In the current context of a fragmented and antagonistic political landscape, industry is one of the exceptions. It is one of the rare unifying subjects on which it is possible to find an agreement without any party compromising its electoral base.
What is our situation? Since 2009, we have put an end to a long cycle of deindustrialization, notably through the initiatives of successive Presidents of the Republic: the 2009 General Assembly on Industry and the Future Investment Program, the Gallois Report in 2012 and the Montebourg plans, or more recently France Relance, France 2030 and then the Green Industry Act.
Unfortunately, this reindustrialization is still not fully perceptible in the macroeconomic figures. We remain stuck at 10% manufacturing industry in our wealth creation, one of the worst scores in Europe, at the level of Greece, which allows us to be ahead of only Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg! Of course, we can boast of the opening of 300 factories in three years, but this is an indicator of territorial dynamics rather than an economic indicator. We can also highlight the 20,000 industrial manufacturing jobs per year, but with caution, because we would need triple that.
So why this trompe-l’oeil reindustrialization? Historically, the successes of Gaulo-Pompidolian policies were based on an organization into sectors piloted by large groups and state interventionism in technological choices. This has not disappeared from our public action.
However, the State and its armed wings of the 1950s-1960s (Cnes, Cnet, DGA, CEA, etc.) have lost a significant part of their techno-industrial knowledge to private companies, particularly large ones. Traditional innovation is “disrupted” by digital technology and its new organizations. Our economy has become globalized and financialized, while our public finances no longer follow. Our sectors no longer have the same reality, they are now multi-fragmented, internationalized: there are few manufactured goods that do not depend on imported components. More recently, our environmental ambitions and our expensive energies are impacting our cost structure. Our supply chains are disorganized by geopolitical or geo-economic instabilities.
Between our historical references (the Trente Glorieuses or the great Gaulo-Pompidolian programs) and our economic reality, our industrial policies have sometimes remained stuck in a limbo which has made them less effective.
However, there is another, even more crucial, unthought-of fact: at the time of the construction of the nuclear power plant, the invention of the TGV or the launch of the Caravelle which became Airbus, EDF, SNCF, CNES, Aérospatiale relied on a growing industrial base, taking full advantage of the Trente Glorieuses and household equipment: automobiles, refrigerators, TVs, etc. This industrial fabric trained cohorts of engineers and technicians and fueled the development of industrial know-how.
Today, we should pay more attention to the calls of project leaders gigafactories, in batteries or health, which highlight the weakness of this industrial fabric, necessary not only to build them, but also to ensure their maintenance, upkeep and therefore productivity over time. In the same vein, to revive our nuclear sector or to bring out the hydrogen sector, only 20% of training needs are specific to these professions, while 80% relate to “basic” industrial professions: mechanics, metallurgy, plastics, etc. To put it bluntly, we will not become a “leader in green industry” – if this ambition is achievable – without densifying our industrial base.
This leads to a simple observation: after fifteen years of efforts, we have not yet really put back in place what forty years of deindustrialization and globalization have turned upside down, particularly in our heads.
To mobilize our savings, we celebrate fundraisings by digital companies, sometimes as spectacular as they are ephemeral. And we are unable to earmark 200 billion euros, or three small percent of our colossal savings, to invest in our reindustrialization. Instead, we buy American Treasury bonds that finance the Inflation Reduction Act, a vacuum cleaner for industrial projects for North America.
For the image of the professions, we put digital startupers and “top chefs” in the spotlight. And we ignore these “everyday heroes” and their teams of all ages and all levels of training who, in our SMEs, bring our territories to life, fight to reduce our dependencies, invent short circuits, often without noise. Their stories are nevertheless full of meaning and capable of inspiring many young people.
For our trade balance, we are calling for ever more exports, while our economy is not very competitive, and our technological differentiation is not as obvious as we think. And we underestimate the lever of reducing our imports through made in France, particularly in our public procurement. By itself, promoting made in France would make it possible to fill half of our manufacturing trade deficit.
For our pride, we communicate with great reinforcement of means on foreign investments during Choose France or on the French delegation at CES (Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas). And we omit too much the local productions which nevertheless nourish the pride of our territories and constitute two thirds of the source of projects for our reindustrialization.
It is not a question of abruptly substituting the former for the latter, but of rebalancing our priorities realistically.
Our flagships of tomorrow, whether they are from the green industry or another sector, need an industrial base with their “good jobs”. Through these major levers and a few others, we have the keys to densifying our industrial fabric, our base of skills and know-how. Only then will we have real support for our ambitions as a leader.
This rebalancing would be an aggiornamento, a “new grammar” for our industrial policies. Perhaps less “glamorous”, less “hype” and less “com” than the previous approach, but precisely so much more anchored in the territories and the real economy. It would affect all levels of training, from the engineer to the worker. It would spread hope in all territories and give meaning to those who have felt left behind by globalization.
In a fragmented political landscape, this new grammar for our industrial policies is one of the rare subjects that can achieve consensus. It is very valuable for the times we live in. So, shall we go for it?
*Olivier Lluansi is responsible for a government mission on the future of industrial policies, teaching at the Ecole des Mines and at ESCP Business School, and author of the book The Neo-Industrialists. The Advent of Our Industrial Renaissance (Les Déviations, 2023).
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