Niger: “The jihadists have an interest in such coups”

What way out of the crisis for Niger? The leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will discuss this Thursday, August 10, in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. So far, they have not been heard by the putschists, who have refused to reinstate President Mohamed Bazoum, despite the threat of armed intervention. But other cards can be played to constrain the military, explains Jean-Hervé Jézéquel, director of the Sahel project at the International Crisis Group.

L’Express: What role can ECOWAS play in the Niger crisis?

Jean-Hervé Jezequel: A central role. It is she, in a way, who took the lead with the most visible and public reactions to the events in Niamey, compared to other international organizations, such as the African Union or the UN. Lately, she has been able to give the feeling that she was powerless and without much impact. But, after the 2020 coup in Mali, it had taken economic and financial sanctions which had weighed in the negotiations and had brought the National Committee for the Salvation of the People [CNSP, la junte qui avait pris le pouvoir] to make a lot of concessions. It is undoubtedly a model from which it can draw inspiration to react to the coup d’etat in Niger.

However, at the time, his influence on the course of things in Mali did not last…

Yes, ECOWAS struggled to maintain a balance of power, and the fact that the Malian vice-presidency was left to a soldier proved decisive during the following coup, in 2021. During the two coups State of 2022 in Burkina Faso, on the other hand, it did not do much, contenting itself with discussions on the timetable for the transition. At that time, the idea was not to break up.

Why is ECOWAS more active in the case of the crisis in Niger?

Niger could become the 4th country out of the 15 members of ECOWAS to be held by the military. She feels a dangerous spiral could drag down other West African countries. The decision to react more strongly also comes from the fact that Nigeria [poids lourd de la zone avec ses 215 millions d’habitants] wants to play a greater role within it, under the leadership of the president elected this year, Bola Tinubu, a civilian in a country that has experienced military coups.

What are the Nigerian President’s goals?

The first of President Tinubu’s motivations is to put an end to this series of military coups which overthrow civil powers. There are also domestic considerations, with the desire to open a new chapter after a hotly contested Nigerian election. But public opinion is divided, as the opposition of senators from the north of the country to a military intervention in Niger has demonstrated. Nigeria is already facing various armed insurgencies, such as Boko Haram in the North East, but also a phenomenon of militarization of banditry which is causing serious problems for the heavily occupied security forces.

Do we know a little more about the true motivations of the putschists and General Tiani?

The event is still too recent for a clear and complete line of reading. However, there are immediate causes and others that are more structural. In Burkina, the two coups were linked to very deadly jihadist attacks for the army, creating great discontent within the troops. In Mali, it is after several months of mobilization in the street against President IBK [Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta] and an electoral process that felt confiscated.

In Niger, there were not these conditions and we did not expect them at that time. President Bazoum also inherited the management team from his predecessor, Mahamadou Issoufou, and had to deal with the balances built before him. Behind a great displayed complicity, there were tensions between their clans. Some of these tensions have crystallized in the security apparatus. In a country with multiple coups, the army is both at the service of the state and a potential counter-power. Mohamed Bazoum reportedly tried to change the staff for people he thought were more loyal. It is in this context that the coup took place.

And for more structural causes?

Niger enjoyed political continuity and a democratically elected president following a peaceful transfer of power. But this apparent success has made less visible the fact that the population of Niger – one of the poorest in the world -, and in particular the youth, has, it seems, very largely lost confidence in democracy to reduce inequalities and bring change quickly. In addition, the attacks have reduced against the security forces, but the jihadists continue to collect taxes from populations close to the capital. Improving safety is not perceived in the same way by everyone.

And then the putsches in Mali and Burkina demonstrated that one could seize power by force and obtain popular support. Basically, the military, with their discourse of force, of revenge, easily seduces and appears as an alternative. It was different in 2010, when the Niger military took over. They didn’t keep it long, because there was strong international and domestic pressure. And, in their minds, the era of successful military coups was a thing of the past.

Why does this putsch seem even more difficult for France to accept?

It is the 4ᵉ of a series which is starting to worry. We wonder when this will stop. There is the fear that coups d’etat will affect coastal Africa, after Sahelian Africa. France has been, over the past ten years, the major player in stabilization operations in the Sahelian zone as the leader of a substantial international intervention. This is what has been questioned over the past three years.

The coups d’etat in Mali and Burkina Faso have revealed the extent of a very strong rejection of France in the Sahel, with a badly digested colonial past and the failure of the stabilization operation in the Sahel. This led France to reposition its system. Emmanuel Macron had decided to reinvest Niger as a solid ally, with an always important device, which would come more in support of local forces. But we underestimated the very strong rejection of this presence. And the putschists can play on that to build up a broad base of support. They gathered 30,000 people in the Niamey stadium for a rally.

The various aids, in particular humanitarian and economic, to Niger are suspended. How harmful is this likely to be for the country?

This will weigh on a State whose part of the budget is very dependent on aid. But Mali has shown that it is capable of holding out for a certain period of time despite the sanctions, without it being known yet for how long. Sanctions are not a magic tool and punish the population more than the rulers. But that of Niger is already very weak and one of the poorest in the world. The calculation of forcing the population to compel the leaders to compromise can have the opposite effect and fuel a movement of support for the military, as in Mali. The hardest thing, for the moment, for Niger, is the closing of the borders, while the country is landlocked with the main port, that of Cotonou, in Benin.

What can we fear in the months and years to come for Niger, plagued by jihadist attacks?

The jihadists have an interest in such coups d’etat: it makes Western armies start and they can claim it as a success. In addition, the putschs diverted for a time the action of the national armies, like that of Niger, which prepared the defense of the capital against the risk of external intervention. But the military regimes that are set up also arrive with a strong response speech against the jihadists, of whom they remain fierce opponents.

In Mali, the impact of the departure of the French is more uncertain than what is said in Paris. The situation has deteriorated in some regions, improved in others, without collapsing so far. The coups follow a decade of deterioration in the situation. And neither the civil regimes, nor the military regimes, nor the French or Russian partners have found the key to responding in a lasting way to these jihadist insurgencies.