“NATO’s strategy is a strategy of defeat for Ukraine” – L’Express

Retired Australian Army Major General Mick Ryan helped shape his country’s military doctrine and cooperated with the U.S. military. In his latest book, The War for Ukraine: Strategy and Adaptation Under Fire (Ed. Naval Institute Press, August 2024, not translated), this strategist draws lessons from the conflict in Ukraine, a “battle of adaptation” between the belligerents on the operational, tactical and informational levels. In an interview with L’Express, he analyzes the consequences of the Ukrainian offensive on Russian soil and calls on Westerners to finally adopt a strategy to “defeat Russia in Ukraine.”

L’Express: By making a breakthrough in the Kursk Oblast, on Russian soil, the Ukrainians hope to force the enemy to redeploy units mobilized in the Donbass. Fifteen days after the start of this offensive, what is the situation?

Mick Ryan : It is clear that one of the imperatives of the Ukrainian command was to move Russian troops away from the particularly dangerous axis towards Pokrovsk and Toretsk, in the Donbass, where the Russians are advancing. At this stage, there has been no massive redeployment from this area, but the Russian army has withdrawn troops from other theaters, and the Ukrainians could exploit these movements.

kyiv’s other goal is to obtain a bargaining chip in potential future negotiations with Russia. Ukraine, 18 percent of whose territory is under Russian control, knows that the status quo would necessarily work against it in the event of talks. It was therefore necessary to change the status quo and the position of the main negotiating parties, namely Ukraine and Russia.

What does this unexpected offensive teach us?

First, it shows that surprise is possible, if you take risks. We have heard a lot about the notion of “battlefield transparency”: the idea that thanks to signals intelligence, satellites, drones, social networks, it is increasingly difficult for belligerents to hide their movements and intentions. This incursion shows that the battlefield is not so transparent. But you have to take risks and develop tricks and decoys to create surprise.

This offensive also shows that after thirty months of war, many foreign observers do not understand or do not want to take the kind of risks necessary in a modern world to deter Russia or China. The Ukrainians took considerable risks in this operation, Western countries are no longer accustomed to this type of strategy.

Third, the fact that the Ukrainians decided to keep this operation secret is an important element. They did so not only to create surprise but also to manage expectations. In fact, there were no expectations for this operation. In contrast, during the offensive in the summer of 2023, expectations were so high that it was probably impossible for the Ukrainians to meet them. It is questionable whether this practice will become the norm for major Ukrainian operations in the future.

Today, Ukraine and Russia must lead two major fronts at the same time. Is this sustainable?

Both sides are simultaneously waging two major campaigns that consume a lot of manpower, ammunition and support weapons (drones, air defense). This is a new configuration. I think that neither Russia nor Ukraine will be able to hold out for a long period. Each will have to choose a priority front. In the coming weeks, we will see which belligerent will give in first.

This choice will be dictated by the military realities on the ground, but above all the political realities. In the case of Volodymyr Zelensky, it will be necessary to determine which campaign is the most important for the survival of his nation; as for Vladimir Putin, he will favor the most strategic front for the survival of his regime.

What are the possible scenarios for Ukraine?

In the Kursk region, the Ukrainians will reach a maximum advance point in a few days or weeks. For several reasons: the amount of forces needed for this offensive; Russian resistance; logistical capabilities. Finally, because from a political or strategic point of view, it makes no sense for kyiv to advance indefinitely into Russia. Once this point is reached, the Ukrainian army will have several options: Either it stays there and defends all the conquered territory, which would be very difficult. Or it partially withdraws to defend only part of the taken territory. Or it withdraws completely. Volodymyr Zelensky and other members of his administration have already mentioned the hypothesis of the buffer zone, so I have the impression that kyiv is leaning towards this option. In this case, Ukraine will define the most defensible terrain and try to hold on to it. It will not only be a buffer zone, but a way to force the Russians to fight to get it back. The Ukrainians could then inflict heavy losses on their opponent.

How is the Kursk region strategic for Ukrainians?

The Kursk region has a resource interest, as it is one of the last transit points for Russian gas by pipeline to Europe, heading towards Slovakia, Austria and Italy, which continue to receive Russian gas supplies.

