The title is in the form of a question, and the answer is no. On January 18, Jean-Dominique Merchet, daily journalist Opinion, specialist in defense issues, published by Robert Laffont Are we ready for war?*, a reflection on France’s capacity to face a major conflict. Ammunition, personnel, industrial capacities… Reviewing all of the French military forces, he draws a damning observation: with its “bonsai” or “sample” army (with a little of everything but in small quantities), Paris could not not fight for long against a powerful aggressor. In the first pages of his work, he explains, for example, that the Grande Muette would not be capable of holding a front more than 80 kilometers long, the distance “separating Dunkirk from Lille or Strasbourg from Mulhouse”.
Faced with Russian aggression, the Ukrainian army had to deploy and hold a 1,000 kilometer front. Our army model, also described as “expeditionary” – transformed over the years to carry out operations in the Middle East or Africa – is no longer capable of enduring so-called “high intensity” or “high intensity” wars. major commitment”. Interview.
L’Express: The military programming law [LPM] 2024-2030, adopted in July 2023 by Parliament, provides for an increase in the army budget. Would this be sufficient to face a possible invasion of our territory similar to that experienced by Ukraine?
Jean-Dominique Merchet: During the discussion on the military programming law, we were faced with real choices. It was either necessary to continue as before, or to make an extremely important strategic choice. The geopolitical situation in Europe, with the presence on our doorstep of a revisionist Russia, as well as the risk of American disengagement from NATO – in the event of a re-election of Donald Trump – push us to think about our model army. This could mean abandoning the current posture of the French army, whose model resembles that of the American armies. But we are not the United States. We have what we call a “bonsai army”, or “sample” – say the most critical: we know how to do everything, but not much, and not for very long. We are, moreover, in debt to the tune of 3,000 billion euros, which makes it difficult to increase the defense budget sufficiently to move out of this category.
But, despite the new threats, it was decided to keep this model which, ultimately, suits all soldiers. We remain with the army as we have known it for thirty years. We did not choose to refocus on Europe and perhaps the Mediterranean – on collective defense – thinking that, perhaps, others would do it in our place. We doubtless think that we can act in this way because France will continue to be a great power, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a nuclear power. But I think that this is a French illusion – this is also the subtitle of my book – and that, sooner or later, revision will be necessary.
During the discussions and negotiations on the MPL, it was often said that the “navy had won”, perhaps to the detriment of the army. Don’t you agree?
The navy is doing well. The army, on the other hand, is very bad. What would more resources have meant for the army? A body likely to be present very quickly in Eastern Europe – in Romania, in Poland, in the Baltic countries. This would have meant a restructuring with many more tanks and more artillery, more means of transport, more combat aircraft on European soil, more missiles, more air defense. All while maintaining nuclear deterrence. In short, this meant a much more robust army. The Army tried, a little, to sell this idea. It clearly did not succeed, especially since these developments only worked within the framework of NATO. However, neither the President of the Republic, nor the generals, nor the diplomats, nor the Ministry of the Armed Forces are fierce Atlanticists. They are not very comfortable with the alliance. The option was therefore not chosen.
In your work, you raise the possibility of a form of sharing nuclear weapons with European countries, based on the model of what the Americans are doing. Do you think that this type of scenario could be imagined in the extreme case where, for example, the United States decides to leave NATO?
I hope we can at least debate it. In France, there is no debate in the strategic area, because it is considered to be the reserved domain of the president. Some of us think that we should at least start a debate on these questions. This is undoubtedly the most entrenched Gaullist taboo. Wrongly, no doubt, because General de Gaulle was precisely someone capable of questioning taboos. He did this in the 1930s with his theory on tanks and the professional army, then, in the 1960s, with the end of the colonial wars and the shift towards nuclear deterrence. General de Gaulle knew how to question our habits. Obviously, President Macron does not know how to do it.
