Michel Duclos: “Playing with the food weapon could backfire on Putin”

Michel Duclos Playing with the food weapon could backfire on

After a year of relative calm, the danger weighing on Ukrainian cereals reappears. In question: the refusal of Russia, on July 17, to renew the agreement on the export of foodstuffs in the Black Sea. “Hundreds of millions of people facing hunger will “pay the price”, denounced in the wake of the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. In one year, this agreement had allowed the delivery of 33 million tons of Ukrainian grain, exported up to 60% to Africa and Asia.

For the time being, the head of the Kremlin has made his possible return to the agreement conditional on the satisfaction of his demands “in their entirety”. Moscow is calling in particular for Russian banks and financial institutions to be reconnected to the Swift international banking system, of which they were deprived following the sanctions imposed by the West in 2022. “Putin, in my view, is taking a significant risk. the Scenarios for the future of Vladimir Putin’s regime. Interview.

L’Express: Is the Russian president using the food weapon to put pressure on Westerners?

Michael Duclos: This effectively allows him to show Westerners that he still has a lot of leeway to harm them. However, his decision to leave the grain agreement seems to me to be primarily directed against the Ukrainians. Even if his army is not in a hopeless situation, the Russian president is very worried. And the rebellion of Wagner’s boss, Evgueni Prigojine, made him realize that time is no longer necessarily on his side. Moreover, it was also weakened by this week’s attack on the Kerch Bridge, which connects Crimea to Russia.

In my opinion, Putin therefore seeks by all means to do as much harm as possible to Ukraine. Incidentally, there is also a strong economic and political dimension to this affair. The losses for Ukraine will be considerable. Russia is maximizing its position which is already very strong on the grain market. And we can bet that the new deal will benefit those close to Putin.

In doing so, is Putin holding hostage the countries of the South, facing an increased risk of famine?

Absolutely. Putin is knowingly holding hostage the countries of what is now called the Global South. There is a clear risk of aggravation of the global food crisis. And it will be all the more difficult to avoid that even with the best will in the world, Western countries do not have sufficient cereal resources to meet the demand of all the countries of the South. Foodstuffs produced by Russia and Ukraine remain indispensable in this area.

However, Putin is, in my view, taking a significant risk. I think that the benevolence shown by the countries of the south towards Russia is beginning to fade. So far, they’ve been willing to give credence to his arguments, aiming broadly to blame the West for their troubles, but this time it might be too much. A form of weariness of these countries could emerge. Moreover, the fact that Putin denounces the grain agreement, saying that Russia does not benefit from it, may be difficult to hear for countries that will be directly affected by its withdrawal. In this context, playing with the food weapon could backfire on Putin.

Why this change?

Today there is a diminishing of Putin’s aura internationally. First of all, militarily, the Russian army turned out to be much inferior to what many countries imagined. Wagner’s recent mutiny, and more generally, the degradation of the Russian system, have further reinforced an impression of hesitation. Moreover, President Putin does not give the impression of wanting peace, or seriously seeking negotiations. No one can say that Putin was more determined to negotiate than anyone else. Recently, the Americans have seemed more inclined to find a solution. And the recurring threats of the Russian regime on nuclear power are also difficult to pass in the countries of the South.

At the same time, we see that certain southern countries are being carefully courted by the United States and Europe at present, like India and its Prime Minister Modi, who was welcomed with great fanfare in Washington, as in Paris. At the same time, Putin is increasingly isolated on the international scene, including in the countries of the south. It is notable, in this regard, that South Africa finally decided to give priority to respecting its commitments under the International Criminal Court rather than welcoming Putin to the BRICS summit, which will be held in the country at the end of August. As the Russian president is the subject of an international arrest warrant, he will not be present.

When we see that Putin accuses Westerners of “blackmail”, isn’t there a form of cynicism in his attitude?

He is indeed faithful to his line of conduct: absolute cynicism. It is a cynicism that is based on a very great faith in propaganda: this idea that he can say anything, the credulity of his targets will allow him to be believed. But when your credibility goes down, and the credulity of your interlocutors goes down, it becomes more difficult to practice.

Opposite, the Westerners would have to find a way to counter-attack. For example at the United Nations, by denouncing this new attack on world food security. It’s not guaranteed that this will be enough for Putin to reverse his decision, but Westerners need to play skillfully to appear as those with good will in this crisis.

Turkey had a leading role in the negotiation of the grain agreement. Can it get involved again with a view to resolving the crisis?

We can actually imagine it. Two main options are possible for Turkey: action of force or action of persuasion. Forceful action would be to protect boats transiting to Ukrainian ports, escorting them with Turkish Navy ships. However, this does not seem to me to be the most likely scenario due to the risk of escalation with Moscow. The other option would be to try to build a coalition with the United Nations, and the countries affected by the food crisis, to put pressure on the Kremlin. However, Turkey may no longer be so well placed to play this mediating role. Indeed, Ankara did not block Sweden’s accession to NATO and supported Ukraine’s entry into the Alliance. This aroused strong dissatisfaction in Moscow.

Could China take over?

It’s a possibility. But she won’t get too visibly involved until she’s confident she can get results, so she doesn’t have to take responsibility for failure. However, a Beijing-sponsored solution could be attractive to China, especially vis-à-vis its relationship with the Europeans, who may view such involvement as a gesture of goodwill.

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