It is in the Hautes-Pyrénées that Emmanuel Macron received, for his second day of visit to France, Chinese President Xi Jinping. This meeting marks sixty years of diplomatic relations between Paris and Beijing, initiated in 1964 with the recognition of the People’s Republic of China by General de Gaulle. However, this visit is not a honeymoon. The splendor of the bucolic setting of the Col du Tourmalet, well known to cycling lovers, could only be a cover for the many discords that the Franco-Chinese couple is going through. While the war in Ukraine is in full swing, Emmanuel Macron is on a crest. How can we convince Xi Jinping to no longer support the Russian war effort, while maintaining balanced and reciprocal trade relations between the two countries?
A complex balancing act, on which even the Macronian “at the same time” could stumble, analyzes Abigaël Vasselier, director of the “External Relations” program at the Mercator Institute of Chinese Studies (Mérics). Despite all the good will of the President of the Republic, “the levers available to France and the Europeans to reduce China’s role in the war in Ukraine are limited”, affirms the former European diplomat.
L’Express: In 1964, the recognition of China by General de Gaulle marked an important step for the People’s Republic. Today, while this visit gives France the opportunity to reassure itself about its status as a great power, the balance of power seems to have been reversed…
Abigaël Vasselier: In reality, our ties with China date back well before 1964. Even before the establishment of diplomatic relations, this relationship was based above all on cultural and intellectual exchanges, as well as commercial exchanges.
The Opium War [NDLR : conflit entre la Chine et le Royaume-Uni, entre 1839 et 1842, provoqué par des désaccords commerciaux et diplomatiques liés à l’exportation britannique d’opium en Chine] and the Boxer Rebellion [NDLR : soulèvement anti-étranger, anticolonial et antichrétien en Chine, mené par la société secrète des Boxers entre 1899 et 1901] disrupted this dynamic. China experienced these events as a humiliation by the West towards the Chinese Empire. These episodes have had a lasting influence on Xi Jinping’s thinking, particularly on his relationship with the West.
Despite these tensions, Franco-Chinese interactions intensified throughout the 20th century. In 1900, the first Chinese students settled in France. In 1913, we witnessed the first banking cooperations.
The recognition of the People’s Republic of China by France in 1964 took place in the context of the Cold War, at a time when France was seeking to assert itself as an independent power. The 1970s were a time of deepening relations with China, particularly on the commercial level, with the first exchanges in the aeronautics sector. In 1974, for example, France sold sonars to the Chinese army.
The relationship will deteriorate following several events. In 1989, on the occasion of the Tiananmen Square massacre, François Mitterrand’s France strongly condemned the repression carried out by the Chinese government against demonstrators. In 2008, at the time of the Beijing Olympic Games, while pro-Tibetan demonstrations were taking place in the streets of Paris, President Sarkozy met the Dalai Lama. This decision was strongly criticized by the Chinese authorities, who saw the Dalai Lama as a separatist aiming to divide China.
Has Xi Jinping’s coming to power changed anything?
Since 2013, François Hollande has worked to restore good relations. He was the first European head of state to meet the newly elected Xi Jinping. From 2016, Franco-Chinese relations have been profoundly transformed. At that time, Chinese investments in critical infrastructure began to flow to France, this is particularly the case for Toulouse-Blagnac airport, or shipyards. These investments have raised questions about France’s ability to maintain its strategic authority and national security. This explains why France has moved from a position of accommodation towards China to a position of strategic ambiguity.
This posture has even been strengthened since Emmanuel Macron came to power. Here too, he does “at the same time”. In 2018, he gifted a Republican Guard horse to Xi Jinping, while encouraging the European Union to take a tougher stance on China. During his trip to China last year, he was accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, to address critical issues such as the war in Ukraine, trade imbalances between China and Europe, national security, etc. Xi Jinping’s current visit to France is entirely part of this scenario of strategic ambiguity.
What are the challenges of this meeting for China?
Above all, Xi Jinping wishes to strengthen the strategic partnership between the two countries. He hopes to leave France with a little more than thirty bilateral agreements in his pocket. There is also a desire on his part to deepen trade between China and France. Through these actions, he seeks to show that China is open to the world and promotes a positive business climate, even if this does not reflect reality.
Finally, China is counting on France to balance and stabilize the tensions that exist today on the international scene, particularly in its strategic competition with the United States. Moreover, relations between China and Europe have deteriorated in recent years, and Xi Jinping relies heavily on France and Germany, whom he sees as key interlocutors capable of revitalizing Sino-European relations. As far as the United States is concerned, the position of France and the EU is very clear: the transatlantic partnership remains essential and a priority, there is no equidistance with China.
What are Emmanuel Macron’s priorities?
The first is to reestablish reciprocity at the heart of bilateral trade, in order to rebalance commercial relations between the two countries, and guarantee the maintenance of French strategic autonomy. In the continuity of his action throughout his mandate, which consisted of constantly placing the Franco-Chinese relationship within a European framework, he chose to align with his European partners, an approach illustrated by the presence of the president of the European Commission.
The second major issue concerns China’s position in the war in Ukraine. China has a very important role to play. This was the case, for example, when she worked for the de-escalation of nuclear tensions with Russia. But it can also play a negative role from the European point of view, by supporting the Russian war effort. On this point, the position of France and Europe is to ask China not to deliver lethal weapons to Russia, which China respects. On the other hand, France would also like China not to deliver non-lethal weapons. And China does not respect this. However, nearly 80% of non-lethal equipment found on the Ukrainian battlefield, such as drone engines for example, comes from China or transits through China. This is a real challenge for European security.
On the war in Ukraine, what can Emmanuel Macron really get from this meeting with his Chinese counterpart?
It must be made clear that the levers available to the French and Europeans to reduce China’s role in the war in Ukraine are limited. Concerning the economic support that China gives to Russia, few leaders can weigh in. China will continue to support Russia economically, simply because it is too great an economic opportunity for it. No one has leverage to change that.
On the political and diplomatic level, it’s the same thing. The close relationship between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin means that China will continue to work with its Russian partner. Vladimir Putin, for example, is preparing to come to Beijing. This is a very clear message sent by China to the West: it will not abandon Putin by following the policy of isolation imposed on Russia by the Europeans.
Finally, to return to the question of supporting the Russian war effort, the red lines drawn by France and the European Union only concern “direct aid”, that is to say lethal weapons. However, if the Europeans aim to truly change the balance on the battlefield, this red line should be extended to non-lethal weapons. But for the moment, at European level, we are not ready to move this line.
For what ?
Because to achieve this, all Europeans must be ready to assume the consequences, and that is not currently the case, as we see with the disagreements surrounding the question of sanctions. If economic sanctions were to be imposed on Chinese companies, European unity would not be guaranteed.
In your opinion, is Emmanuel Macron wrong to receive the leader of an authoritarian country? Some speak, for example, of a “policy of complicity in the Uyghur genocide”…
I would be a little more nuanced. The Xinjiang question [NDLR : province du nord-ouest de la Chine où sont installés les Ouïghours] and the repression of the Uighurs has been the subject, since 2018, of intense conversations at European level. Many things have been done at the multilateral level, with joint declarations from European countries. In March 2021, for example, the European Union imposed sanctions on five Chinese entities that were linked to human rights violations against Uyghurs.
On a bilateral level, member states systematically address this subject during their diplomatic meetings with China. This is the case of Emmanuel Macron, who consistently raises the question of human rights during his meetings with his Chinese counterpart.
But the real question is whether raising the subject of human rights with Xi Jinping produces results. Having dealt with this issue myself when I was a European diplomat, I am not convinced… Our levers are limited, but our consistency is essential.
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