Nuclear deterrence, which is the heart of our security and defense, has immense virtues. But it has a flaw: it isolates us in Europe. We are the only country with nuclear weapons – along with the United Kingdom. The entire heart of the defense of other countries rests on the alliance with the United States within the Atlantic Alliance. We should use our nuclear deterrent as a political weapon. I suggest that we propose to our allies, for example the Poles, the Germans – and others who would like to discuss it – a clear division, with a double key. This is what the Americans are doing with their European allies. American nuclear weapons are under double lock and would obviously be transported by fighter planes of these countries in the event of a confrontation with Russia. All this can only be done within the framework of NATO. This must be negotiated, planned, in collaboration with the Americans. For that, we would have to return to the NATO Nuclear Plans Group, which is the taboo of taboos.
In your work, you write that this proposal would amount to a “heresy for the guardians of the temple of French doctrine, which they only see as frozen in the great principles of the 1960s”. How do you explain it?
We are in the myth of the great France, that of General de Gaulle. According to this idea, sharing deterrence would somehow amount to losing everything. We can clearly see that, for fifty years, there has been a sort of French decline – we are no longer what we were. Our reflex response is therefore defensive and cautious. However, we still have assets, and we must play them intelligently, tactically, and finely. Let’s play them within the framework of the European project, which is in principle that of President Macron! Let’s not stay stuck in postures. However, today, there is a freeze in thinking around these subjects.
Concerning nuclear deterrence, again, you mention the fact that since the 1980s, France has reduced the number of its nuclear warheads by half. Conversely, several countries are engaged in an arms race. But is it really useful, to ensure its defense, to accumulate nuclear warheads?
Actually, not that much. A nuclear bomb would be enough to change the strategic situation. It is not the absolute weapon, but it is the one that has never been used since August 1945. The first person to threaten to unleash nuclear fire as part of deterrence would shake up the situation. The United States and Russia keep them more than they accumulate them. Between them, they share around 8,000 nuclear warheads. China is clearly gaining momentum. American intelligence services say that the Chinese, who until now were at our level, are building up to around 1,000 nuclear warheads. China is in a clearly aggressive posture, at the national level, of militarization. I think it is good that we leave it there, even if I insist: nuclear weapons are a factor in stabilizing international relations. As long as you have nuclear weapons, clearly, we will not attack you. If Ukraine had kept its nuclear weapon, I don’t think Russia would ever have attacked it.
Some countries, such as Russia, carry out attacks against other states while trying to stay below the threshold that could provoke a military response. These methods (cyber attacks, disinformation, economic interference) can weaken and ignore nuclear deterrence. So it’s not a cure for everything…
Nuclear weapons and armies in general do not protect countries against all attacks. This is why we have long developed the concept of national forces. It is a global concept, which integrates other things. It is clear that it is not nuclear weapons and tank divisions that protect France against terrorism. We are well placed in France to know that terrorism is a threat, and that there are other systems to fight against these attacks: the intelligence services, the police, the justice system.
The big news today is obviously the possibility of cyberattacks. A cyberattack can be an extremely serious attack, of course. But what we observe today is that they are overwhelmingly the work of criminal groups who do not require the same response as that which we would oppose to a State.
You also look at the state of artillery, logistics or engineering. These elements of the French army do not seem to be a point of political attention, although they are crucial for the Ukrainian army…
Nothing has really changed for them, even though we’re talking about some of the most important elements in a war. But artillery, engineering, logistics… these are things that take a long time to move. What is even more difficult to change are mentalities and culture. Especially since this type of question is not necessarily popular: today we are still in the fantasy of special forces, fueled by the press, television and cinema.
In your book, you mention the possibility of “investing massively in ‘reserves’, that is to say part-time soldiers” to increase our numbers. Do you think the general public is ready to accept that reservists go to theaters of operations in large numbers – and take the risk of being killed?
We have fortunately moved away from a culture of war. Not a Frenchman under the age of 80 has been forced to take part in a war operation. Not a Frenchman under the age of 40 has been forced to carry a rifle and a uniform. We are in a demilitarized society, with great exaltation of every human military loss. Public authorities and politicians also consider this emotion as essential. But this is not the case for the French. The French consider that waging war has consequences. However, perhaps the large presence of reservists in the army would require a little more democratic debate, particularly in Parliament, on the decision to commit the armed forces.
* Are we ready for war? The illusion of French power, by Jean-Dominique Merchet. Robert Laffont, 224 p., €18.
.