Facts: Intelligence officer, agent or spy?
Intelligence officer: The person who, on behalf of a foreign country, has the task of obtaining information – himself or with the help of someone else. The person may be employed in the intelligence or security service of his or her home country, but often has a diplomatic service in the recipient country, a so-called “cover job”.
Agent: The person with whom the intelligence officer succeeds in establishing cooperation. The agent often has no direct connection to the foreign intelligence service, but receives his assignment from the intelligence officer.
The role of the intelligence officer is to give instructions to and to lead / operate the agent, while the agent’s role is to obtain information.
A spy, in the legal sense, is the person who, for example, obtains or discloses secret information for the purpose of obtaining foreign power.
There are also so-called dormant agents who do not enter active service as a spy for several months or sometimes even years.
About 15 states have intelligence officers on site in Sweden, according to Säpo. The threat from a foreign power has been described as heightened for several years.
Source: “Espionage and other illegal intelligence activities”, Säpo
The threat from spies seems to have increased in Europe. In the last decade, several cases of suspected espionage have attracted attention.
There are both criminal smugglers and insiders in the military recruited by Moscow, technical experts hired to hack into important networks and high-ranking bureaucrats and politicians who have passed on secret information to both Russia and China.
Espionage today takes place both more aggressively and with greater risk-taking, according to Michael Jonsson, research leader at the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI).
– It reflects a gradually deteriorating security situation. The conflict between Russia and the West has intensified, leading to increased and more aggressive espionage. But Western security services have also become more inclined to prosecute and publish cases of espionage, he says.
The top of icebergs
As recently as June, a new case became known when the Dutch intelligence service stated that they had stopped a Russian spy from infiltrating the Hague court. The man is said to have lived under a false name as a Brazilian citizen.
In Sweden, two brothers have already been investigated, one of whom is a former top manager within a government agency that also worked at Säpo and Must, for gross espionage against Sweden for ten years. And last year, a 47-year-old consultant was sentenced to prison after spying on Scania and Volvo Cars on behalf of Russia.
Three years in prison for spying against Sweden. It was the Court of Appeal’s verdict against a 47-year-old man who passed on trade secrets from Scania and Volvo Cars to a Russian intelligence officer. Stock Photography.
There are a total of 62 openly known spy cases in Europe where the people got caught between 2011 and 2021, according to an FOI report. 42 of them have been convicted of espionage.
However, this should be seen as “the tip of an iceberg”, according to report author Michael Jonsson.
No one knows how big the dark figure is – but Jonsson recalls the wave of expulsions of Russian diplomats that took place in the spring. In all, more than 300 Russians were sent home from European capitals after being accused of espionage or illegal intelligence.
Russia dominates
In the study, it is clearly Russia that is behind the largest part of all secret intelligence activities in Europe.
– That Russia is the country that accounts for the most cases in Europe is not so surprising, but that it is such an overwhelming majority of cases is still a bit surprising. In the USA, between 1990 and 2015, it was not Russia but China that was behind most cases of espionage, says Michael Jonsson.
Most active spies have been discovered in northern Europe and the Baltics, and Sweden is said to have a vulnerable geographical location in this context.
The Russian spies report to either the military intelligence service GRU, the Russian security service FSB or the civilian foreign intelligence service SVR. In the study, it is GRU and FSB that are most active.
– We do not know what it is due to. To some extent, it may be that GRU tends to have higher risk acceptance and be more aggressive, says Jonsson.
“Very confrontational”
In the last decade, there are also spectacular examples of operations believed to have been carried out by Russian intelligence services, such as the poison attack in Salisbury, the assassination attempt on a Bulgarian arms dealer and the explosion of a weapons depot in the Czech Republic.
The same unit from GRU has been designated for both Salisbury and the weapons depot.
Some have pointed out that it is strange that the GRU leaves such clear traces behind – the poison attack in Salisbury took place, for example, with the chemical weapon novitjok, which only Russia has access to.
– In general, experts have warned for quite some time that the Russian security services are acting as if they were at war, as if it were an existential struggle for Russia’s survival. This was also the case before the invasion of Ukraine.
– In the rearview mirror, one can see the actions in Salisbury and the Czech Republic as warning signals about where the Russian state was headed. It was very confrontational and open.
The same GRU unit has been singled out for having committed both the poison attack in Salisbury in 2018 and the explosion of a Czech weapons depot in 2014. Reviews have shown that their careers have been fraught with mistakes. Stock Photography distributed by British police. Bad craftsmanship
The two agents who were singled out for the deed, and who in an interview with Russian RT claimed that they were in Salisbury to “see the famous cathedral”, have been tapped for their clumsy mistakes.
– There are quite a few signs in the material that there is not a very high working height for the Russian security services’ operations all the time. You can imagine that it must be super skilfully executed, but sometimes it is simply just a bad craft, says Jonsson.
Overall, it is a rather unglamorous picture of spy life that is described in the study. The spies often receive low compensation but take enormous risks.
– You identify people who are vulnerable in different ways and use them as much as you ever can. The money is limited in relation to risk-taking and the long-term consequences.
Of the convicted spies, the one who earned the most received about three million kronor – but it was for 25 years as a Russian spy. Half of the convicts are said to have received no compensation at all, and even though there is a very small group who received more than one million kronor in compensation, most received less than 100,000 kronor.
Own insider sources
Michael Jonsson emphasizes that the study is about failed spies because everyone got stuck. Western counter-espionage may have become more effective, he speculates. Exactly how this happened is not known, but it can be about, for example, getting your own sources on the inside or successfully succeeding in cracking encrypted communication.
The spies then – have they really managed to get something important?
– We do not know what was obtained. But we know that they, for example, photographed secret documents and used couriers for deliveries abroad. However, the majority of those convicted are civilians who have not necessarily had access to classified information. However, they may have had access to sensitive or otherwise interesting information. These are, for example, employees at airlines who have copied passenger lists, or experts with expertise in technology that can be used both civilly and militarily, says Michael Jonsson.
According to Jonsson, history shows that war tends to give birth to more spies. For example, in neutral Sweden, Stockholm was a tumultuous place for spies during World War II. Today, Brussels, with all its international institutions, probably plays a similar role, writes FOI.
Take big risks
In the new situation that has arisen after the expulsions of suspected Russian intelligence officers, it may be that more spies reveal themselves, Jonsson believes. Sources are normally handled via the embassy and now many may have lost contact. At the same time, decisions are being made on arms deliveries to Ukraine and important foreign policy choices.
– So on the one hand you have limited resources, on the other hand a very great interest in collecting intelligence, which makes me believe that you will take quite large risks with the resources you have.
– I see the probability that the number of spies that are revealed increasing as quite large.
TT: Is Sweden more vulnerable today?
– Reasonably yes, given the deteriorating security situation in Europe. Of course, it is of great interest to foreign powers to collect data on Sweden’s NATO application and other defense policy choices.
The Russian embassy on Kungsholmen in Stockholm. According to Säpo, a third of the staff here are intelligence officers. That would mean 10-15 people. In April, three Russian diplomats were expelled. Stock Photography.