From Washington’s point of view, it is clear that the United States cannot give Finland full security guarantees during the NATO search process. The help offered by the United States is still not insignificant, writes US correspondent Iida Tikka.
15.4. 12:16 • Updated April 15th. 16:00
WASHINGTON. From Washington’s point of view, the security guarantee debate in Finland seems partly detached from reality.
On Wednesday, the Prime Minister Sanna Marin (sd.) suggested that Finland apply for security guarantees from larger countries such as the United States, Britain, France or Germany during the NATO application process. So far, what is meant by security guarantees has not been defined.
“Security guarantees” can easily be thought of as the promise of a NATO Article 5 defense of a common defense in the event of an attack. As concerns about Russia’s reaction to a possible application for membership are understandably strong, the idea of full protection for a major nuclear power like the United States is a matter of relief.
Finland is not receiving such a promise from the United States.
The sources that followed the discussions between Finland, the United States and NATO confirm to that a formal agreement on bilateral security guarantees would not even be sought and would not be necessary in Finland’s interests.
However, that does not mean that the aid is not promised and that it is not significant. For example, the importance of sharing intelligence, for example, should not be underestimated, according to U.S. experts interviewed by .
To the bilateral agreement between the United States and Finland there are both legal and strategic obstacles to the defense agreement.
The official commitment of the United States to defend another country always requires an agreement confirmed by the Senate.
In practice, the United States currently has only a handful of mutual defense agreements that have been largely negotiated since the end of World War II.
These agreements helped the United States justify its military presence around the world, the most significant of which is the NATO Charter.
The NATO Treaty is pre-negotiated and does not require separate non-NATO negotiations in the United States. Instead, the creation of hypothetical bilateral agreements would require negotiation and lobbying, which would take time and energy from Finnish military experts.
As for the United States, admitting a new NATO member to the military alliance requires two-thirds support in the Senate.
There are no obstacles to Finland’s accession to NATO in the United States, given the current climate in the Senate, as Congress has been quite unanimous in its decisions on Ukraine.
When Finnish and Swedish politicians visit Washington, there will be opportunities to secure the support of the Senate.
From the perspective of the US strategy, giving Finland full bilateral security guarantees would also be a huge change. Especially in a situation where the country is led by a president with an emphasis on complex international cooperation and alliances Joe Biden.
Currently, not even a close partner of the United States, Israel, has official security guarantees. Instead, Israel receives widespread military support in the form of intelligence, armaments, and political support.
They have been enough to secure Israel’s immunity in recent decades, despite Iran’s political leadership on several occasions over the years expressing its desire to wipe Israel off the world map.
Finland is pursuing a NATO application process military support that would be a sufficient deterrent to prevent an Russian invasion. The Israeli model shows that it does not necessarily mean direct, full defense commitments.
Fighting an attack ultimately consists of the sum of several factors. Influential but significant steps have already been taken in this direction within the framework of the development of military co-operation between Finland and the United States.
Researchers at the U.S. RAND think tank Stephen Flanagan and Gene Germanovich have explored the possibilities for developing co-operation between the two countries on behalf of the Ministry of Defense.
According to researchers, Finland’s defense capability is already excellent.
According to them, however, Finland would benefit most in the future from, for example, an even closer exchange of information with NATO countries. According to Germanovich, intelligence agreements may sound boring, but they play an important role in conflict prevention.
Comprehensive intelligence prevents Russia from being surprised and makes it more expensive to attack Finland.
In addition, the United States and Finland may increase joint military leadership exercises to review possible defense scenarios.
Again, sounds small, but the exercises improve the defense’s responsiveness and combat readiness.
Russia’s failures in Ukraine show how important planning and good intelligence are.
But could Finland to receive full security guarantees directly from NATO during the application phase?
If our country were attacked during that time, it would be a loss of prestige for the military alliance, according to many experts.
NATO has once in the past extended security guarantees such as Article 5 beyond the military alliance. When the countries around Serbia helped NATO during the Kosovo crisis, NATO promised to defend the countries in the event of an attack by Serbia.
However, Serbia is not a military power comparable to Russia.
In addition to the United States, the Finnish leadership is seeking promises of security assistance from France and Britain. These countries have their own domestic and foreign policies that affect the quality of promises.
Article 42.7 EU binds the countries of the Union “by any means available to it” in the event of an attack by another member state. Under it, Finland could receive help from France, for example.
In public, a promise sounds as vague as any other promise that is not a paper-based contract.
Strategically, such obscurity can also be an advantage. Then Russia will not know what it would get.
You will be able to discuss this topic until Saturday, April 16 at 11 p.m.
Correction: The article on security guarantees in the Lisbon Treaty is 42.7, not 47.2, as was the case earlier.