It took more than two months, following the last legislative elections, to give birth to a new government. Which, from the moment it was appointed, saw its legitimacy questioned by the left, but also by certain right-wing figures. “This is the first time in the history of our Republic that a government has no democratic legitimacy,” worried Henri Guaino, special advisor to Nicolas Sarkozy at the Élysée. A few days earlier, the malaise became a polling fact, when 74% of French people considered that by appointing Michel Barnier to Matignon, Emmanuel Macron had ignored the results of the legislative elections. Democratic denial? Ambient confusion.
The day after the elections, each of the political parties gave their own interpretation of the vote. Here is the New Popular Front declaring itself the winner, having come out on top in the seat count. The Élysée Palace, for its part, speaking of a “barycentre” of the country on the right – the “supposed” victory of the former being only the product of the Republican barrier – while the National Rally, for its part, continues to reason in terms of the number of votes obtained. And this question, between the lines, reveals these major differences of assessment and the rules of the game: in France, are elections still the arbiter of peace? Do they still allow democratic conflicts to be appeased? For the philosopher Pierre-Henri Tavoillot, this analytical confusion is the product of a groundswell, itself accentuated by the decorrelation of these legislative elections from their primary goal: “The question of the governability of the country has been dissolved in an exclusively negative debate: ‘Who should not govern?'”, he told L’Express.
L’Express: Faced with the great ambient political confusion, we finally have the impression that elections in France no longer fulfill their function as “justice of the peace”. Is this a turning point under the Fifth Republic?
Pierre-Henri Tavoillot: We need to take a step back. The political configuration is particular, and I am not convinced that elections are definitively doomed. Nevertheless, they have been structurally slipping for some time for three reasons. The competition between polls gives the illusion of a real-time mapping of opinion. Social networks also cultivate another illusion: they suggest that we can easily capture “the noises of the people”. Finally, there is a kind of demonetization of elections through activism strategies: for a citizen, it seems much more effective to win a case through a grand gesture – politicians are, unfortunately, often more receptive to this – than by slipping a ballot into the ballot box.
In the medium term, Emmanuel Macron has accentuated the phenomenon by exercising a form of mistreatment on electoral logic. During his first term, he championed the “moralization of political life”, a disastrous episode in my opinion because it implied that the Republic was immoral and that all elected officials were corrupt – Bayrou, at the head of this system, himself paid the price. The convening of the Citizens’ Convention on Climate also blurred the electoral pattern, implying in turn that parliamentarians were not the real people. Finally, in 2022, the President of the Republic did not campaign for his re-election when he had to boost his legitimacy: the political strategy paid off, but it is not respectful of citizens, as evidenced by the staggering uncertainty after his victory. Finally, in the very short term, the very recent dissolution has created a traffic jam of elections on extremely varied subjects, while for the legislative elections the only question that prevailed was the following: “Who should govern us?”
The trials of illegitimacy of Michel Barnier’s government are flourishing on the left, but also on the right when figures like Henri Guaino believe that it has “no democratic legitimacy”. The malaise has also become a polling fact: 74% of French people believe that Emmanuel Macron did not take into account the results of the legislative elections. What does this feeling, real or supposed, of democratic anomaly reveal?
It reveals that the main question of the legislative election, at the heart of democracy in my opinion, was not asked at any time during the campaign. The question of the governability of the country was dissolved in an exclusively negative debate: “Who should not govern?” There was therefore a triple negative campaign, anti-Macron, anti-New Popular Front, and anti-National Rally. It is a strict political conjuncture at this time, I do not believe it is definitive, because the consecration of the citizen will return for sure. But in the extremely divided configuration in which we find ourselves, the situation is absolutely disastrous. The only perspective, in my eyes, is the wait for other elections.
The only legitimacy of the government today, which is not negligible, is that there must be a government. The difficulty in forming it was enormous, its durability remains uncertain, given the extent of the blunders three days after its appointment. The French may well think that it does not match the results of the ballot boxes, but would they prefer that there be no government at all? Legality is not legitimacy, and from this point of view, Emmanuel Macron respected the law, so there is no democratic scandal in terms of institutions. Especially since the parties and other political alliances, like the NFP, which are leading this trial of illegitimacy would, once in power, be confronted with the same accusations. Because the situation also reveals that, deep down, no one won these elections.
