The cooperation program for nuclear submarines Aukus, between the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom, provokes the anger of the strategic rivals of the Americans: China speaks of a ” wrong and dangerous path Russia accuses the three parties of orchestrating years of confrontation ” in Asia. Interview with Héloïse Fayet, researcher at Ifri’s Security Studies Center, specialist in nuclear deterrence and proliferation issues.
RFI: Joe Biden wants to be reassuring by saying that the submarines will certainly be nuclear-powered, but that they will not carry nuclear weapons. China, Russia, but also certain experts, however fear that the principle of non-proliferation will be undermined by the Aukus program. What is your analysis?
Heloise Fayet: So, they are indeed two totally different things. It is certain that Australia is not going to acquire nuclear weapons, because indeed the submarines which are planned in the Aukus agreement are nuclear attack submarines. So they are not equipped and cannot even be equipped with weapons with a nuclear warhead. In addition, Australia is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), so it cannot legally acquire nuclear weapons. She is also a signatory to a treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga [pour une zone exempte d’armes nucléaires dans le Pacifique-sud, signé en 1985 – NDLR]Who prohibits any signatory state in the Pacific from acquiring nuclear weapons.
We can therefore say that the issue of proliferation does not rely on nuclear weapons themselves. It is potentially based on nuclear propulsion which, it is true, uses highly enriched uranium and which is therefore the same uranium that is used to manufacture nuclear weapons. However, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom have ensured that there is no risk of nuclear proliferation within the framework of the Aukus program, in particular with the help of a signature of agreement between Australia and the IAEA.
But it is still a transfer of highly sensitive technologies, and Australia will have access to American nuclear secrets. Isn’t the concern of countries like China partly justified?
I remind you that Russia, for example, also sent a nuclear attack submarine to India, and it was thanks to this that India was able to acquire its own nuclear attack submarine. offensive. And concerning the transfer of technology, it is not something illegal: the United States had already transmitted the technique of nuclear propulsion to the United Kingdom in the 1950s so that the United Kingdom could develop its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. Again, there is no risk of proliferation in the case of Australiaespecially since Australia has no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
What you also need to know is that everything is done so that the nuclear reactor is handled only in the United States by American personnel. In fact, the reactor will be delivered completely sealed. Then there will be only one reactor for the life of the submarine.
China is actually trying to manipulate public opinion on this deal, an agreement that is obviously directed against her, recalling that indeed, it is an illegal transfer of fissile material. It’s something she already explained last summer, but in my opinion, it’s a protest that is indeed aimed at manipulating public opinion.
► To read also: “Aukus only aims to be in a position of strength against China”
If Australia, a signatory country to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), will indeed honor its commitments, can the same be said of other States ? In other words : Aukus, does he risk creating a precedent and therefore weakening the non-proliferation treaty signed in 1968? ?
Indeed, the subject is rather there, and in this perspective, we better understand the Chinese hostility or even that of Japan which was moved by the Aukus program during the summer of 2022. This transfer indeed creates a precedent. Potentially, other states that do not have nuclear weapons, but who are interested in nuclear propulsion could use this Australian precedent to justify a right to nuclear propulsion as well. We think of South Korea, for example.
Other countries, perhaps a little less careful and a little less respectful of IAEA safeguards [l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique de l’ONU – NDLR], could then wish to acquire nuclear propulsion in the name of what has already been done within the framework of the Aukus program. And that is where the potential danger of nuclear proliferation lies in relation to this agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.
But this agreement will precisely provide a better legal framework for the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology from a country that has nuclear weapons to another that does not.
► To read also: Aukus nuclear submarines: the IAEA vigilant on the risks of proliferation