Negotiating over Ukraine is already a victory for Putin, by George Friedman

In international negotiations, there is often a moment of calm before the storm of threats. This is what we are witnessing today between the United States and Russia on the eve of talks on the status of Ukraine, on January 9 in Geneva. Moscow has made known its demands – or rather its dreams – in an attempt to set the agenda. Except that in the end, reality always decides. To understand it, a quick look back at the past year for Russia is a good starting point.

Russia wants to recover the buffer zones lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These buffers, the most important of which are in central Europe, protect Russia from a potential attack from the West. As such offensives have tended in the past to spring up unexpectedly, Russia would like to have them in its fold before even the slightest threat appears. That these regions are integrated into the Russian Federation is, from Moscow’s point of view, not necessary. On the other hand, the Kremlin intends to ensure that they are not hostile to it or occupied by opposing powers.

This is why all of Russia’s actions in 2021 were predictable. When war broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Transcaucasia (or South Caucasus), Russia sent a peacekeeping force there. In the region, its influence is considerable, thanks to a system of relations woven by the Soviet Union which allows it, even today, to maintain the ascendancy. In Central Asia, Moscow built a network of airfields – a process that only accelerated when the United States withdrew from Afghanistan. And in Belarus, Russia dominates the government of Alexander Lukashenko from A to Z.

All these steps, carried out with method, are important for the reconquest of its stamps. But none is more crucial than Ukraine. Because by its area (603,000 km2, a little more than France which has 550,000 km2), this country offers space for maneuvers, and this maneuverability would force the adversary to disperse his forces.

Moscow understood from the start that it had to find an arrangement with Washington. Also, the Russians know that the United States, like any country, only sits at the negotiating table when it has to. So far, Washington has been content with the status quo. But not Russia. Who therefore decided to threaten American interests in the region, in particular in Ukraine, in order to weigh.

The next step was to ostensibly mass forces near the Ukrainian border. Thus deployed, the Russian tanks seemed ready for the invasion. The problem is that while a country as large as Ukraine can be invaded, it is still impossible to do so quickly. Militarily speaking, the United States finds itself in a difficult position. They have no significant forces in Ukraine, and any contribution of troops could lead to a long war with an indecisive outcome.

What’s more, NATO doesn’t really have the guts to put up with this kind of conflict on its doorstep. Its armies, apart from Turkey, are small in size. And the NATO model has turned into the EU model. The EU model is based on the idea of ​​peace and prosperity. According to Moscow’s calculations, the United States is not ready to act and, if it does, its action would be a source of division among Europeans. Because any European collective action is tinged with ultra-prudence.

From the American point of view, intervening in Ukraine is of no short-term interest. It would be about waging another distant and potentially losing war with unreliable European allies. However, a long-term danger remains. During the Cold War, the American strategy was to prevent Russia from imposing its hegemony over Europe, which would have allowed Moscow to become a superpower capable of challenging the United States in the Atlantic. The Soviet threat was not eliminated, but it was contained at relatively little cost.

The current situation in Ukraine resuscitates the long-range threat. Russians view the United States as an unpredictable and ruthless nation. They never know when the Americans will act, and their Cold War experience has taught them that the Americans were able and willing to deploy large military forces. Russia’s strategy is to demonstrate its might with enough credible force on the Ukrainian border to compel the United States to negotiate, but not to go too far so as not to risk a massive response. Washington, for its part, cannot begin negotiations without recalling that it is in a position to respond credibly to the Russian threat.

In the end, both parties are fully aware of the weak points of Russian military strategy compared to the American one. For example, the kind of armored fighting vehicles sent by Russia to the Ukrainian border consume an insane amount of fuel. When on the move, a US Army armored division guzzles about 2.4 million liters of fuel a day. However, Russia is in the process of deploying several divisions, which will necessarily have to follow an interminable caravan of supply vehicles making the junction with gigantic fuel depots. At best, it’s complicated. At worst, we are heading straight for a war of attrition with the United States which, knowing Russia’s anti-aircraft capabilities, would be content to fire cruise missiles from a distance without involving the air force.

As in tennis, America will have conceded the point

Whether or not Russia decides to wage a multidivisional armored war will depend on how much credit it gives to the willingness of the United States to get involved; confidence in one’s own defensive systems; and to the assessment of its capacity to support politically a defeat, even temporary. In any case, it should not be forgotten either that, unlike the Americans, the Russians have not carried out multidivisional offensives since 1945. And that a loss of the buffer countries would be unbearable for them – a defeat, even more so.

Wars are full of unknowns, many of which arise at the worst possible time. The price to be paid by Russia should an eventual invasion of Ukraine fail would be colossal in terms of domestic politics and international credibility. The one that the United States would have to pay in case of defeat would be less. Their credibility would suffer, but that would in no way mean a geopolitical setback. The Russians know this better than anyone.

The Russians will therefore remain, for the time being, on high alert. But, again, Russia cannot afford defeat, just as it cannot be certain of victory. In the end, what the Russians will have won in the negotiations which open on January 9 in Geneva, is to have been able to sit down opposite the Americans on an equal footing and under the eyes of the rest of the world. . As in tennis, America will have conceded the point but the game will continue. And the Europeans will proclaim the end of American power for the hundredth time…

GEORGE FRIEDMAN: Born in Budapest in 1949, heis the founder of Geopolitical Futures, geopolitical analysis and forecasting site. An American expert in the field of foreign affairs and intelligence, he has advised numerous governmental and military organizations in the United States and abroad. In 2015, George Friedman created Geopolitical Futures. Previously, in 1996, he founded Stratfor, an influential digital media also devoted to international affairs. Finally, George Friedman is the author of numerous books including the best-selling The Next 100 Years,published in 2009 and praised for the accuracy of its predictions.