The cycle of happy globalization that began in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall closed in 2022. From now on, the brutal geopolitics of nations dominates our collective lives. The war in Ukraine, the rise of Chinese nationalism and the Islamist threat give an advantage to countries whose lucidity and means allow them to respond to these different threats. This lucidity has long been lacking in Germany, whose economic fundamentals were based on a cheap supply of Russian hydrocarbons and exports of industrial goods to China. The upstream part of this model has been broken by sanctions and its downstream weakened by the stubborn economic difficulties of the Middle Kingdom. As for financial means, they are lacking in France.
Certainly, our country is protected by its nuclear daddy and its army which has cutting-edge equipment, particularly in the air domain. But our very heavy public debt prevents us from increasing our defense spending as much as we should, particularly to hold out during a medium-high intensity conflict. We are barely reaching 2% of GDP, even though this figure is the one requested by NATO in peacetime.
France and Germany are also weakened by a confused political situation. In France, no one can say how and when Emmanuel Macron’s second five-year term will end. In Germany, the rise of an AfD that is much more extremist than our National Rally is accelerating, and there is no guarantee that Chancellor Olaf Scholz will still be in power after the legislative elections in September 2025.
The “populist moment” has passed
Invited to participate last week in the impressive Karpacz Economic Forum, the largest economic forum in Eastern Europe, in the mountains of Lower Silesia, I was able to observe how different the atmosphere was in a country like Poland. The Polish economy still represents only 4% of European GDP. But unemployment is absent, the Poles have refused mass immigration and, above all, the public debt is less than 60% of GDP. This country can therefore invest massively in its defense. This item already represents 4% of GDP, more than double the French effort, and is heading towards 5% in the short term, which will make it the country which, relative to the size of its economy, will provide the largest effort in NATO.
Another crucial point for understanding Polish political and economic dynamics: the country has already passed its “populist moment.” Centrist and former European Council President Donald Tusk took over the Polish government in 2023 from Mateusz Morawiecki of the Law and Justice party, the Polish equivalent of the RN, who remained prime minister for six years. His country was moving away from Europe while Tusk was working within the Union. During the election campaign that preceded his return, the latter made it clear that his goal was to place Poland at the center of the European stage. Tusk is a remarkable figure, an effective promoter of economic liberalism and liberal democracy. His government is partly dedicated to repairing the cracks in the rule of law noted under the previous term.
France-Poland, the hope of a new start
Clear-sighted about Russia, mass immigration and economic liberalism as a condition for social progress, Poland also shows clear-sightedness in energy matters. The country has decided to equip itself with nuclear power plants. Unfortunately, the Polish choice fell on the American Westinghouse, and not on EDF, to build its first plant. This decision must be seen as the insufficient commitment of the European Union on the subject of energy sovereignty, and the relative French contempt, since the 2000s, for the countries of Eastern Europe.
In a few months, France will sign a Treaty of Nancy with Poland, a bilateral cooperation agreement similar to the Treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle with Germany, the Quirinal with Italy and Barcelona with Spain. This treaty will cover security, defense and energy. Let us hope that it marks the beginning of a new beginning for a strengthened alliance.