MOSCOW “From a spiritual and moral point of view, the military special operation is a holy war, in which Russia and its people, while defending the united spiritual territory of holy Russia, fulfill the mission of the ‘Retainer’, defend the world from the onslaught of globalism and the victory of the West, which has fallen into Satanism.”
I saw the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine characterized Universal Russian People’s Assembly in its statement in March.
It is about a Russian nationalist organization operating in connection with the Russian Orthodox Church. It is headed by the Patriarch of Moscow Kirillwho is the head of the Russian Orthodox Church.
“Keeper” is a translation from the Greek of the concept Katekhon. It means a state whose historical mission is to hold back the arrival of the end of the world and the Antichrist.
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine thus takes on downright apocalyptic religious proportions.
– Hardly anyone would have guessed 15 years ago that Kirill would speak like that, researcher Nikolai Mitrokhin says.
Mitrohin is a visiting researcher at the Center for East European Studies at the University of Bremen. As a sociologist and historian, he has studied the Orthodox Church for a long time.
Mitrohin says that Kirill’s political opinions have changed over time. Initially, Kirill was relatively progressive, pro-Western in principle and had good relations with the Catholic Church.
The patriarch destroys his own legacy
Because of Kirill’s current actions, black clouds have gathered in the sky of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the past, especially the Baltic countries were suspicious of the church’s activities, but now the same attitude is spreading to other parts of Europe.
– Patriarch Kirill primarily sees himself not only as a patriarch but as a politician, and that is an accident for the church, says Mitrohin.
Kirill is also destroying his own legacy, because under his leadership in the early 2000s and 2010s, the Russian Orthodox Church opened new congregations and communities in different parts of the world.
In April, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared in its resolution that the Russian Orthodox Church is Vladimir Putin the regime’s ideological weapon.
A representative of the Russian Orthodox Church denies to that the church is a warmonger.
– Our church is often accused of having some kind of militaristic stance, Vakhtang Kipshidze says. He is the vice president of the public and media relations department of the church’s governing body, the Holy Synod.
Kipšidze says that military chaplains in the army is a European tradition.
– The church has always and at all times supported the army, because the army consists of people who need spiritual help.
Kirill implements the ideology, but does not define it
Researcher Nikolai Mitrohin believes that the Western media has created a false image, according to which Patriarch Kirill is the leading ideologist behind the current regime and the war of aggression.
– It is clear that Russia’s ideology is primarily determined by Putin and his closest friends from the KGB of the Leningrad region, says Mitrohin.
It is the worldview of a security service officer: militaristic and xenophobic towards the West and oriented towards the defense of Russian interests – depending on how those interests are understood at any given time.
Kirill, on the other hand, is just one of the many ideological entrepreneurs who each support this world view in their own way.
Other prominent figures in this field are, for example, a far-right philosopher Aleksandr Dugin or a film director Nikita Mikhalkov.
The Holy Synod has been cautious in its statements
Nikolai Mitrohin reminds us that the Patriarch of Moscow is not like the Pope of the Catholic Church. The Russian Orthodox Church does not have a similar dogma on the infallibility of the church leader as the Catholic Church.
The most important decisions of the church are made by the Holy Synod, the meeting of bishops, and it has been more cautious in its statements than the patriarch.
– The decisions of the Holy Synod have not declared a military special operation as a holy war. In the last two years, there have been very few decisions that could be interpreted as unequivocal support for the war, says Mitrohin.
There are good reasons for this. The Russian Orthodox Church does not only operate in Russia, but has congregations in approximately 120 countries. In many countries, the churches under the Moscow Patriarchate are under pressure to make a clear separation from the views of the Moscow Patriarchate.
The war has, of course, led to the severing of previously very close church relations with Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, previously under the Moscow Patriarchate, announced in May 2022 that it would break away from the Patriarchate.
Mitrohin says that both in the Russian state media and in the Western media, priests and bishops who support a war of aggression get attention. The majority of priests refrain from talking about the war directly. Even if they support Russian nationalism, that doesn’t mean they support Putin’s war policy.
Mitrohin points out that the Metropolitan of Kaluga who was Kirill’s counter-candidate in the patriarchal elections Clement has said nothing about the war, although he is known as a conservative and a supporter of moderate Russian nationalism.
The church’s influence in society is decreasing
During the war of aggression, the Russian Orthodox Church has increased its power in the field of media and culture. Criminal cases are often filed for hurting the feelings of believers.
The church has therefore been assigned a role in the field of propaganda and censorship. Its influence in Russian society should not be exaggerated.
Mitrohin points out that only a small minority of the population, 0.5–1 percent, regularly attend church services. Only 2.5 percent attend religious services a few times a year, 7.5 percent once a year.
– Interest in Orthodoxy and its rituals is declining, especially among young people, who have a strongly negative attitude to everything, says Mitrohin.
Even in the state machinery, the church’s position is not necessarily as strong as one might imagine based on Patriarch Kirill’s visibility.
The Russian Ministry of Education recently announced that it will end the spiritual culture subject in schools, which Kirill had advocated for. The ministry canceled the subject without any social discussion and without prior agreement with the church.
The church could do without government money
As patriarch, Kirill has tied the destinies of the church to Putin’s regime.
However, a representative of the church says that the church is now more independent from the state than ever.
– The state and the church must support each other but remain independent from each other, says Vahtang Kipšidze.
– Church and state are much more independent of each other in our country now than in the days of the Russian Empire or especially the Soviet Union, when the church had no freedom, Kipšidze says.
Researcher Mitrohin says that the church could function without financial support from the state. It is the largest social organization in the former Soviet Union and the most effective fundraiser. Mitrohin estimates that the church receives 50 percent of its funds from the fees it collects from church services. Another important funding channel is large corporate sponsors.
The church receives support from the state, firstly for the restoration of historically significant churches and secondly for social activities, for example events and competitions organized for young activists.
Another issue is that any large-scale social activity in today’s Russia requires the approval of the president and other people in power. Organizations that kick against the radar quickly find themselves in the teeth of official inspections.
The young generation of priests has been overshadowed
The image of the Russian Orthodox Church is determined by the 77-year-old Patriarch Kirill, who grew up in the Soviet era and has close relations with the state.
Mitrohin reminds that Kirill is already very old.
Priests and bishops who are in the age group of 25-45 and whose worldview has been formed in the post-Soviet reality remain invisible in both Russian and Western public opinion.
– Many of them are quite critical of the war and Kirill’s actions. They have their own views on the West and gender minorities and other issues, says Mitrohin.
– We do not hear and do not take their voices into account, but it is the positions of these people that will determine the future of the Russian Orthodox Church in the next decade. I believe that sooner or later we will hear this voice, says Mitrohin.