But this area is especially valuable to Ukrainians because it is Russian land. Now, the fact that Ukrainians have penetrated Russian soil and conquered part of the territory poses a political problem for Vladimir Putin. It remains to be seen to what extent, because the Russian president knows how to be clever. He could, for example, use this incursion to justify what he has been saying for years about Ukraine and NATO, which are, according to him, a threat at Russia’s doorstep.

In the buffer zone scenario, Ukraine will have to redeploy more troops to the region. Can it afford to do so?

If the Ukrainian army chooses to establish a buffer zone, it will be 30-40 kilometers long at most. This is quite a large territory to defend, but ultimately, if the Ukrainians have to retreat into Ukraine, the distance is not very significant. However, they will need troops to defend this territory, air defenses, artillery, logistics, medical supplies, etc. This is a major undertaking, especially since Ukraine is under great pressure in the Donbass. So a balance must be struck between maintaining this territory and defending other regions, including the northern border with Belarus. This is a complex challenge for the Ukrainian command.

What is the probability that Ukraine will lose Pokrovsk, and in the long term, the whole of Donbass?

The Ukrainians have lost a lot of territory in Donbass. But this has come at the cost of a huge effort on the part of the Russians. The Russians have probably taken 700 square kilometers since the beginning of the year, but in doing so they have lost a lot of men. Moreover, we have noted that Russian projections of progress have always been too optimistic.

The city of Chassiv Yar (in Donetsk Oblast) was supposed to fall on May 9, but it still hasn’t happened. And remember all the predictions about the fall of Bakhmut… So even if the Russians manage to take Pokrovsk – which they haven’t – it will cost them dearly. And it’s not certain that this cost is worth what they actually captured.

Ukrainians have long had a mobilization problem. With two priority fronts, the lack of soldiers is likely to weigh even more heavily…

It takes time to train people, to train effective units on the battlefield. You can’t rush. As we saw in last year’s offensive, large brigades didn’t work out well. It took the Russians time to sort out their mobilization, and it will take the Ukrainians some time. The government has implemented a series of reforms regarding corruption, recruitment locations, mobilization legislation.

On the Russian side, what are the options now with these two fronts?

As I said, Putin’s strategy will be guided by a single concern: the survival of his regime. Is it more dangerous to leave the Ukrainians on Russian territory or to stop the advance in Donbass? This is a very complicated equation for the Kremlin. I have the impression that the Russians will try as much as possible to block the Ukrainian advance towards Kursk while continuing to hold Pokrovsk. This could create opportunities for the Ukrainians.

For this, kyiv will need more ammunition and real support to secure its skies. Are the West ready for this?

NATO’s current strategy is a strategy of defeat for Ukraine. Yes, we give that country resources, but not enough to give it a real advantage and win the battle. We need a different strategy, which is to defeat Russia in Ukraine. Too many countries are timid about that.

Today, Germany is cutting back on its resources, France hasn’t really moved recently, and nothing significant is going to happen on the US side until after the presidential election. Unfortunately, the only people who can change the trajectory of the war right now are the Ukrainians. And they have clearly decided to take their destiny into their own hands. That’s also, I think, one of the messages of the surprise raid on Kursk. It will be interesting to see whether this offensive will force countries like Germany and the US to reconsider their current restrictions on the use of their weapons. The fact that North Korea allows its weapons to be used anywhere and at any time, as does Iran, should force Western policymakers to allow Ukraine to use its weapons where necessary.

Can the Ukrainian army plan new surprise operations in the coming weeks?

It is possible. The Ukrainians are extraordinarily innovative and they will have learned a lot from planning and conducting this operation on Russian territory. They have demonstrated throughout this war a great capacity for adaptation. They have learned from the failure of the offensive in the summer of 2023 and have used what they learned in the attack on Kursk. I think they will use what they are learning now for future operations. They know that they must conduct offensive operations to win this war.

What are the weak points they could hit?

It is difficult to say at this stage, it will depend on the extent of the redeployment of Russian forces, from southern Ukraine for example. Crimea or Belgorod could be weak points. One of the reasons for these offensives is to encourage the enemy to change its positions. This may reveal weaknesses that the Ukrainians will look for and could consider exploiting in the coming months.