The Constitution invites itself into the conversation. In recent months, with the breathlessness – to use a measured word – of our democracy, the debate has swelled. This summer, L’Express revisits, with political scientist Olivier Rozenberg, associate professor at Sciences Po, researcher at the Center for European Studies and Comparative Politics, the history and issues of several emblems of the Fifth Republic. First episode: the presidential mandate.
L’Express: Where does the seven-year term come from?
Oliver Rozenberg: After the war of 1870, the monarchists are in the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, while being divided on the type of monarchy desirable as on the holder, count of Chambord or count of Paris. So is placed at the head of the country MacMahon, and for seven years, a fairly long period to find a solution. Some wanted five years, others ten, the seven-year term is a compromise. Eventually, even before the period is up, the majority erodes. We know what happened next: in 1875, an amendment voted by one vote established the Republic.
When did the first questions about the duration of the presidential term date?
They are not immediate. Longevity does not have many consequences, because the president then has a secondary role, it is the IIIrd, then the IVth Republic. The longevity of the function even serves its arbitration role. When the Fifth Republic took hold, between 1958 and 1962, the question was not discussed. It should be noted that during these four years de Gaulle has a very particular practice of the presidency: it is as if there was no seven-year term, since he multiplies the referendums, one in 1958, one in 1961, two in 1962, by calling his post into play. This popular practice will lead to its fall in 1969.
The seven-year term dies for the first time in 1973, except that… Tell us!
Georges Pompidou, elected in 1969, launched a reform which led to a vote by the National Assembly and the Senate in favor of the five-year term. When the Presidents of the Republic are of the same color as their predecessor, the institutional reform makes it possible to point out their specificity in spite of the continuity in the economic or the social. But Pompidou will come up against opposition from certain historical Gaullists, so much so that he has doubts about obtaining a three-fifths majority in Congress, which brings together deputies and senators. It is to say if the image of a parliament godillot is already false at the time: the problems come from its camp! The Congress is not convened, and the reform is forgotten.
After the Pompidou episode, the status quo continues. For what ?
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing led a number of important institutional reforms, whether referral to the Constitutional Council, the right to vote at 18 or support for current issues in the National Assembly. His program is sufficiently loaded. Then François Mitterrand, at first, does not deal with the question, whereas his 1981 program proposed either the five-year term or the non-renewable seven-year term.
His presidency will also be the longest, with two seven years. Has this changed thoughts on the subject?
During his second term, voices were heard calling for the seven-year term to be shortened. Mitterrand feared having to leave the Elysée Palace before the term scheduled for 1995. This prompted him to set up a think tank, the Vedel committee (1992-1993), which allowed him to save time and drown the subject among other possible reforms. The committee, which is under pressure from the Elysée on the question, is so divided that it does not propose anything with regard to the duration of the mandate. However, this period prepared minds for the reform of 2000 because of the length of Mitterrand’s presidency, the end of twilight and the two cohabitations.
In 2000, the referendum on the five-year term was organized. How does he emerge?
We are then, with Jacques Chirac at the Elysee Palace and Lionel Jospin at Matignon, at the third cohabitation: this is no longer the exception. From 1986 to 2002, we will have nine years of cohabitation out of sixteen! Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, once again a deputy, tabled a constitutional bill: he did not lose hope of returning to the Elysée, and said to himself that at his age it would be easier if it was for five years; he also finds there a way to exist politically and to put Chirac in difficulty. This one ends up accepting so as not to undergo the reform. Given his age, he can do the same calculation as Giscard. The political class is rather unanimous, with the exception of a few figures and the far right, but the referendum called by Chirac will fall flat, with 70% abstention. Chirac struggles to find a justification. He who cohabited as Prime Minister and then as President is in no position to stress that this is how we will avoid diarchy at the top of the state!
What is at stake in the battle of the presidential-legislative calendar?
In 2002, we should have had the legislative elections before the presidential one. This order had a fortuitous character, stemming from the date of Pompidou’s death. At the time, politicians and constitutionalists explained that it made more sense to choose the president first, given both his role in the political system and the interest of the French in the presidential election. There is perhaps also a dimension of calculation in Jospin, who will impose this change of calendar: in the legislative elections of 1997, the PS had not won alone, the electoral base is fragile, while the left has with him a real leader who is not disputed in his leadership.
The quinquennium is the last constitutional revision adopted by referendum. And already challenged. How to explain it?
We know that the political class and sometimes its commentators have a herding character. There are some excesses in making the five-year term responsible for all our ills. First, the five-year cycle for assigning power now places France in the norm of all modern democracies. Then, thanks to the alignment of the duration of presidential and legislative mandates, there has been no more cohabitation since 2002. However, this institutional form is deeply harmful, both for the risk of immobility of public policies and for the clarity of electoral judgment at the end of the cycle. Finally, the five-year term may have accentuated the domination of the president, but the least that can be said is that it does not date from 2002.
The most recent constitutional amendment, adopted by Parliament meeting in Congress in 2008, limited the number of consecutive presidential terms to two. And the measure is also already contested. For what ?
Already at the time, it was not unanimous. The Balladur committee installed by Nicolas Sarkozy does not recommend it. Guy Carcassonne judges the idea bad for two reasons: it does not affect the sovereignty of voters, and the two-term limit will deprive the president of authority in a second term, it will be a “lame duck”, as we say in the United States. He adds a point: if a president is ready to do anything not to leave power, it remains possible, either by changing the Constitution or by becoming Prime Minister. It is really Nicolas Sarkozy who imposes the measure, inspired by the American model. We can clearly see today that the second five-year terms are hampered when the possibility of a third does not exist. For Emmanuel Macron, the lack of authority over his troops is, for the moment, not too glaring due to the absence of an absolute majority. But he has a problem of attractiveness, and struggles to rally to him major personalities in comparison with his first mandate. Moreover, it may change his way of presiding. There was a little “scorched earth” side with the pension reform.
During his 2022 campaign, Emmanuel Macron pointed to the problem of democratic breathing. In what terms is this question posed?
There are two distinct problems with the five-year term: demobilization during the legislative elections following the presidential election, and the absence of electoral expression over the five years. There is no obvious solution to the first point. Perhaps proportional representation could make legislative elections more attractive. On the second, there are many participatory mechanisms or direct democracy which could be more frequent. Whether it’s referendums or conventions drawn by lot, a central issue seems to me to be to be able to organize them without presidential impetus, and even despite opposition from the Elysée. The possible reforms are numerous, provided we do not forget that the current situation has certain advantages, such as the stability of power and the avoidance of badly carved odds. In 2015, the Winock-Bartolone commission had proposed the non-renewable seven-year term, at the risk of exacerbating the contradiction between the initial electoral legitimacy of the president and his political isolation.