L’Express: The examination of the pension reform began Monday, January 30 in committee at the National Assembly. Why did the government consider that an amending social security finance bill (PLFSS) was the most appropriate vehicle?
Benjamin Morel: In my view, the government should not be given more intention than it had. He made sure with this PLFSSR to be able to draw a 49.3, whatever happens, without putting himself in danger for the immigration law which will perhaps deserve one. Then, the advantages of the famous article 47.1 of the Constitution appeared – “if the National Assembly has not decided on the first reading within twenty days after the tabling of a bill, the government refers the matter to the Senate, which must rule within fifteen days” – which is only applicable within the framework of a PLFSS, very practical if you want to go quickly and ward off parliamentary obstruction. It makes it possible to prevent the opposition from paralyzing the lower house while the mobilizations, in the street, drag on with the support of public opinion. However, in view of the obstruction, it is very likely that the examination of this pension reform cannot be done in twenty days…
Only, it is, according to you, a false good idea…
Yes, and in several ways. First, not everything can be put in the text, because a PLFSS has only a financial purpose. Then, it’s a restrictive procedure, which leaves very little room for maneuver within this period. However, the President of the Constitutional Council, Laurent Fabius, seems to want to indicate to the government, via offs in the press, in particular in The chained Duckthat the text must be voted in the National Assembly in first reading so that there is no danger on the constitutionality of the text.
Can the entire text be censored by the Elders?
Without a vote at first reading, it cannot be excluded. The Constitutional Council would have all the more opportunity to do so if the political bodies are divided and public opinion is opposed to a reform. In this case, the Parliament is very divided, the mobilizations numerous in the streets and the polls very unfavorable for the executive… The boost of legitimacy of the Council would be very important if it censured this text and there are legal bases which would not make censorship absurd. Without a vote or real debate, except in a Joint Joint Committee behind closed doors, one could question the sincerity of the parliamentary debate. For it to be sincere, it would therefore need a vote. And since getting to the end of the examination of the text seems difficult, the only way would be 49.3…
Qualified as a “failure” by Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne, if it were to happen!
Yes. In reality, the government, because of the procedure it chose itself, may have forced itself to do precisely what it did not want to do. This is the whole paradox, especially since it would be a red rag waved under the nose of public opinion which keeps a very bad image of 49.3.
Another risk, both legal and political, would be the censorship of many provisions aimed at balancing the text, on the hardship or the employment of seniors…
The government wants to release some carrots to the “constructive” oppositions and to its skeptical deputies, only the presence of these provisions in a PLFSSR is very, very debatable. They are what we call social riders. However, for several years, the Constitutional Council has been finicky about them, has been very harsh, and risks censoring all these concessions. The government then sees itself obliged to promise adjustments in future texts of law, in two, three, six months, but one in your hand is better than two in your possession! The choice of the PLFSS induces, in many ways, to tie one’s hands, whereas it is necessary to show itself in capacity to dictate its rhythm and its strategy to obtain political majorities. The vehicle, this PLFSSR, does not allow this.
Whether, ultimatelythe government succeeds, would you see in it a form of danger for democratic debate and for the power of the National Assembly?
Yes, and the risk is double. This text is undoubtedly the most visible of this five-year term, identified by the French since the presidential campaign and it is quite possible that it will not be examined from top to bottom in Parliament. Or worse, that there is no vote, neither in the Assembly nor in the Senate, nor even a debate on article 7 which concerns the postponement of the retirement age. There could be, as the only debate, that of the Joint Joint Commission, by nature behind closed doors between 14 parliamentarians…
If this type of social reform goes through this vehicle, this momentary technique could become habitual in the future. To simplify: if it ever goes well this time, why not start again on other laws, by marginalizing Parliament in an extremely strong way? The warnings of Laurent Fabius are perhaps also motivated by this aspect.
More politically, do you consider that the National Rally and Marine Le Pen will inevitably be those who will reap the fruits of this opposition against the pension reform?
La Nupes still has something to play for. There is, on the part of left-wing parties, a capacity to embody and mobilize which will be put forward. On the other hand, it is certain that the RN plays its part very well and is preparing to reap. The first reason is that, on this reform, it is in the direction of the opinion, plays the role of defender of a large part of their electorate, existing and potential.
Moreover, he plays the role of the reasonable opponent: the phase of demonization is over, he has now entered a phase of credibility. The whole game of Marine Le Pen is to demonstrate that the Nupes are doing tons, that the majority does not know where to go, and that the RN does not join in this din while remaining reasonable. He is content to play on the contrasts, that is enough. It will necessarily emerge strengthened from this sequence, the question is: to what extent?