He will not betray any state secrets. On the other hand, he can deliver the instructions for use. Olivier Mas, ex-colonel of the Directorate General for External Security (DGSE), knows perfectly well the missions of his former service in theaters of operation such as Ukraine or Russia today. The one who runs the Youtube channel Talks with a spy, for which he recently returned to the Ukrainian conflict, agreed to tell L’Express about the demands of political power on Ukraine, the division of powers between the DGSE and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DRM) in the field, the level of information of the agencies as well as the objectives of the secret services in the entourage of Vladimir Putin. The other side of the decor, in short.
In a period like this, are the demands of the political authorities on the DGSE different from usual?
Olivier Mas Yes, when you’re an analyst in charge of Europe, everything accelerates. The President of the Republic reads daily what you do. The director of the DGSE must be with him at all times, he returns to the service with a shopping list. He can say: “That, the president liked it, he would like more things on this or that”, and, therefore, it creates a great dynamic. There is the issue that the Head of State is one of the best informed about the situation.
Is this really the case? The Americans publish a lot of information on the crisis, and we, a lot less.
Americans publish because they want to communicate, they have made this choice. Perhaps to make up for the failure in Afghanistan, in particular. They are very knowledgeable, it’s a high-performance service, that’s obvious. But the French president is also well informed. It is done by the DGSE and also by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, which does not necessarily have troops on site but does have satellite resources.
How does the collaboration between the DGSE and the DRM work in Ukraine?
There is always a bit of competition, of course. It’s a small challenge to be the best, but overall, the information sharing is very good, in real time or almost. There must be daily meetings. The two services are complementary. The DRM does tactical intelligence and the DGSE strategic intelligence. Thanks to satellite intelligence, the DRM will obtain information on the movement of Russian units, their type of armament, where their bases are located. They are the ones who are closest to the field, who get information on the state of the fighting, the civilian losses. They also make radio interceptions, while we will be more on telephone, SMS, Internet interceptions. We complete each other.
What about emulation between the DGSE and foreign services?
The people we feed are the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is necessary to avoid, if possible, that the president learns things from one of his foreign counterparts, because that can annoy him. But that rarely happens. Where there may be competition is in the collaboration with Ukrainian services. A secret service of a country at war does not have much time. He is not going to do operational cooperation with everyone. It will select a few states. It can be the Americans, the British, the French. You have to be in it.
What is the interest of the Ukrainians in sharing their information with France?
Each case is specific, but given the situation, the youth of Ukrainian power, their recent declarations, I have the impression that they have a favorable a priori with regard to cooperation with the West. It is in their interest. It is to be expected that they will formulate shopping lists, that they will express needs in terms of armaments and intelligence. We try to answer it.
Do the risks of poisoning by Ukraine exist?
Yes, especially because the Russian services inevitably have spies in the Ukrainian services. In any case, the DGSE must verify any information that reaches it. The culture is never to take at face value what you have heard from a partner.
Concretely, what can the DGSE do to make Russia bend in Ukraine?
The DGSE is more of an analysis and intelligence service, but since the 2000s, intelligence has been developed for action purposes. We call this obstruction, it’s about stopping terrorist actions, stopping arms deliveries, for example. In terms of influence, the Americans are not shy about taking control of the media, influencing, and sometimes even disinforming. We refuse to do that. We can identify relays of influence, whom we will finance, to whom we will give equipment.
Can the DGSE deliver weapons clandestinely to Ukraine?
It’s theoretical, but it can happen. It can be very sensitive material on which we do not want it marked “France”. The Action service knows how to do that.
And participating in fights in a secret way, is it possible?
We are not there yet, it seems very theoretical to me. We have done that in the past. Compared to the more seasoned Special Operations Command (COS), the Action service is more discreet. He does real hiding, under legend, and can be used for that.
Should we expect redeployment of DGSE staff to Ukraine and Russia?
You have to see what political power demands, it’s not impossible, but you mustn’t get disorganized either. The means have been put on Russia since the Bajolet era. Generally, analysts, we don’t move them too much. The technical direction, on the other hand, yes. There are more people going to work on Russia. It will be a question of putting sensors in order to intercept things.
What will the DGSE seek to know in Russia?
The president has at his disposal a large document, produced by the DGSE, on the decision-making processes in Russia, Putin’s reasoning. The difference is that in times of war, people talk. You have people who are usually discreet and who will say things. So we will be able to report. Such an oligarch, such an official who criticizes Putin, this can feed a report. We are trying to find out what Putin thinks, if he is followed, if power is cracking. It’s like a journalist scoop. In this, interceptions are extremely important.
In times like this, is technical intelligence your primary source of information in Russia?
There is also human intelligence. If there are people in the immediate entourage who talk, people who know the oligarchs perfectly, that’s great.
What are the risks of working in Russia today?
Russian power can respond by being implacable, by shooting, by imprisoning people, even innocent people. In times of war, anything is possible. What happened around nuclear deterrence is astonishing. We go to an extreme threat very quickly, it can show that Putin, whom we saw until then more like a reasonable chess player, is panicking.
If power cracks around Putin, will the media necessarily know?
Not necessarily. If there is an interest in the media knowing about it, we will say so, otherwise we will keep it a secret. But the media work well. Often, information that we have comes out in the media a fortnight or three weeks later.