Can a government regain legitimacy after elections? It is unlikely that Michel Barnier will ask for the confidence of parliamentarians… But by what other means could he and his executive be democratically rehabilitated?
I am not very optimistic about this matter. The only reason for me to be optimistic is the Prime Minister’s negotiating ability, whose qualities we have seen during the Brexit negotiations, to get a budget voted for France. At the very least, the French could appreciate the loyal effort of a head of government to find compromises, although in view of the current situation, this is not the political minimum that we need. The tragedy of the situation deserves, in my opinion, to be made public: the more it is said, the more the French will become aware of it, and the more the Prime Minister’s efforts will be perceived as meritorious, and probably paying off. It is a kind of leveling down. With a major difficulty: the diagnosis of the French disease is not at all shared by the entire political spectrum. In other words, on the decisive issues, there is no agreement but rather a frank disagreement. There are those who consider the issues of debt, security and immigration to be completely secondary, and those who make them a priority.
This is what makes, in finethe biggest flaw: the crisis of democracy is not a crisis of representation. In this case, the Assembly is much more representative than before with three very divided blocs. The real heart of the democratic malaise is a crisis of public power. The image that politicians, although they perceive all the problems, are powerless in the face of all the issues. A feeling of total impossibility, which can be found at all levels of democracy. There is no other way, it is through action that one must prove oneself.
The various political parties have expressed interested readings of the election results: Emmanuel Macron reasons in terms of “barycentre”, the RN in terms of number of votes, the NFP in quantity of seats… What reading should be favored to reconcile these differences of appreciation, and really understand “what the French said” on June 30 and July 7?
The question is not simple. Indeed, the actors themselves have a radically different interpretation of the outcome of this election. The problem was more or less similar during the yellow vest crisis, where more horizontality was demanded; during the Covid-19 pandemic also where this time there was a demand for verticality. In this case, the divergence of assessment of the last election reveals an admiring flexibility of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. In the light of the republican tradition, there was indeed a democratic anomaly when Emmanuel Macron refused to appoint Lucie Castets. But the situation is different if we reason by awareness of impossibility – when we cannot demonstrate what we are saying but any opposite demonstration produces an absurd effect – and not in terms of an ideal.
None of these interested and partisan readings are entirely judicious. What the French said is the great misunderstanding of the French themselves: they forgot that the purpose of the legislative elections was to form a government. This is the idea induced by the various campaigns and the dissolution, contributing to their voting more against the possible access to power of a political party.
François Bayrou believes that this election “did not designate any winners” or “first place”, stating that the first place of the New Popular Front was in reality the victory of “all those who did not want the National Rally”. Is it the role of politicians to interpret the invisible reasons for the vote?
It is not the role of politicians to do this, indeed. But they will always do it! The issue is to know which narrative will win. We may not give them credit for doing this, but it also reveals that the election is no longer the arbiter of peace. It is a little irresponsible, but everyone does it: Mélenchon was the first, on the evening of July 7, to react by saying that he had come out on top. In this period, political leaders of all sides must, responsibly, be careful about the words they use. Some statements have political effects that can be harmful. Above all, there is a form of performative in the initiative, and this is also the meaning of politics: “saying is doing”, hence the temptation to win the battle of the narrative in the absence of triumphing at the ballot box.
In other words, should the Republican front contribute to biasing the reading of the results of this election, or should we take the vote for what it is in a two-round single-member majority vote: the preference for one candidate over another?
I was personally opposed to the Republican barrier: the moral posture is a negation of politics, and makes the reconquest of the 11 million RN voters all the more complex. In reality, it seems to me all the more harmful for democracy, because it denies the kratos and therefore prevents governing. The reason is simple and stems from a striking paradox: the observation of public powerlessness gives rise to more public powerlessness.
The citizen, aware of this flaw, protests against public impotence and makes it more powerless by opting for “outside the system” political offers, which contribute to the weakening of the State. It is a kind of vicious circle where the problem is fueled by a solution that is frantically sought.
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