trump would be on our side.”
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