The second in two days. An underwater telecommunications cable linking Sweden to Lithuania has been damaged in northern Europe. “It is essential to clarify the reasons why two cables are not working in the Baltic Sea,” Swedish Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin declared on November 19 in a message to AFP. This announcement follows the statement the day before that another cable – this time linking Finland and Germany – had also been damaged in the area. “We can confirm that the interruption of Internet traffic was not caused by an equipment fault but by material damage to the fiber optic cable, said Audrius Stasiulaitis”, spokesperson for the Lithuanian branch of the Internet. Swedish operator Telia. Internet traffic from the Swedish submarine cable, damaged since Sunday morning, was routed to other international links.
Although the precise origin of this damage remains to be determined, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius declared on Tuesday that “sabotage” was probably at the origin of the damage observed on the two telecommunications cables. “No one believes these cables were cut by accident […] I do not believe in the versions of (boat) anchors which would have accidentally caused damage to these cables.” The operator of the second cable – linking Finland to Germany -, the Finnish Cinia, also pointed out that “this type of rupture does not occur in these waters without external impact”. So, who is to blame?
In an attempt to elucidate the mystery, Finland and Germany announced an investigation into the break in the submarine cable between the German port of Rostock and Helsinki. Both European capitals said they were “deeply concerned” by the situation. “Our European security is not only threatened by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but also by malicious actors,” said the foreign ministers of Germany and Finland. Such an incident immediately raises suspicions of intentional damage.” European concern is not surprising: in recent months, incidents in the area have multiplied, with all eyes turning towards Moscow. Analysis with Camille Morel, researcher associated with the Institute for Strategy and Defense Studies, author of Submarine cables. Challenges and perspectives in the 21st century.
L’Express: Were you surprised by the speed with which the German and Finnish ministers raised the possibility of a malicious act to explain the damage to the cables?
Camille Morel: Let’s remember the facts. Two cables were damaged within days of each other, in a highly scrutinized area – the Baltic Sea. Investigations have been carried out but, to date, we do not know anything about the origin of these defects. In both cases, we simply know that some of the traffic has been compromised, and that some of the flow has been “rerouted” to other cables. At present, it is therefore impossible to identify the author(s) of these facts with certainty. However, the international environment obviously gives rise to suspicions.
First, the current tension with Russia, given the conflict in Ukraine, but also the latest declarations from the Baltic countries, in particular, which fear attacks from Moscow. We are in a very particular context, where the Russian threat looms.
Especially since, recently, intimidation has increased. Five days ago, a Russian ship equipped with hypersonic cruise missiles, the Zircon, crossed the English Channel. This weekend, in particular, a Russian ship, the Yantar, was near Irish waters. In the past, there have already been suspicions of this ship’s interest in submarine cables. These elements will weigh in people’s minds in the sense of intentional damage. The whole challenge will be to attribute this event to an actor. But we are still far from having proof of anything.
Do we even have proof that this is human intervention, or could it be a technical problem?
Around 70% of submarine cable damage has natural causes. This time, Cinia set aside the possibility of an underwater earthquake. Apart from this hypothesis, however, there remains many possibilities for damage other than human intervention. Fishermen may have caused damage by accident. This could also be a technical fault. It could be a lot of things in reality – it’s unclear whether or not it was a malicious act. This is what the investigation will try to define.
What would be the point for Russia to damage these cables?
For Russia, as for other countries, attacking communications networks is a lever in the context of a conflict. It is a way of putting pressure on a government, on a population. Moscow uses this communications lever a lot – whether cables, but also satellites, Internet servers. Moscow routinely attacks communications infrastructure. The damage to the cables would therefore be consistent with Russian techniques, and their hybrid way of acting. I emphasize this last point, because the whole point of such an operation is obviously that it is difficult to attribute.
When a State tries hybrid warfare – or rather hybridity techniques – it chooses not to act publicly and therefore does not claim its action. It may even decide not to carry out the action itself, but to act through non-state actors. In the case that concerns us, its goal would not be to cut off a country from its communications – the attacks carried out are too limited for that – but to show its capacity to act, to cause harm. A country that uses these techniques wants to put pressure and sow doubt in the minds of those it attacks.
Berlin and Helsinki have nevertheless raised the possibility of Russian intervention. Does this signify a change in the doctrine of European States in this area? ?
Since 2023, there have been a series of attacks on maritime infrastructure in the broad sense in the North Sea and Baltic Sea aimed at damaging submarine cables. As the clusters of clues become a little more solid over the months, suspicions about Moscow continue to grow a little more. However, these acts are never formally claimed: as I already have, their whole point is to remain vague. European countries have therefore had a change in philosophy since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, and are more quick to assert their suspicions when events similar to the cable damage we are talking about today occur.
However, victim states are still quite helpless when it comes to organizing reprisals in the face of this type of attack.
Indeed, but the subject is of increasing concern. Hybridity is the subject of discussions in European circles, with the hope, ultimately, of defining a doctrine of action in order to have a common position. Several countries have called for the establishment of an intelligence cooperation service, in particular to monitor these cables. But for now, they leave it there.
It is important to remember that this possible attack remains below a certain intensity threshold. No territory has been cut off from the rest of the world. The possible perpetrator attacked an Internet stream, which could be recovered by another means. The damage therefore did not have sufficient consequences to trigger a response, especially since its perpetrator has not been identified with certainty. This is the whole point of these hybrid attacks: to maintain ambiguity. The threat looms, but it is elusive – and therefore difficult to stop.
Does cable damage require special technology? Is their location known, or does it require intelligence efforts?
If the damage occurs close to the surface, it is possible to reach the cables with an anchor or grappling hook. On the other hand, if you want to be discreet, you can act in deeper places. It is then necessary to use drones and underwater robots to intervene in depth.
But this requires a greater investment in intelligence, in order to know precisely where the target is. This information is not known to the general public, but rather to operators and their subcontractors. This is also the case for the countries to which the territorial waters they cross belong. Obtaining a precise map of their route therefore requires bringing together all this information.
Is this desire to attack underwater infrastructure new to the Ukrainian conflict, or has it already occurred in the past?
It is at least as old as the First World War. One of the first objectives was to cut German submarine cables at specific locations in order to isolate Berlin from the rest of the world. At the time, this action was on a completely different scale than the damage of recent days: the country had no other levers to communicate internationally. More recently, the Nord Stream gas pipeline was damaged a few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The origin of this damage is still unclear today: the uncertainty caused by this type of affair is still one of their main interests.
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